That is indeed one scenario. I don't know how many lives you've had in
Internet years (I've got more than twenty), but you have a general idea.


On Sat, 2 Dec 2000, dnsadmin wrote:

> 
> That was rather long winded. I hope people didn't skip over it after they
> got down to the 5th or 6th paragraph. :)
> 
> Basically someone that registers a domain, and unlawfully lists a victim's
> nameservers and technical contact information can cause:
> 
> a) several administrative threats and complaints about the registrant to be
> incorrectly addressed to the victim who owns the nameservers or is listed as
> the tech contact
> 
> b) can cause the victim's ip block to be denied access to other networks
> 
> -----------
> 
> Basically, it works like this:
> 
> 1. Domain horder registers "example.com" and puts a Victim's tech contact
> and nameservers on the domain
> 
> 2. Domain horder sends out tons of spam saying "example.com" is available to
> be purchased for $5,000 if anyone wants it
> 
> 3. People get upset, do a WHOIS on "example.com" and flame the tech contact
> and block the ip blocks that the nameservers sit on
> 
> 4. Victim sysadmin gets ton of complains, threats, and their network is
> blocked by several, and they are left cleaning up a mess that they are 100%
> not guilty for..
> 
> Is this correct?
> 
> 
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> > [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]On Behalf Of PacificRoot.com
> > DomReg Svcs.
> > Sent: Saturday, December 02, 2000 6:51 PM
> > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> > Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> > Subject: nefarious and unscrupulous registrants... (fwd)
> >
> >
> > oopsie. left out an "S" in discuss.
> >
> > ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> > Date: Sat, 2 Dec 2000 18:40:16 -0800 (PST)
> > From: PacificRoot.com $5.00 and Free DomReg Svcs. <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> > Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> > Subject: nefarious and unscrupulous registrants...
> >
> > A friend of mine who operates an ISP in Florida came to me with a question
> > regarding some notorious entity (I do not know who the registrant is).
> > that is an OpenSRS registrant.
> >
> > She states that she has received several administrative threats and
> > complaints about the registrant, since her nameservers are listed as auth
> > for the domain at whois.opensrs.net and this is something that many of you
> > I am sure have not been around long enough to remember - so I'll spell it
> > out.
> >
> > Back when Internic was in Sandy Eggo, and even after that for some time,
> > but especially then, you had to demonstrate that you had at least two NS's
> > on preferably separate packet switched networks answering AUTH for a
> > domain BEFORE you could register it. The enforecement of this STANDARD
> > ceased at some point (that was stupid), which is part of the reason that
> > speculators, ransomers, and cybersquatters came into prominence.
> >
> > How many people here remember the days when providers would register a
> > domain for you (for free they said, and then you would get the bill from
> > NSI)? That still worked within the model because they would set up the
> > NS's (and your website- which is what they were in business for) and you
> > would have nameservers answering auth. The registrant's provider would be
> > correctly listed as the tech contact, since it was their provider's BIND
> > boxes.
> >
> > I've had trouble with this for so long it's not even funny. But that's
> > beside the point. Because the user is too stupid or lazy to educate
> > themselves about something they have no business participating in unless
> > they do actually educate themselves, we now have a model where anyone can
> > register a domain that goes NOWHERE. and poor administrator's
> > nameserver -
> > possibly unbeknownst to them - is listed in the database's contact
> > information.
> >
> > Notwithstanding the appaerent obviousness that I have finally succumbed to
> > accept this, especially since if we enforced the standards which are still
> > in effect the domain might not still be available by the time you set up
> > the NS's and go back to register the doman, it is WRONG that we turn a
> > blind eye and permit villains to list the nameservers of innocent admins
> > who are unaware and leave them without recourse to initiate revocation
> > proceedings for the registration(s) of these nefarious registrants.
> >
> > Screw the registrants privacy, let them get a PO BOX and answering
> > service, or subscribe to a privacy bureau so that an effective method of
> > contacting them is secured, yielding a non-fruadulent contact record
> > (Apologies if I sound a bit like Marie Antoinette).
> >
> > We have, by not adhering to well imposed standards, shaken hands with a
> > demon known by the name of "Complete Disregard". This villain's ability to
> > list my friends nameservers is the reason that she is threatened with the
> > potential blocking by several other networks and I want to know what it is
> > that we can do here with TUCOWS to initiate and secure the revocation of
> > domains belonging to such calculated and unscrupulous abusers (frauds).
> >
> > 1.) Please list the steps which one can follow (even if she is not an
> > OpenSRS reseller) to have these domain registrations revoked.
> >
> > 2.) Please preserve confidence wrt our commitment to excellence by
> > enforcing at least this aspect of the standards (revocation of domain
> > registration due to fraudulent registrant information).
> >
> > 3.) And please, let's talk about instituting an operationally viable
> > system of "POST REG NS VERIFICATION" that will enforce the requirement of
> > nameservers in whois to answer AUTH for a domain - I would suggest, say, a
> > week or so following registration that nameservers must answer auth or the
> > registrant forfeits the domain registration w/o refund.
> >
> >     a.) it's not hard to do.
> >
> >     b.) it's been done in the past (especially in europe)
> >
> >     c.) it's a variation on what we're supposed to be enforcing
> > anyway.
> >
> >
> > I know I don't spend a lot of time here in this list, but I AM one of the
> > first of Tucows OpenSRS resellers that ever went online, and I think that
> > this experience should serve to convey that I have SOME experience in this
> > sector.
> >
> > So Once again, how do we make the revocation of domain regsitrations with
> > fraudulent contact info easy and accessable for people like my friend that
> > has been damaged (Monetarily mind you) by the way our system has been
> > implemented?
> >
> > Sincerely,
> >
> >
> > Bradley D. Thornton
> > CTO: The PacificRoot / Joint Technologies Ltd.
> > [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> > http://www.PacificRoot.com
> > http://www.Jointtech.com
> >
> >
> >
> 

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