On Fri, Apr 24, 2009 at 1:17 AM, Samuel Klein <[email protected]> wrote: > > I think that a much broader swath of modern interpretation of > 'copyright' is primitive, scale-limiting, and counteproductive to its > original intent, but there's nothing about this particular wrinkle > that I find worrisome in a novel way. (and focusing on trivia to the > exclusion of real problems can derail movements for years)
I agree that criticism of this feature should be tied to a more general critique. > Rob Myers writes: > >> The particular control being protested against here prevents the book >> being read using text-to-speech. So even if it was true that some >> forms of control of texts do not affect reading, this one definitely >> does. > > No more than the Kindle in general 'prevents the book from being used > to distribute digital copies of texts'. Distribution is not use. This is similar to the difference between positive and negative freedom. But the Kindle could be used *to* distribute, so I agree that this is an issue whichever way you look at it. And this means that both are examples of the freedom to read being restricted. > In particular, your Kindle I don't own a kindle. ;-) > does indeed parse and process text, just as it does connect to the > internet and know how to transfer files. It simply doesn't let you > run certain operations (such as 'copy this and file and email it to my > aunt' or 'use the built in tts converter and read it out loud'). "Simply not letting" is control. >>> Considering how deeply many free software orgs have delved into >>> various ways to modify and prohibit certain types of reuse, >> >> If they did so then their software would not qualify as free. > > I agree with your statement, under 'reasonable' definitions of "free". > The FSF definnition does not qualify, for instance. The FSF's definition of freedom is reasonable for non-teleological definitions of "free". Both public domain dedication and the BSD licence are free under the FSF's definition. Copyleft is a useful addition which protects that freedom, but it is not the definition of that freedom. (Although I personally think it is the best way of ensuring it.) > To the contrary, copyleft, including FSF "freedom", requires the full > strength of copyright-law-backed restrictions on reuse, Free use of software requires the neutralization of copyright on software. But copyright law cannot be neutralized without using copyright law. If copyright law went away tomorrow, the need for and mechanism of copyleft would go with it. Copyleft is an ironization of copyright, it is a legal judo throw that uses copyright's own strength against it. > for a minimum > of life+70 years. Some copyleft supporters would use infinite-term > copyleft if it were available. Crosbie Fitch always tells me off if it even looks like I am going to treat copyleft as an end in itself, and I am worried about OpenStreetMap trying to use "share-alike" for data, so I do recognize that the desire to use legal hacks to protect freedom can become counter-productive. > This imposing definition applied to a > very unimposing word (and held up as the standard for free sharing of > knowledge) is something I find rather offensive... If you are objecting to copyleft going too far, I agree that people can try to take it too far. >> Both groups must consider copyright law as a factor in achieving their >> desired outcome but free software does so in order to protect the >> freedom to use software rather than to remove the freedom to read. >> Protecting and attacking freedom are not the same thing. > > Free software protects the right of the author to indefinitely and > granularly restrict future use of a work. It protects the freedom of > the author at the expense of the freedoms of reusers. It protects everyone equally. > Designers of auto-text-to-speech restrictions protect the right of the > author to granularly restrict future use of a work; again protecting > this specific freedom of the author at the expense of the freedom of > reusers. The "freedom" to control others is not freedom, it is control. > Defining the freedoms protected and those restricted in each > situation is a good exercise; you may prefer one bundle of freedoms to > the other, but they are similar in form. The fact that two opposing objectives can be realized using the same methods does not make them similar *except* formally. Similarity of form is not similarity of content. >> Copyleft is not viral, nothing can catch a copyleft license through >> mere proximity. > > Standard copyright and copyleft are both viral. If we must use that metaphor then copyleft is the attenuated version of the virus required to vaccinate against copyright. But I'd say that "heritable" is a better description. > You have to work at > it to make a license that fits within Copyright that is /not/ viral. > We can argue about what 'proximity' means, but in our gangly, > adolescent concept of copyright, all of the following are sufficient > proximity to pick up such a virus, [even though for instance many do > not involve significant creative alteration]: If copyright is such a problem, then it needs neutralizing as effectively as possible. Neutralizing copyright requires use of the law, because copyright is a legal construct. The relevant area of law here is license law. Since it is, as you point out, difficult to make an effective copyright license without heritability, the most effective way of neutralizing copyright is with a heritable license. This is what copyleft is. - Rob. _______________________________________________ Discuss mailing list [email protected] http://freeculture.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/discuss
