(Please still consider it to be RFC only, I need to modify the uspace teststuite
again due to changes in key_string format. Also the changes to dm-crypt 
documentation
will follow before final submit. Feature wide I'd consider the patch being 
complete
unless any bugs would emerge)

The kernel key service is a generic way to store keys for the use of
other subsystems. Currently there is no way to use kernel keys in dm-crypt.
This patch aims to fix that. Instead of key userspace may pass a key
description with preceding ':'. So message that constructs encryption
mapping now looks like this:

  <cipher> [<key>|:<key_string>] <iv_offset> <dev_path> <start> [<#opt_params> 
<opt_params>]

where <key_string> is in format: <key_size>:<key_type>:<key_description>

Currently we only support two elementary key types: 'user' and 'logon'.
Keys may be loaded in dm-crypt either via <key_string> or using
classical method and pass the key in hex representation directly.

dm-crypt device initialised with a key passed in hex representation may be
replaced with key passed in key_string format and vice versa.

(Patch is based on original work by Andrey Ryabinin)

Signed-off-by: Ondrej Kozina <okoz...@redhat.com>
---
 drivers/md/dm-crypt.c | 167 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 148 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c b/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
index 0aedd0e..f4189ca 100644
--- a/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
+++ b/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/key.h>
 #include <linux/bio.h>
 #include <linux/blkdev.h>
 #include <linux/mempool.h>
@@ -29,6 +30,7 @@
 #include <crypto/md5.h>
 #include <crypto/algapi.h>
 #include <crypto/skcipher.h>
+#include <keys/user-type.h>
 
 #include <linux/device-mapper.h>
 
@@ -140,6 +142,7 @@ struct crypt_config {
 
        char *cipher;
        char *cipher_string;
+       char *key_string;
 
        struct crypt_iv_operations *iv_gen_ops;
        union {
@@ -1490,29 +1493,138 @@ static int crypt_setkey_allcpus(struct crypt_config 
*cc)
        return err;
 }
 
-static int crypt_set_key(struct crypt_config *cc, char *key)
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+static int crypt_set_keyring_key(struct crypt_config *cc, const char 
*key_string)
 {
-       int r = -EINVAL;
-       int key_string_len = strlen(key);
+       char *new_key_string, *key_desc;
+       int ret;
+       struct key *key;
+       const struct user_key_payload *ukp;
 
-       /* The key size may not be changed. */
-       if (cc->key_size != (key_string_len >> 1))
+       /* look for next ':' separating key_type from key_description */
+       key_desc = strpbrk(key_string, ":");
+       if (!key_desc || key_desc == key_string || !strlen(key_desc + 1))
+               return -EINVAL;
+
+       if (strncmp(key_string, "logon", key_desc - key_string) &&
+           strncmp(key_string, "user", key_desc - key_string))
+               return -EINVAL;
+
+       new_key_string = kstrdup(key_string, GFP_KERNEL);
+       if (!new_key_string)
+               return -ENOMEM;
+
+       /*
+        * FIXME: are there any key descriptions we should disallow users
+        * from loading to dm-crypt? i.e.: kernel keys starting with '.'
+        */
+
+       key = request_key(strncmp(key_string, "user", 4) ? &key_type_logon : 
&key_type_user, key_desc + 1, NULL);
+       if (IS_ERR(key)) {
+               kzfree(new_key_string);
+               return PTR_ERR(key);
+       }
+
+       rcu_read_lock();
+       ret = key_validate(key);
+       if (ret < 0)
                goto out;
 
-       /* Hyphen (which gives a key_size of zero) means there is no key. */
-       if (!cc->key_size && strcmp(key, "-"))
+       ukp = user_key_payload(key);
+       if (cc->key_size != ukp->datalen) {
+               ret = -EINVAL;
                goto out;
+       }
+       memcpy(cc->key, ukp->data, cc->key_size);
+
+       rcu_read_unlock();
+       key_put(key);
 
        /* clear the flag since following operations may invalidate previously 
valid key */
        clear_bit(DM_CRYPT_KEY_VALID, &cc->flags);
 
-       if (cc->key_size && crypt_decode_key(cc->key, key, cc->key_size) < 0)
-               goto out;
+       ret = crypt_setkey_allcpus(cc);
 
-       r = crypt_setkey_allcpus(cc);
-       if (!r)
+       /* wipe the kernel key payload in each case */
+       memset(cc->key, 0, cc->key_size * sizeof(u8));
+
+       if (!ret) {
                set_bit(DM_CRYPT_KEY_VALID, &cc->flags);
+               kzfree(cc->key_string);
+               cc->key_string = new_key_string;
+       } else
+               kzfree(new_key_string);
+
+       return ret;
+out:
+       rcu_read_unlock();
+       key_put(key);
+       kzfree(new_key_string);
+       return ret;
+}
+
+static int get_key_size(char **key_string)
+{
+       char *colon, dummy;
+       int ret;
+
+       if (*key_string[0] != ':')
+               return strlen(*key_string) >> 1;
 
+       /* look for next ':' in key string */
+       colon = strpbrk(*key_string + 1, ":");
+       if (!colon)
+               return -EINVAL;
+
+       if (sscanf(*key_string + 1, "%u%c", &ret, &dummy) != 2 || dummy != ':')
+               return -EINVAL;
+
+       *key_string = colon;
+
+       /* remaining key string should be :<logon|user>:<key_desc> */
+
+       return ret;
+}
+#else
+static int crypt_set_keyring_key(struct crypt_config *cc, const char *key_desc)
+{
+       return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static int get_key_size(char **key)
+{
+       return (*key[0] == ':') ? -EINVAL : strlen(*key) >> 1;
+}
+#endif
+
+static int crypt_set_key(struct crypt_config *cc, char *key)
+{
+       int r = -EINVAL;
+       int key_string_len = strlen(key);
+
+       /* Hyphen (which gives a key_size of zero) means there is no key. */
+       if (!cc->key_size && strcmp(key, "-"))
+               goto out;
+
+       /* ':' means that the key is in kernel keyring */
+       if (key[0] == ':')
+               r = crypt_set_keyring_key(cc, key + 1);
+       else {
+               /* clear the flag since following operations may invalidate 
previously valid key */
+               clear_bit(DM_CRYPT_KEY_VALID, &cc->flags);
+
+               /* wipe references to any kernel keyring key */
+               kzfree(cc->key_string);
+               cc->key_string = NULL;
+
+               if (cc->key_size &&
+                   crypt_decode_key(cc->key, key, cc->key_size) < 0)
+                       goto out;
+
+               r = crypt_setkey_allcpus(cc);
+               if (!r)
+                       set_bit(DM_CRYPT_KEY_VALID, &cc->flags);
+       }
 out:
        /* Hex key string not needed after here, so wipe it. */
        memset(key, '0', key_string_len);
@@ -1524,6 +1636,8 @@ static int crypt_wipe_key(struct crypt_config *cc)
 {
        clear_bit(DM_CRYPT_KEY_VALID, &cc->flags);
        memset(&cc->key, 0, cc->key_size * sizeof(u8));
+       kzfree(cc->key_string);
+       cc->key_string = NULL;
 
        return crypt_setkey_allcpus(cc);
 }
@@ -1561,6 +1675,7 @@ static void crypt_dtr(struct dm_target *ti)
 
        kzfree(cc->cipher);
        kzfree(cc->cipher_string);
+       kzfree(cc->key_string);
 
        /* Must zero key material before freeing */
        kzfree(cc);
@@ -1729,12 +1844,13 @@ static int crypt_ctr_cipher(struct dm_target *ti,
 
 /*
  * Construct an encryption mapping:
- * <cipher> <key> <iv_offset> <dev_path> <start>
+ * <cipher> [<key>|:<key_size>:<user|logon>:<key_description>] <iv_offset> 
<dev_path> <start>
  */
 static int crypt_ctr(struct dm_target *ti, unsigned int argc, char **argv)
 {
        struct crypt_config *cc;
-       unsigned int key_size, opt_params;
+       int key_size;
+       unsigned int opt_params;
        unsigned long long tmpll;
        int ret;
        size_t iv_size_padding;
@@ -1751,7 +1867,11 @@ static int crypt_ctr(struct dm_target *ti, unsigned int 
argc, char **argv)
                return -EINVAL;
        }
 
-       key_size = strlen(argv[1]) >> 1;
+       key_size = get_key_size(&argv[1]);
+       if (key_size < 0) {
+               ti->error = "Cannot parse key size";
+               return -EINVAL;
+       }
 
        cc = kzalloc(sizeof(*cc) + key_size * sizeof(u8), GFP_KERNEL);
        if (!cc) {
@@ -1958,10 +2078,13 @@ static void crypt_status(struct dm_target *ti, 
status_type_t type,
        case STATUSTYPE_TABLE:
                DMEMIT("%s ", cc->cipher_string);
 
-               if (cc->key_size > 0)
-                       for (i = 0; i < cc->key_size; i++)
-                               DMEMIT("%02x", cc->key[i]);
-               else
+               if (cc->key_size > 0) {
+                       if (cc->key_string)
+                               DMEMIT(":%u:%s", cc->key_size, cc->key_string);
+                       else
+                               for (i = 0; i < cc->key_size; i++)
+                                       DMEMIT("%02x", cc->key[i]);
+               } else
                        DMEMIT("-");
 
                DMEMIT(" %llu %s %llu", (unsigned long long)cc->iv_offset,
@@ -2028,6 +2151,12 @@ static int crypt_message(struct dm_target *ti, unsigned 
argc, char **argv)
                        return -EINVAL;
                }
                if (argc == 3 && !strcasecmp(argv[1], "set")) {
+                       /* The key size may not be changed. */
+                       if (cc->key_size != get_key_size(&argv[2])) {
+                               memset(argv[2], '0', strlen(argv[2]));
+                               return -EINVAL;
+                       }
+
                        ret = crypt_set_key(cc, argv[2]);
                        if (ret)
                                return ret;
@@ -2071,7 +2200,7 @@ static void crypt_io_hints(struct dm_target *ti, struct 
queue_limits *limits)
 
 static struct target_type crypt_target = {
        .name   = "crypt",
-       .version = {1, 14, 1},
+       .version = {1, 15, 0},
        .module = THIS_MODULE,
        .ctr    = crypt_ctr,
        .dtr    = crypt_dtr,
-- 
2.7.4

--
dm-devel mailing list
dm-devel@redhat.com
https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/dm-devel

Reply via email to