On Thu, Jul 12, 2018 at 10:17 PM, Kees Cook <keesc...@chromium.org> wrote:
> On Thu, Jul 12, 2018 at 9:02 AM, Arnd Bergmann <a...@arndb.de> wrote:
>> On Wed, Jul 11, 2018 at 10:36 PM, Kees Cook <keesc...@chromium.org> wrote:
>>> Several uses of AHASH_REQUEST_ON_STACK() will trigger FRAME_WARN warnings
>>> (when less than 2048) once the VLA is no longer hidden from the check:
>>> drivers/block/drbd/drbd_worker.c:325:1: warning: the frame size of 1112 
>>> bytes is larger than 1024 bytes [-Wframe-larger-than=]
>>> drivers/block/drbd/drbd_worker.c:352:1: warning: the frame size of 1120 
>>> bytes is larger than 1024 bytes [-Wframe-larger-than=]
>>> crypto/ccm.c:235:1: warning: the frame size of 1184 bytes is larger than 
>>> 1024 bytes [-Wframe-larger-than=]
>>> drivers/md/dm-crypt.c:353:1: warning: the frame size of 1096 bytes is 
>>> larger than 1024 bytes [-Wframe-larger-than=]
>>> drivers/net/ppp/ppp_mppe.c:158:1: warning: the frame size of 1168 bytes is 
>>> larger than 1024 bytes [-Wframe-larger-than=]
>>> net/wireless/lib80211_crypt_tkip.c:537:1: warning: the frame size of 1136 
>>> bytes is larger than 1024 bytes [-Wframe-larger-than=]
>>> drivers/staging/rtl8192u/ieee80211/ieee80211_crypt_tkip.c:528:1: warning: 
>>> the frame size of 1136 bytes is larger than 1024 bytes 
>>> [-Wframe-larger-than=]
>>> drivers/staging/rtl8192e/rtllib_crypt_tkip.c:531:1: warning: the frame size 
>>> of 1136 bytes is larger than 1024 bytes [-Wframe-larger-than=]
>>> This bumps the affected objects by 20% to silence the warnings while still
>>> providing coverage is anything grows even more.
>>> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keesc...@chromium.org>
>> I think this is a dangerous precedent, I wouldn't really want any of
>> those functions to
>> ever take more than 1024 bytes, even that is really too much, but we
>> can't easily
>> lower the global limit.
> The issue is that these are _already_ able to use this much stack
> because of the VLA. It was just hidden from the FRAME_WARN checks.

Yes, of course.

>> You are patching all users of AHASH_REQUEST_ON_STACK with the exception of
>> arch/x86/power/hibernate_64.c here (which is always used on 64-bit and has
>> a larger limit already), which in turn suggests that the 
>> macro using bytes is just fundamentally broken by requiring that much space
>> (808 bytes for the context, plus 8 pointers for struct ahash_request, plus
> Yes -- it's huge. That's always been true, unfortunately.
>> How did you come up with that 808 byte number? I see a total of 39 callers
>> of crypto_ahash_set_reqsize(), did you check all of those individually?
>> If 808 bytes is the worst case, what are the next 5 ones? If there are only
>> a few of them that are badly written, maybe we can fix the drivers instead
>> and lower that number to something more reasonable.
> That was discussed a bit (maybe not enough?) in the next patch:
> https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/10520407/
> I used tcrypt (which examines all sane combinations) and sha512
> produces the 808 number. I had done an earlier manual evaluation of
> all crypto_ahash_set_reqsize() callers but Herbert and Eric pointed
> out issues with my methodology (namely that things can be recursively
> stacked (I had calculated too low) but some things will never be
> stacked together (so some pathological conditions will never happen)).
> So I moved to the tcrypt instrumentation approach, which tests
> real-world combinations.
> For example, reaching this 808 size is trivially easy to do right now
> by just asking for dm-crypt to use a cipher of
> capi:cbc(aes)-essiv:sha512.

Ok, but is there anything that can be done to the sha512
implementation to lower that number? E.g. if a significant chunk
of struct sha512_hash_ctx is only used to hold temporary data,
could it be replaced with e.g. a percpu buffer?
>> The other ones I looked at seem to all be well under 400 bytes (which is
>> still a lot to put on the stack, but probably ok).
> I wish sha512 was "rare", but it's not. :(

Looking at the callers of crypto_ahash_set_reqsize(), it appears
that the only instance that is so bad is specifically
arch/x86/crypto/sha512-mb/sha512_mb.c, which is architecture
specific, and only one of multiple implementations of sha512.

Am I misreading that code, or does that mean that we could get
away with using the 808 byte limit only on x86 when
CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA512_MB is enabled, but using a smaller
limit everywhere where else?

> So: mainly the crypto VLA removal is about exposing all these giant
> stack usages. We can work to fix them, but I want to get these fixed
> so we can add -Wvla to the kernel to avoid more being added (we've had
> at least 2 added during this linux-next cycle already).
> IMO, we're much better off with this stack usage _actually_ being
> checked (even with a 20% bump) than staying entirely hidden (as it's
> been).

Yes, definitely. You may recall that I spent several months tracking
down all drivers that grew to insane stack usage when CONFIG_KASAN
was enabled, so we could again turn on the existing stack check
in an allmodconfig build in order to find the normal regressions, so
I'm definitely all for improving both the actual usage and the kind
of diagnostic we have available.

I mainly want to ensure that we have tried anything within reason
to reduce the stack usage of the AHASH_REQUEST_ON_STACK()
users before we resort to changing the warning limit. I'm not
convinced that everything has been tried if we have 808 byte


dm-devel mailing list

Reply via email to