Looping back about this. Currently openarc only supports relaxed canonicalization for the ARC Message Signature.
On closer inspection, https://tools.ietf.org/html/ draft-ietf-dmarc-arc-protocol-03#section-5.1.2 and https://tools.ietf.org/ html/draft-ietf-dmarc-arc-protocol-03#section-5.1.2.1.2 do *not* appear to be in direct contradiction of each other. 5.1.2 states that AMS header canonicalization must be relaxed, and 5.1.2.1.2 says that AMS body canonicalization must respect the c= value. Is this what was intended (AMS headers=relaxed, body=[c value]), and should be included in the proposed draft? Or should the entire AMS (headers and body) respect the c value and both specs be updated? Seth On Wed, May 10, 2017 at 12:34 AM, Brandon Long <[email protected]> wrote: > > > On Tue, May 9, 2017 at 3:56 PM, Gene Shuman <[email protected]> wrote: > >> I've taken a look at the proposed draft and have a few notes as well. >> >> 4. The currently specified limits on i= are not included MUST >10, >> SHOULD > 50, etc >> >> 5.1 - In the current draft, it's mandated that AMS must use relaxed >> header canonicalization, but that's missing from the proposed draft >> > > I think that 5.1.2 in the current draft is wrong, it's overridden by > 5.1.2.1.2. > We started out only allowing relaxed, but then added back support for c= in > a later draft. > > Brandon > > 5.2 - I'm a bit confused by the comment noting the importance of i=2. >> What is it that you're intending there? >> >> 5.3.1 - typo: one of three possible values: -> one of *four* possible >> values >> >> 7.2 - It may be worth elaborating more on the possible ways in which >> cv=invalid can arise, if not here, maybe somewhere else >> >> 7.4 - In general I prefer this to the psuedo code in the current draft, >> but I think it could still use a bit of work. In particular, sections C-H >> are exactly describing how to validate a DKIM signature and seems somewhat >> unnecessary. Is there any particular reason you decided to include this, as >> opposed to just relying on the DKIM spec for this? >> >> 7.5 - typo: no -> all >> >> In general though, I agree with Brandon, the proposed draft definitely >> makes some things clearer, which I think is a step in the right direction. >> >> =Gene >> >> >> On Tue, May 9, 2017 at 2:04 PM, Brandon Long <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> In 5.1 defining the AMS, you say that it should cover DKIM-Signature and >>> AuthRes headers. In particular, AuthRes headers are expected to be removed >>> by ADMDs, especially if the message transits the same ADMD multiple times. >>> Also, the information in the AuthRes header is superseded by the ArcAuthRes >>> header. Including it means an arbitrary AMS breakage for something pretty >>> minor, so I would recommend to not include it. >>> >>> Our implementation explicitly blacklists that header. >>> >>> I know some mailing lists also strip the DKIM-Signature header, but >>> since they are likely to break the AMS anyways, that's less important. I'm >>> not sure what the benefit is to including it, but it seems harmless. In >>> particular, if the DKIM-Signature still passes, then the ARC isn't adding >>> that much, and removing the DKIM-Signature header doesn't mean all that >>> much either since it's validity was already assessed and that assessment >>> included in the AAR. We don't blacklist the DKIM-Signature method in our >>> implementation, but I don't understand the advisement. >>> >>> You also talk about "responsibility". I'm not sure that's how I would >>> describe it. An ARC hop is documenting that a message passed through it, >>> and that it evaluated the authentication of the message. The only >>> responsibility of a hop is to correctly validate the SPF/DKIM/ARC >>> information, there is no ownership implied over the message itself. >>> >>> With AMS, you can answer the question: which ADMD is the last ADMD to >>> have modified the message. I guess in that sense, the last modifier is >>> "responsible" for the current state of the message... but that kind of >>> means that the AMS of previous hops allows them to disown responsibility >>> for the current state of the message... >>> >>> 5.2 - should we point out that there should be only one of these per >>> hop? The openspf/dkim/dmarc implementations tend to add separate AuthRes >>> headers for each evaluation, but ARC requires those to be a single instance. >>> >>> 5.3.1 - none as defined as "arrives at an MTA from an MSA", perhaps my >>> understanding of those terms is slightly odd, but I would think that an MSA >>> usually uses an MTA to actually send the message, and it isn't that >>> "sending" MTA that's the first hop, it should be the first "receiving" >>> MTA. I mean, that's usually the point at which the DKIM signature is >>> applied, and the SPF would be "from" there, not based on the location of >>> the MUA. >>> >>> There are some missing pieces here, corresponding to the current draft >>> sections 5.4 (alternate signing algorithms), 6.4.3 (arc email >>> authentication method for AuthRes), 6.4.5 for dmarc xml. I see that the >>> arc is included in your IANA section, not sure if the call out outside of >>> the definition is necessary or not. >>> >>> Overall, I think your draft makes some things clearer, and some things >>> in the original are clearer. It's worth looking into either combining or >>> choosing. >>> >>> >>> Brandon >>> >>> On Thu, May 4, 2017 at 12:56 AM, Murray S. Kucherawy < >>> [email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> Colleagues, >>>> >>>> As I progress (slowly, alas) toward completing my sample implementation >>>> of OpenARC, I've found myself taking a lot of notes about the current >>>> draft. This has helped me make progress; in some cases it became things I >>>> posted to the list, and in others it was just to help or confirm my >>>> understanding of the protocol. >>>> >>>> I have developed this enough to become a fairly comprehensive >>>> alternative text to the current draft. I find the layout of this version >>>> to flow better for my own purposes, and in a few places I've tried to >>>> clarify some of the material by rewriting chunks of it. None of this is >>>> meant to assert that the current draft is deficient; I've just found it to >>>> be a helpful exercise for me. >>>> >>>> I offer it here to the WG as a contribution; the WG of course is free >>>> to use some, all, or none of it as it wishes. >>>> >>>> http://blackops.org/~msk/draft-kucherawy-dmarc-arc-base.txt >>>> >>>> If it would be more helpful to post this as an I-D, please let me know. >>>> >>>> -MSK >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> dmarc mailing list >>>> [email protected] >>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dmarc >>>> >>>> >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> dmarc mailing list >>> [email protected] >>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dmarc >>> >>> >> > > _______________________________________________ > dmarc mailing list > [email protected] > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dmarc > > -- [image: logo for sig file.png] Bringing Trust to Email Seth Blank | Head of Product for Open Source and Protocols [email protected] +1-415-894-2724 <415-894-2724>
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