Hello Douglas,

RFC 7372 describes these status codes.  To my knowledge these are not used.

SPF helps on DMARC with MTAs, which cannot include DKIM signature under circumstances (e.g in bounces). In all othercases SPF does not provide added value to DKIM.

If you want errors about failed DKIM validation, remove the SPF records, set DMARC policy reject and scan your logs for rejected messages to see on which messages DMARC/DKIM have failed.

Regards
  Дилян

----- Message from "Douglas E. Foster" <[email protected]> ---------
    Date: Sat, 25 May 2019 15:42:57 -0400
    From: "Douglas E. Foster" <[email protected]>
Reply-To: [email protected]
 Subject: [dmarc-ietf] Improving feedback using additional status codes
      To: [email protected]


The genius of DMARC, as compared to DKIM and SPF alone, is the feedback
component.   Unfortunately, sender authentication remains challenged by
these issues:
        Limited deployment of DMARC feedback between senders and receivers.
                Significant levels of SPF and DKIM validation errors, on 
legitimate
mail, even when indirect mail is not involved.  Handling false positives
becomes a significant obstacle to implementation of Sender Authentication
by receivers.
                When the sender has not implemented DMARC, the recipient has 
difficulty
communicating with the sender about Sender Authentication problems.
Finding a knowledgeable employee is difficult and time consuming, so it
will rarely be attempted.  (And I have tried it.)
 I propose two improvements to deal with this issue.  The first is to
define another feedback mechanism using message reception status code.
The second is intended to reduce DKIM verification errors, and will be
posted later.

 PROPOSAL

 When a recipient detects an SPF or DKIM problem, it can provide immediate
feedback to the sender with message status codes.  I think these are a
complete list of the conditions which would need a result status defined.
The approach should be entirely upward-compatible with the existing
infrastructure.

  Message Success with SPF warning
        Accepted despite SPF=NONE & Source IP not in MX list        Accepted 
despite
SPF=NEUTRAL     Accepted despite SPF=SOFTFAIL   Accepted despite SPF=FAIL
        Accepted despite SPF TempError  Accepted despite SPF PermError
 Message PermFail because of SPF
        Rejected because of SPF=NONE & Source IP not in MX list     Rejected
because of SPF=NEUTRAL  Rejected because of SPF=SOFTFAIL        Rejected because
of SPF=FAIL     Rejected because of SPF TempError       Rejected because of SPF
PermError
 Message TempFail because of SPF
        TempFail due to SPF TempError

  Message accepted despite DKIM
        Accepted despite DKIM PermError         Accepted despite DKIM TempError
 Message PermFail because of DKIM (not recommended)
        Rejected because of DKIM PermError      Rejected because of DKIM 
TempError
 Message TempFail because of DKIM
        TempFail because of DKIM TempFail

 Since DMARC evaluation is based on SPF and DKIM evaluated together, the
above codes would seem applicable even with DMARC enforcement.   I think
these additional codes should be sufficient:
        DMARC PermError (invalid policy record)         DMARC TempError (problem
retrieving policy record.)
 Is this reasonable?

 Doug Foster


----- End message from "Douglas E. Foster" <[email protected]> -----


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