On Sun, Jan 31, 2021 at 3:02 PM John Levine <[email protected]> wrote: > In article <[email protected]> you write: > >Rate limiting usually implies a number of buckets. They are managed by > >imposing limits per time periods, which can be either server-global or > per > >bucket. Normally, for MSA usage, one has one bucket per user. I have > never > >implemented failure reporting, but I'd guess buckets may vary. Besides > the > >signing domain (which determines the report consumer), the receiving > address, > >the sender and the spam flag may deserve their own buckets. > > The only one that matters for DMARC reporting is the recipient > address, since the purpose of rate limiting is to avoid overloading > the recipient mail system. I wouldn't worry about trying to send a > "representative" set of reports. > > Keep in mind that very few people send failure reports at all. >
My experience is that most failure reports are provided through private channels where there are contractual agreements in place to deal with potential privacy and legal issues. This may be through intermediaries or direct between the parties (sending organization and receiving organization). Understand that the DMARC effort came about because the original participants felt it was useful in the private exchange of information between senders and receivers. We felt it was better as an open standard rather than as a private club. >From my perspective it is unfortunate that we can't seem to find a way to implement a system where failure reports are available other than through private channels. In my > experience few of them are useful. Most of mine are ordinary mailing > list messages where the failure is not surprising and does not mean > that anything needs to be fixed. > I disagree with John about failure reports not being useful. I have found failure reports to be extremely useful in anti-abuse efforts. The value can range from takedowns of images and links to maliciousness to shutting down sources of maliciousness.In some cases it has proven useful to law enforcement as documentation of activities. Unfortunately, I think addressing some of this has to be beyond the scope of the current effort. Michael Hammer
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