This risks sendability with the fact that there are a lof of receivers that 
require SPF-RRs. So not providing SPF-RRs also fails with such an requirement. 
Besides that does SPF not help with any kind of 5322.From spoofing, but this 
ist he most important identifier for an enduser.

/ Tobias Herkula

Senior Product Owner Mail Security
Mail Application Security

1&1 Mail & Media GmbH | Mitte | 10115 Berlin | Deutschland
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Von: dmarc <dmarc-boun...@ietf.org> Im Auftrag von Seth Blank
Gesendet: Montag, 14. Juni 2021 19:45
An: Brotman, Alex <Alex_Brotman=40comcast....@dmarc.ietf.org>; dmarc@ietf.org
Betreff: Re: [dmarc-ietf] Sender-supplied decision matrix for passing DMARC

HUGE cringe ;-) DMARC has an explicit policy that either SPF or DKIM must pass 
aligned. This proposal breaks that foundationally.

This is suggested quite frequently, but fails to understand just how few 
senders of email actually send with DKIM. Most email is sent from services that 
have a core business that's not in email, and when we're lucky, they manage to 
publish an SPF record for their customers to use. Only large volume 
sophisticated services tend to do DKIM.

A domain owner that requires everything that sends on its behalf to use DKIM 
basically shoots itself in the foot, and makes most of the services they'd need 
to use unavailable to themselves.

The correct answer is what you said: domain owners who want this should only 
authenticate services using DKIM.

Seth


On Mon, Jun 14, 2021 at 10:10 AM Brotman, Alex 
<Alex_Brotman=40comcast....@dmarc.ietf.org<mailto:40comcast....@dmarc.ietf.org>>
 wrote:
Hello,

I was talking to some folks about DMARC, and a question came as to suggest as 
the domain holder that your messages should always pass DKIM.  Effectively, the 
asker wants to say "I intend to deploy SPF and DKIM, but I will *always* sign 
my messages with DKIM."  So the obvious answer may be "Just only use DKIM", but 
I'm not sure that completely answers the question.  While discussing with 
someone else, "Tell me when DKIM fails, but SPF is fully aligned".  There was 
recently an incident at a provider where they were allowing any sender to send 
as any domain (and I'm aware that's not specifically a DMARC issue).  We all 
know brands that have just dumped in a pile of "include" statements without 
fully understanding the implications.  In this case, other users could send as 
other domains, but perhaps they would not have been DKIM signed.  Should there 
be a method by which a domain holder can say "We want all message to have both, 
or be treated as a failure", or "We'll provide both, but DKI
 M is a must"?

>From a receiver side, it makes evaluation more complex.  From a sender side, 
>it gives them more control over what is considered pass/fail.

How does this look in practice?  Maybe 
"v=DMARC1;p=quarantine;rua=...;pm=dkim:must,spf:should;"
(pm=Policy Matrix)

Does this make everyone cringe, or perhaps worth a larger discussion?

--
Alex Brotman
Sr. Engineer, Anti-Abuse & Messaging Policy
Comcast

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