It appears that Ted Wham <[email protected]> said: >-=-=-=-=-=- > >DMARC allows a policy ("p") value of none, quarantine, or reject. According to >DMARC.org, as of Q2 >2022 just under 20% of all DMARC implementations chose the reject policy >(source: >https://dmarc.org/stats/dmarc/). However, for that subset of all DMARC >adopters, obviously those >businesses are certain that they have correctly identified and signed each of >their legitimate email >sources and that any other source of email that fails authentication is >definitionally unauthorized. >So why not alert the senders of these bad messages that they might have an >open relay that has been >hijacked for spam purposes by sending a message to the Abuse alias at the >originating domain for >failed messages?
DMARC aggregate reports have always included both messages that are aligned and those that are not. The few places that send failure reports send the ones that are not. FYI, in my experience the failures are 99.9% due to legit mail sent in ways that DMARC cannot describe and 0.1% open relays. R's, John _______________________________________________ dmarc mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dmarc
