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In message <[email protected]>, Alessandro
Vesely <[email protected]> writes

>On Thu 14/May/2026 23:56:08 +0200 Richard Clayton wrote:
>> In message 
>> <CAH48Zfy=jTP3VA_WwYDcEm=BE4hzhOqywSGFwZNDqCzYq=+=o...@mail.gmail.com
>>, Douglas Foster <[email protected]> writes
>> [...]
>>>    * DKIM2 requires recipient email filters to maintain a list of 
>>>      trusted mailing lists, so that those DKIM2 transforms can be 
>>>      accepted.   This also has been difficult to achieve to date.
>> 
>> I expect that mailbox providers will apply heuristics as the type (and 
>> scale) of recipes that they will deem appropriate. Note that the 
>> exploded flag allows identification of mailing lists, which current 
>> systems do not do  (yes, I know about List-* header field, but I have 
>> done enough analysis of what is seen on incoming email at scale to know 
>> that they are of little practical use at that scale)
>
>
>This is where I lose track of the reasoning.  How can a protocol rely on 
>unspecified heuristics to decide whether to override a domain's published 
>policy?

receivers can do whatever they wish ... when this is likely to affect
interworking we draw attention to this by mentioning "local policy" in
the protocol specification

>Let me connect this to the upcoming DMARC update. It says that domains whose 
>users post to mailing lists "SHOULD NOT publish p=reject".  That is clearly a 
>limitation.  However, the use of SHOULD rather than MUST suggests that the 
>mailing-list problem is expected to become solvable eventually.

SHOULD is not a forwarding looking statement ... 

   This word, or the adjective "RECOMMENDED", mean that there
   may exist valid reasons in particular circumstances to ignore a
   particular item, but the full implications must be understood and
   carefully weighed before choosing a different course.

>Now consider a message from a domain publishing p=reject.  The message is 
>exploded by a mailing list and modified in transit.  The mailbox provider must 
>then decide, precisely, whether to accept or reject it.

quite so

>I do not see how f=exploded changes the situation fundamentally.

it allows the mailbox provider to apply a different set of heuristics
than they would do otherwise

>  It can be 
>asserted as arbitrarily as List-Id:, and it does not establish that the 
>modified message still preserves the semantics of the author's signed text. 

this is true but does not seem to have much to do with ARC

- -- 
richard @ highwayman . com                       "Nothing seems the same
                          Still you never see the change from day to day
                                And no-one notices the customs slip away"

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