On 31/05/2026 23:35, Richard Clayton wrote:
Douglas Foster <[email protected]> writes
Email authentication seeks to establish these things:
Curiously, none of the listed objectives involves alignment with the
RFC5322.From domain. Yet since DMARC introduced a mechanism for the
RFC5322.From domain owner to express disposition preferences in the
presence of identifier misalignment, I would have expected alignment to
appear among the primary goals of email authentication.
Yet the DKIM component of DMARC implicitly assumes that local
policy will trust a signature created by a downstream server as
equally valid with a signature created by the originating
organization. To my understanding, DKIM2 expects to preserve the
assumption that a signature's validity is independent of when it
is created.>
that is correct ... the signature merely demonstrates that a system was
in possession of the relevant private key and that the entire contents
of the message was available to it (I suppose strictly, that it is in
possession of the hash values for the header and body and is able to add
a header field to the message). You might like to note that DKIM2
expresses things in this manner and avoids language suggesting claims of
trust or ownership
W.r.t. DMARC, signatures by intermediaries do not have the same value as
signatures from the author's domain. I'm not clear whether DKIM2 aims
to solve the mailing-list problem and, if so, how.
AFAICS, the most likely outcome is that From: munging will persist,
while receivers that trust a mailing list will reverse the munging,
possibly using DKIM2-based mechanisms.
In other words, From: munging becomes a de facto forwarding protocol:
hack and counter-hack. How receivers acquire the trust required to
apply the counter-hack remains a local policy issue.
BTW: I don't see why it would matter to anyone that organisations
regularly outsource the signing of their email. $DAYJOB$ outsources
sending their daily newsletter to a third party who applies a DKIM1
signature -- the public key is published under $DAYJOB$.net which is
entirely under $DAYJOB$'s control and writing to that space is forbidden
to anyone else.
Fully agreed. This is both the strength and the weakness of
domain-level authentication. If a signing agent behaves foolishly, that
becomes a characteristic of the domains that choose to deploy it.
Best
Ale
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