On 31/05/2026 23:35, Richard Clayton wrote:
Douglas Foster <[email protected]> writes

Email authentication seeks to establish these things:


Curiously, none of the listed objectives involves alignment with the RFC5322.From domain. Yet since DMARC introduced a mechanism for the RFC5322.From domain owner to express disposition preferences in the presence of identifier misalignment, I would have expected alignment to appear among the primary goals of email authentication.


Yet the DKIM component of DMARC implicitly assumes that local policy will trust a signature created by a downstream server as equally valid with a signature created by the originating organization. To my understanding, DKIM2 expects to preserve the assumption that a signature's validity is independent of when it is created.>
that is correct ... the signature merely demonstrates that a system was in possession of the relevant private key and that the entire contents of the message was available to it (I suppose strictly, that it is in possession of the hash values for the header and body and is able to add a header field to the message). You might like to note that DKIM2 expresses things in this manner and avoids language suggesting claims of trust or ownership


W.r.t. DMARC, signatures by intermediaries do not have the same value as signatures from the author's domain. I'm not clear whether DKIM2 aims to solve the mailing-list problem and, if so, how.

AFAICS, the most likely outcome is that From: munging will persist, while receivers that trust a mailing list will reverse the munging, possibly using DKIM2-based mechanisms.

In other words, From: munging becomes a de facto forwarding protocol: hack and counter-hack. How receivers acquire the trust required to apply the counter-hack remains a local policy issue.


BTW: I don't see why it would matter to anyone that organisations regularly outsource the signing of their email. $DAYJOB$ outsources sending their daily newsletter to a third party who applies a DKIM1 signature -- the public key is published under $DAYJOB$.net which is entirely under $DAYJOB$'s control and writing to that space is forbidden to anyone else.

Fully agreed. This is both the strength and the weakness of domain-level authentication. If a signing agent behaves foolishly, that becomes a characteristic of the domains that choose to deploy it.


Best
Ale
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