Paul Vixie writes: > i think you mean "we have heard no reports of incidents caused by stale > data"?
I meant it as I said it, but appreciate the distinction you are trying to make. Many organizations have a formal distinction of what an incident is. If it wasn't reported (for expansive values of "reported"), it wasn't an incident. > if the real problem is "ttl's are too short" It isn't. This doesn't address legitimate needs organizations have for short TTLs -- which are not only, of course, CDNs like my employer. It also doesn't at all address the issue that even with a very long TTL, data do eventually expire without the resolver being able to refresh. > or "rdns servers should save and restore their cache across > restarts" This also is not the issue, though it is one that I've worked on separately. The heart of the problem is authorities becoming unavailable, usually through administrative error in our experience, and not inherently a problem in the caches. > violating other people's reasonable assumptions meanwhile shouldn't > be an option. For what it's worth, the "TTLs are inviolable" ship sailed long ago. Both ends of the TTL are already monkeyed with by local policy across the Internet. BIND has had max-cache-ttl for a very long time. Web browsers similarly for a very long time have kept local caches with minimum TTLs that the vast majority of people are not even aware. > see also: [2]<http://queue.acm.org/detail.cfm?id=1242499>. Great article. Thanks for writing it. _______________________________________________ dns-operations mailing list [email protected] https://lists.dns-oarc.net/mailman/listinfo/dns-operations dns-jobs mailing list https://lists.dns-oarc.net/mailman/listinfo/dns-jobs
