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+1 for short RRSIG times and the discipline it enforces. We went down this
path when building DNSSEC for Route 53, ZSK signatures are on the order of 10
hours:
hilander.com<http://hilander.com>. 3599 IN RRSIG DNSKEY 13 2 3600
20210210090000 (
20210209230000 38680 hilander.com<http://hilander.com>.
3H3QZt3qC2XbqkbumqsvRVeVrtgJVVRVGC/TZkc7vMuN
IdlL/wZrw+qBfYaSOex7dOp2PUP7pwW+NUgCXc2F7Q== )
A bunch of risks with this approach that needs to be mitigated, especially
around static stability in the face of an issue with the ZSK signing process.
But all solvable. As part of this we also automated ZSK rotation (which
happens less often, but still on the order of once a week).
On Feb 8, 2021, at 9:27 PM, Paul Vixie
<p...@redbarn.org<mailto:p...@redbarn.org>> wrote:
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On Mon, Feb 08, 2021 at 01:45:06AM -0500, Viktor Dukhovni wrote:
...
I do not recommend either X.509 certificate or RRSIG lifetimes quite
this long. Shorter lifetimes IMHO promote better discipline.
for my own zones i think i'm using one year signatures and regenerating them
from "cron" once per week -- just to be safe. so, not better discipline unless
you deliberately _live_ on the edge, which i think is an unwise practice.
i expect i'll crib together some bourne shellack to check my whole signature
chains and warn me when there's less than 72 hours remaining in any validity
period. going into SERVFAIL like this is an operational risk i shouldn't take.
--
Paul Vixie
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