Hi, Phillip, You are right. In order to make this solution work securely and efficiently. Except the issues you mentioned, the key rollover schemes for both client and recursive server should be designed. BR, Zhiwei
在 2015-03-11 20:26:13，"Phillip Hallam-Baker" <[email protected]> 写道： >The proposal is a reasonable approach and not overly complex. The question >that concerns me though is how the client authenticates the resolver. Without >authentication, encryption is useless because you could be having the >conversation with Mallet. > > >Using DNSSEC for that is problematic since the credentials in DNSSEC are >designed to be ephemeral. Even PKIX certs, limited to 60 months becomes a real >problem. And both approaches have circular dependency issues. > > >Another concern that I have is that the protocol has to protect resolver hosts >from a Denial of Service attack. That means that the hosts cannot perform any >function that provides an attacker with 'leverage' unless the request passes >authentication first. > > > > >So the first thing I think is necessary in any proposal is to separate out the >problem of how the client-resolution service context is established from the >mechanism used to enhance the DNS packets. The second part of the proposal is >very straightforward. A simple framing scheme using the tools already present >in the TLS toolkit can be devised and implemented in few hours. Supporting >parallel UDP and TCP or even UDP and HTTPS schemes is not a major overhead. > > >The hard part is how you decide to set up the initial relationship between the >client and the resolver and how long you want it to last. _______________________________________________ dns-privacy mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dns-privacy
