On Sun, Mar 08, 2015 at 11:28:00PM -0700,
 [email protected] <[email protected]> wrote 
 a message of 41 lines which said:

>         Title           : Evaluation of Privacy for DNS Private Exchange
>         Authors         : Aziz Mohaisen
>                           Allison Mankin
>       Filename        : draft-am-dprive-eval-00.txt

I tried to apply the methodology to qname minimisation but only had a
partial success:

Eval(Qname_minimisation (algo=aggressive, qtype=ns),
   System_Settings([R], [R-A]),  
   Attacker_Model(Type-2, A),    
   Privacy_Mechanism{
           Mechanism_name = Qname_minimisation
           Parameters{
               Algorithm = aggressive,
               Qtype_used = NS
          }
       },
   System_settings{
       Entities = R 
       Links = R-A
   }, 
   Attacker_model{
       Type = Type-2
       Compromised_entities = A // The attacker controls the auth. server
       Links = R-A    // And/or can sniff the link
   }
   Privacy_guarantee =  unlinkability
   Privacy_measure =  a complicated function of the depth of A (root
   name servers will see less information than TLD servers) and of the
   length of the original name (if the original qname was only two
   labels long, the TLD servers will have exactly the same
   information as before qname minimisation). TODO: add also the
   qtype in the equation.

   Return privacy_guarantee, privacy_measure

}

It seems that defining the actual privacy measure will be more
complicated than with the existing examples.

Some of them seem a bit optimistic. For instance:

Eval(TLS_enc (SHA256, ECDSA, port 53, uniform, NA),
...
Attacker_Model(Type-1B, S-R)). {
...
Privacy_measure (unlinkability) = 1

The way I read it, it means an attacker on the link from stub to
resolver would have zero linkability between two DNS requests. Philip
Hallam-Baker already mentioned the case
<https://github.com/bortzmeyer/my-IETF-work/issues/5> of the info you
can get just by observing the *length* of requests (something that
TLS_enc does not hide).

I also question the terminology "Compromised_Entities". From a privacy
point of view, it is irrelevant if the authoritative servers is
managed by people who willingly send data to the NSA (or the FSB or
the PLA or the DGSE) or if it is compromised by cyberwarriors of one
on the above agencies. The result is the same. We should use the
vocabulary of RFC 6973 ("Observers")

I do not really understand what you have to indicate in
System_Settings, and [syntax] see why we have to repeat things like
System_Settings and Attacker_Model. Allison will probably explain that
at the DPRIVE meeting in one hour :-)

Also, having a syntax to add comments in the formal text would be nice
:-) I decided to use //

_______________________________________________
dns-privacy mailing list
[email protected]
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dns-privacy

Reply via email to