I also read the thread at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/dns-privacy/p0SpGpLBAXZYJhgS3zXWwHBBlw0 and found it interesting background.
On 7/9/19, 10:15 PM, "Tom Pusateri" <[email protected]> wrote: This is relevant to the Push Notification draft we’re trying to wrap up. In the last paragraph of section 4, it says: Not all types of DNS queries are safe to be sent as early data. Clients MUST NOT use early data to send DNS Updates ([RFC2136]) or Zone Transfers ([RFC5936]) messages. Servers receiving any of those messages MUST reply with a "FormErr" response code. There isn’t a reason or reference for this claim of not being safe. Can the authors expand on this? Thanks, Tom > On Jul 9, 2019, at 9:10 PM, Livingood, Jason <[email protected]> wrote: > > Just read it - very interesting! Is the bottom line essentially don't do DNS+TLS-1.3+0-RTT? Basically, since 1-RTT isn't a big performance problem, why take the risk of 0-RTT? > > JL > > On 7/6/19, 12:50 PM, "dns-privacy on behalf of Alessandro Ghedini" <[email protected] on behalf of [email protected]> wrote: > > Hello, > > On Sat, Jul 06, 2019 at 09:19:41AM -0700, [email protected] wrote: >> A new version of I-D, draft-ghedini-dprive-early-data-01.txt >> has been successfully submitted by Alessandro Ghedini and posted to the >> IETF repository. >> >> Name: draft-ghedini-dprive-early-data >> Revision: 01 >> Title: Using Early Data in DNS over TLS >> Document date: 2019-07-06 >> Group: Individual Submission >> Pages: 5 >> URL: https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ghedini-dprive-early-data-01.txt >> Status: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ghedini-dprive-early-data/ >> Htmlized: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ghedini-dprive-early-data-01 >> Htmlized: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ghedini-dprive-early-data >> Diff: https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ghedini-dprive-early-data-01 >> >> Abstract: >> This document illustrates the risks of using TLS 1.3 early data with >> DNS over TLS, and specifies behaviors that can be adopted by clients >> and servers to reduce those risks. > > I've been looking for information about using TLS 1.3 0-RTT with DoT, but all I > could find was a discussion from over a year ago on the mailing list: > https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/dns-privacy/LKZeOAj7Y4fC-9hRcbX_4KVWu0Y > > So I wrote this document to try and document potential risks as well as capture > requirements for DoT implementations deciding to add support for 0-RTT (RFC8446 > in Appendix E.5 says that "Application protocols MUST NOT use 0-RTT data without > a profile that defines its use). > > Most of the wording comes from RFC8470 and some content from the mailing list > discussion mentioned above, though there are still some things that need to be > filled in or expanded. > > In this new revision I expanded some of the sections as well as included some > editorial fixes. > > The draft is maintained on GitHub at: > https://protect2.fireeye.com/url?k=7c610da3-20850368-7c612a17-000babff3540-3079629bacc8ac33&u=https://github.com/ghedo/draft-ghedini-dprive-early-data > > Would be interested to know what people think about this. > > Cheers > > _______________________________________________ > dns-privacy mailing list > [email protected] > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dns-privacy > > > _______________________________________________ > dns-privacy mailing list > [email protected] > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dns-privacy _______________________________________________ dns-privacy mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dns-privacy
