(I changed the subject because this has turned into a solution conversation, instead of a use case conversation)
On Tue, 2020-08-11 at 21:49 -0400, Paul Wouters wrote: > On Mon, 10 Aug 2020, Peter van Dijk wrote: > > > On Thu, 2020-08-06 at 23:04 -0400, Paul Wouters wrote: > > > In the case of encrypted DNS to authoritative servers, those servers > > > obviously can have an cryptographic ID based on FQDN. > > > > This is not obvious. It would be great if it was; but it isn't. > > Sorry, I did not realise it was not obvious to everyone, so let me > clarify: > > _853._dot.ns0.nohats.ca. IN TLSA <blob> > _443._doh.ns0.nohats.ca. IN TLSA <blob> Yes, that part seems obvious (if we assume the records live with the child, which I guess is obvious from your 'national MITM' argument in other threads). Many other aspects are not obvious. Some examples follow. Delegation NS records are not signed, so do we stick -those- (or a hash of the NSset perhaps?) into DS? Can we find those TLSA records without leaking the names of the name servers we are looking for, or do we decide that name server names are not a privacy leak? Do we move delegation-revalidation from 'possibly later' to 'always do that first', so that we get signed NS records before we look for TLSA? Do we expect resolvers to issue a couple of TLSA queries per NS before getting to the actual end user's question? 'Put TLSA records in your zone' is not a protocol. I'm sure we can define a protocol that revolves around TLSA, but your description is not yet it. That is what I mean by 'this is not obvious'. > This uses the unique FQDN of each nameserver's name. You can have > multiple TLSA records if you use different keys on some of your > nameservers (eg some outsourced to an ANYcloud provider) Assuming you use vanity names in the outsourcing (i.e. ns5.nohats.ca is actually a CloudFlare name server). If you don't use vanity names, the scaling mentioned just below comes for free because the outsourced operator would own the TLSA records (i.e. nohats.ca IN NS paul.cloudflare.com). > Note that this scales with the nameserver. For example by publishing the > above, the libreswan.org domain would also have dot/doh published as it > is using the same nameservers. This, to me, is the main selling point of tying key publication to NS names instead of zone names. Kind regards, -- Peter van Dijk PowerDNS.COM BV - https://www.powerdns.com/ _______________________________________________ dns-privacy mailing list dns-privacy@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dns-privacy
