> On 9 Mar 2022, at 17:41, Martin Duke via Datatracker <[email protected]> wrote:
> 
> Martin Duke has entered the following ballot position for
> draft-ietf-dprive-dnsoquic-10: No Objection
> 
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> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> COMMENT:
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> 
> Thanks for this draft! It was very easy to read.

Hi Martin,

Many thanks for the comments - please see the updates in version -11 which was 
just published, which we hope address your comments.

> 
> (4.3) says:
> 
> "Using QUIC might allow a protocol to disguise its purpose from devices on the
> network path using encryption and traffic analysis resistance techniques like
> padding. This specification does not include any measures that are designed to
> avoid such classification."
> 
> but then Sec 6.4 has a detailed, normative discussion of how to use padding to
> avoid classification. I suggest you delete or edit the bit in 4.3.

We’ve update the last sentence to be:
“This specification does not
 include any measures that are designed to avoid such classification --
 the padding mechanisms defined in {{padding}} are intended to obfuscate the 
specific
 records contained in DNS queries and responses, but not the fact that this is 
DNS traffic."

> 
> (5.3.1) Clients are allowed to send STOP_SENDING and servers are allowed to
> send RESET_STREAM. Servers sending STOP_SENDING break the connection. Given 
> the
> prescriptiveness of these rules, it's odd that you don't address clients
> sending RESET_STREAM. IMO this should be allowed, but either way it should be
> specified.

We’ve added an additional paragraph at the end of this section to try to 
address this - please review.

> 
> (6.5.4) and (9.4) I hesitate to write this, as Christian is as well aware as
> anyone, but IMO QUIC address migration is not quite as privacy-destroying as
> this draft suggests. RFC9000 has a number of normative requirements to reduce
> linkability, and work is ongoing to reduce it further. Granted, no
> anti-linkability mitigation is perfect, and if this is a primary goal of DoQ
> it's OK to discourage migration as you've done here.

As I think you discussed with Christian, the issue being addressed is actually 
about disclosing the client location to the server.

Best regards

Sara. 
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