On 28/08/17 17:27, Christian Kujau wrote:
On Mon, 28 Aug 2017, Christian Kujau wrote:
On Mon, 28 Aug 2017, Kevin Darbyshire-Bryant wrote:
My workaround is to only call memset if the difference between buffer begin
and buffer limit is bigger than the query length, thus it retains Simon's
intent of clearing memory most of the time but avoids the SIGSEGV trampling.
Thanks, with your patch dnsmasq doesn't crash anymore when receiving odd
EDNS packets from dnseval.
Here is a fix rather than my sticking plaster workaround. My workaround
patch would actually allow dnsmasq to generate invalid replies, this
actually *fixes* the problem!
>From 38af9b1ac3242a4128e88069c495024caa565f0e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kevin Darbyshire-Bryant <ke...@darbyshire-bryant.me.uk>
Date: Tue, 29 Aug 2017 12:35:40 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] forward.c: fix CVE-2017-13704
Fix SIGSEGV in rfc1035.c answer_request() line 1228 where memset()
is called with header & limit pointing at the same address and thus
tries to clear memory from before the buffer begins.
answer_request() is called with an invalid edns packet size provided by
the client. Ensure the udp_size provided by the client is bounded by
512 and configured maximum as per RFC 6891 6.2.3 "Values lower than 512
MUST be treated as equal to 512"
The client that exposed the problem provided a payload udp size of 0.
Signed-off-by: Kevin Darbyshire-Bryant <ke...@darbyshire-bryant.me.uk>
src/forward.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/forward.c b/src/forward.c
index f22556a..62c5a5a 100644
@@ -1408,6 +1408,8 @@ void receive_query(struct listener *listen, time_t now)
defaults to 512 */
if (udp_size > daemon->edns_pktsz)
udp_size = daemon->edns_pktsz;
+ if (udp_size < 512)
+ udp_size = 512; /* RFC 6891 6.2.3 */
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