Dear ADs,
this is a request to publish
"Preventing Use of Recursive Nameservers in Reflector Attacks"
draft-ietf-dnsop-reflectors-are-evil-04.txt
as a Best Current Practice RFC. This is a DNSOP work item.
Please find below the PROTO questionnaire.
Thanks,
Peter
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(1.a) Who is the Document Shepherd for this document? Has the
Document Shepherd personally reviewed this version of the
document and, in particular, does he or she believe this
version is ready for forwarding to the IESG for publication?
Peter Koch (==me) is the Document Shepherd for this document.
I have read the latest version (-04) of the draft and believe it
is ready for consideration by the IESG.
(1.b) Has the document had adequate review both from key WG members
and from key non-WG members? Does the Document Shepherd have
any concerns about the depth or breadth of the reviews that
have been performed?
The draft has undergone in-depth review in the DNSOP WG and has
been brought to the attention of various other DNS operational fora.
Reviews are available from the DNSOP archive in response to the WGLC
<http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/dnsop/current/msg04814.html>
There are no concerns about the depth or breadth of reviews.
(1.c) Does the Document Shepherd have concerns that the document
needs more review from a particular or broader perspective,
e.g., security, operational complexity, someone familiar with
AAA, internationalization, or XML?
There are no such concerns.
(1.d) Does the Document Shepherd have any specific concerns or
issues with this document that the Responsible Area Director
and/or the IESG should be aware of? For example, perhaps he
or she is uncomfortable with certain parts of the document, or
has concerns whether there really is a need for it. In any
event, if the WG has discussed those issues and has indicated
that it still wishes to advance the document, detail those
concerns here. Has an IPR disclosure related to this document
been filed? If so, please include a reference to the
disclosure and summarize the WG discussion and conclusion on
this issue.
There are no IPR or similar issues with this document.
(1.e) How solid is the WG consensus behind this document? Does it
represent the strong concurrence of a few individuals, with
others being silent, or does the WG as a whole understand and
agree with it?
The WG had good consensus in favour of the document, its intended
status and the recommendations it makes. Some WG members were
uncomfortable with the focus being constrained to "recursive servers",
leaving open the (ab)use of authoritative servers in similar or other
attack scenarios. Given the state of the art separation of
recursive and authoritative name servers and the particular problem
that triggered writing of this document, the WG supports this
going forward knowing that it does not address all potential
amplification issues caused by large DNS responses.
(1.f) Has anyone threatened an appeal or otherwise indicated extreme
discontent? If so, please summarize the areas of conflict in
separate email messages to the Responsible Area Director. (It
should be in a separate email because this questionnaire is
entered into the ID Tracker.)
The judgement made by the WG to address the specific attack
scenario observed in early 2006 was not supported by all WG members
(see separate note).
(1.g) Has the Document Shepherd personally verified that the
document satisfies all ID nits? (See
http://www.ietf.org/ID-Checklist.html and
http://tools.ietf.org/tools/idnits/.) Boilerplate checks are
not enough; this check needs to be thorough. Has the document
met all formal review criteria it needs to, such as the MIB
Doctor, media type, and URI type reviews? If the document
does not already indicate its intended status at the top of
the first page, please indicate the intended status here.
The draft has passed the ID nits test 2.04.12 at
<http://tools.ietf.org/wg/dnsop/draft-ietf-dnsop-reflectors-are-evil/draft-ietf-dnsop-reflectors-are-evil-04.nits.txt>.
This document is aimed at BCP status.
(1.h) Has the document split its references into normative and
informative? Are there normative references to documents that
are not ready for advancement or are otherwise in an unclear
state? If such normative references exist, what is the
strategy for their completion? Are there normative references
that are downward references, as described in [RFC3967]? If
so, list these downward references to support the Area
Director in the Last Call procedure for them [RFC3967].
The references are split into normative/informative and there
are no downrefs.
(1.i) Has the Document Shepherd verified that the document's IANA
Considerations section exists and is consistent with the body
of the document? If the document specifies protocol
extensions, are reservations requested in appropriate IANA
registries? Are the IANA registries clearly identified? If
the document creates a new registry, does it define the
proposed initial contents of the registry and an allocation
procedure for future registrations? Does it suggest a
reasonable name for the new registry? See [RFC2434]. If the
document describes an Expert Review process, has the Document
Shepherd conferred with the Responsible Area Director so that
the IESG can appoint the needed Expert during IESG Evaluation?
The document does not require IANA action, which is what the IANA
considerations section says.
(1.j) Has the Document Shepherd verified that sections of the
document that are written in a formal language, such as XML
code, BNF rules, MIB definitions, etc., validate correctly in
an automated checker?
N/A
(1.k) The IESG approval announcement includes a Document
Announcement Write-Up. Please provide such a Document
Announcement Write-Up. Recent examples can be found in the
"Action" announcements for approved documents. The approval
announcement contains the following sections:
Technical Summary
This document describes ways to prevent the use of recursive
nameservers as reflectors in Denial of Service (DoS) attacks.
It makes recommendations to both operators and vendors (for
default configurations).
Working Group Summary
The document was started in reaction to the "DNS reflection attacks"
widely published in early 2006. While the basic direction was
clear from the beginning, it needed some discussion to agree upon
a recommendation of the more sophisticated and less widely deployed
querier authentication mechanisms (TSIG and SIG(0)).
Document Quality
After the February 2006 DNS amplification attacks, several surveys
have discovered varying, but huge numbers of DNS resolvers on the
Internet willing to respond to DNS queries of arbitrary origin.
At least two vendors of DNS recursive servers (full resolvers)
have announced to (or do already) follow the recommendations made
in this document by adjusting their default ACLs.
Personnel
Peter Koch acted as the document shepherd.
Ron Bonica reviewed this document for the IESG.
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