Dean Anderson wrote: > On Sun, 24 Aug 2008, Dean Anderson wrote: > > >> Ok. But when you resign using arbitrary data controlled by the >> attacker, the private key can be obtained. [There is a crypto attack on >> rekeying] OOPS!!. Rekeying is out of the question for, say, .com, .net, >> etc. I guess you didn't know that. >> > > Correction: The above should say there is a crypto attack on re-SIGNing. > ReKEYing is fine. Apologies for the confusion I just created. >
You say there is a crypto attack on re-signing. One using arbitrary data provided by the attacker - what is the "arbitrary" data, as opposed to some other kind of data? (e.g. If the data being signed were limited to valid public key data that might, for example, be possible to itself be validated before signing)? Can you provide a reference to back up this assertion? Thanks, Brian _______________________________________________ DNSOP mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop
