At 1:48 PM -0400 5/12/09, Olafur Gudmundsson wrote:
>At 22:30 29/04/2009, Paul Hoffman wrote:
>>At 8:13 PM +0200 4/22/09, Peter Koch wrote:
>>>Please review the draft and send comments and/or statements of support or
>>>non-support to the WG mailing list.
>>>There will be a five reviewer threshold.
>>
>>I support the publication of this document. Some comments:
>>
>>Section 2: "Using a DS format is also recommended because it is smaller than 
>>the DNSKEY format and is easier to enter manually, either by typing or 
>>cutting and pasting." I don't know of anyone who can accurately type Base64 
>>for more than a few bits worth. I agree that cut-and-paste of Base64 for DS 
>>is easier than for a DNSKEY.
>
>DS has base16 format which is easier than Base64 for typing and visual
>inspection.

The sentence in the doc is specifically about typing. Typing hex may be easier 
than typing Base64, but it is also more tedious and probably about as 
error-prone.

>>Section 3: "Priming can occur when the validating resolver starts, but a 
>>validating resolver SHOULD defer priming of individual trust anchors until 
>>each is first needed for verification." I disagree with this as a SHOULD; 
>>"may want to" is much more appropriate. I see nothing wrong with wanting to 
>>get the first round of crypto out of the way at startup.
>
>Good point,
>How about s/SHOULD/MAY want to/ ?

No, s/SHOULD/may want to/. There is no interoperability or security reason for 
using 2119-style language here.

>>Section 3: "Following are the steps a validating resolver SHOULD take to 
>>prime a configured trust anchor:". What do you propose they do if they don't 
>>follow the SHOULD? All four of those steps feel pretty damn required.
>
>I have no problem upgrading them all to MUST but we got pushback on that
>in earlier version:

Understood. However, if you have this as SHOULD, you need to explain when the 
reader is allowed to not do one or more of the steps. Leaving it to the 
reader's imagination is a sure-fire way to have them choose incorrectly.

>>Section 4, "Trusted update mechanism": "This mechanism is realistically only 
>>feasible for updating a small number of trust anchors, such as for the 
>>top-level domains." That statement is conjecture unsupported by facts. What 
>>is so hard about doing this for a few thousand trust anchors? The queries 
>>will be spread over hours (if not weeks). Maybe remove the sentence, or 
>>soften it.
>
>If vendor X is willing to become a TAR for large number of domains that is
>fine, I think we assumed (possibly incorrectly) that vendors were not in the
>TAR business.

>From the traffic I have seen on the various DNSSEC lists, that is definitely 
>an incorrect assumption. In fact, some people have pushed the notion that 
>distribution of DNSSEC trust anchors by the software vendors is likely to be 
>more stable than other choices. As much as I hate to admit it, that rings true 
>to me.

>For example how quickly will Apple be able to push out a new set of TA's
>to the millions of clients they have?

Apple can decide that for themselves. They already push out much larger 
software updates, as do most software vendors. Even a "large" TAR is probably 
smaller than many software updates that we all live with today.

--Paul Hoffman, Director
--VPN Consortium
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