At 14:45 22/04/2009, Edward Lewis wrote:
At 20:13 +0200 4/22/09, Peter Koch wrote:
>this is to initiate a working group last call on
>
>        "DNSSEC Trust Anchor Configuration and Maintenance"
>       draft-ietf-dnsop-dnssec-trust-anchor-03.txt
>
>ending Friday, 2009-05-08, 23:59 UTC.  The tools site gives easy access to
>diffs and such under
> <http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dnsop-dnssec-trust-anchor-03>.


I keep forgetting this bit of document jockeying - can an Informational use
RFC 2119 terms in a normative way?

...
#3.  Trust Anchor Priming
   ...
#  3.  Verify that the DNSKEY RR corresponding to the configured trust
#      anchor (i.e., the DNSKEY whose hash is configured) appears in the
#      DNSKEY RRSet and that this DNSKEY RR has the Zone Key Flag
#     (DNSKEY RDATA bit 7) set.  (This bit only indicates that the
#      DNSKEY is allowed to sign the zone.  This DNSKEY may or not be a
#      zone signing key.)

Last sentence? - "This DNSKEY might not be a zone a zone signing key.")

But I'm not sure what is meant. At first the paragraph reads - make sure the Zone Key Flag is set and later says it "may or [may] not be a zone signing key."

Do you mean that "this" key could be a "key signing key?"

We are trying to say that the key can be both KSK and ZSK but does not
have to be.

How about: "this DNSKEY might also be a zone signing key"?


#  4.  Verify that the DNSKEY RRSet is signed by one of the DNSKEYs
#      found in the previous step, i.e., that there exists a valid RRSIG
#      (cryptographically and temporally) for the DNSKEY RRSet generated
#      with the private key corresponding to the DNSKEY found in the
#      previous step.

And here, are you saying that "this DNSKEY RR"'s private companion has to sign the key set for all this to work? In step three you refer to a singular ("this") key, in step four it is plural ("is signed by one of the").

you are right step 3 should be plural as well.



...
#  For this reason, old trust anchors SHOULD be removed from a
#  validating resolver's trust anchor list soon after the corresponding
#  keys are no longer used by the zone, as described in RFC 5011
#  [RFC5011].

Recommend that the priming be done often enough to capture revoked
DNSKEY RR's - so that the zone doens't have to keep them indefinitely.

Well RFC5011 requires you scan at least once a month, and recommends higher
frequency, is that sufficient?


# 4.  Trust Anchor Maintenance
#
#   Trust anchors correspond to zones' key signing keys and these keys do

 <keeping the terminology clean>

Trust anchors *could* be zone signing keys. Still I think you want this here - SEPs? Is that what is meant?

Same as above KSK and ZSK can be one key. There is no requirement that
a KSK have the SEP bit set only a recommendation.


(RFC 4034:
2.1.1.  The Flags Field
...
   Bit 15 of the Flags field is the Secure Entry Point flag, described
   in [RFC3757].  If bit 15 has value 1, then the DNSKEY record holds a
   key intended for use as a secure entry point.  This flag is only
)

# 5.  Security considerations
#
#   This document proposes a standard format for documenting DNSSEC trust
#   anchors.

I didn't see a standard format (a la a zone file). Just "use the DS fields." Perhaps I was expecting examples and such.

We assumed (possibly incorrectly) that having a reference was sufficient.

        thanks for your comments

        Olafur

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