On 25-Aug-2009, at 12:48, Todd Glassey wrote:
If there *is* a practical motivation to roll keys, then let's not
infer any trust at all from old keys.
I agree that if a KEY is rolled it needs to have its application as
a reliable TRUST ANCHOR revoked or terminated for events moving
forward - but it still needs to be available for reviewing and re-
certifying events from a forensic viewpoint. It *(the rolled key)
still needs to be rolled so that requirement is still real.
This is all very interesting speculation, but I'm not sure I
understand how the use of old keys for forensic purposes relates to
the problem of trying to establish a new trust anchor after a period
of disconnection.
Joe
_______________________________________________
DNSOP mailing list
[email protected]
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop
