Edward Lewis <[email protected]> wrote: > > The point I am coming back to is that if a ZSK is exposed, false RRSIGs > will validate until the ZSK disappears from the DNSKEY set (in caches). > The zone administrator can roll out of the compromised ZSK to eventually > end the abuse - but in the interim the false ZSK can be used to extend > signatures over the DNSKEY for a very long time. Only when the DS set > (which is beyond the ZSK's reach) eliminates a chain through the ZSK can > the abuse end.
The lifetime of this kind of compromise is limited by the expiry time of the KSK's RRSIG over the DNSKEY RRset. The attacker with the compromised ZSK can't extend this since they can't re-sign the DNSKEYs in a way that will be authenticated by the DS. Tony. -- f.anthony.n.finch <[email protected]> http://dotat.at/ Forties, Cromarty: East, veering southeast, 4 or 5, occasionally 6 at first. Rough, becoming slight or moderate. Showers, rain at first. Moderate or good, occasionally poor at first. _______________________________________________ DNSOP mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop
