Hi, Am 07.09.2014 um 17:30 schrieb Hosnieh Rafiee: > I just wonder whether or not any of you had a chance to take a look on the > new version of cga-tsig. If you haven't yet take a look please do it. I > welcome your inputs. > > Do you think the problem statement is clear?
No, IMHO it is not. Usually you need clear attacker models to explain existing vulnerabilities. The current problem statement is quite a mixup of various different security aspects and thus not clear. Just a few examples: "DNS records can become compromised." => this is an attack on the _integrity_, but it can be launched at different locations and at different levels (e.g., in the DNS databased, with the DNS server, on the wire in transit, etc.) (TSIG) "No protection against IP spoofing and DNS amplification" - spoofed IP addresses are not a problem if the DNS RR integrity is assured... - "Does not easily protect DNS data confidentiality" -> confidentiality where? Against an attacker on the wire? The DNS (recursive) resolver provider will always know what has been asked for... and so on. Section 1 is therefore quite confusing. Clearly define an attacker model and describe why existing protocols do not protect against these attacks. Regards, Roland _______________________________________________ DNSOP mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop
