Fair point. IMO whitelisting is a common tactic used early on in deployment of new stuff to help manage deployment risk. It was also used in early IPv6 days where query access to AAAA RRs was whitelisted (see http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6589). I suspect it would be similar here; that the need for and use of whitelisting fades as deployment levels increase.
- Jason On 2/13/15, 12:44 AM, "Marcus Grando" <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: The question about whitelist is the problem. I think it need to be addressed on this doc. There's some approaches, like Google does, doing low rate ECS query: https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/public-dns-announce/67oxFjSLeUM Or something not so traditional like TXT record on domain record or hostname based like "ns1.ECS.domain.tld". It's not an clean way, but can optimize latency and can address problems like keep approved domains in memory or save on disk. It's almost impossible to authoritative guys, guess each one resolver that support ECS. It's need to be automatically. The other side of this problem is about resources of DNS resolver. If more domains enable ECS, it can increase exponentially memory usage keeping approved list and cache itself. With this, the minimum netmask will be extremly important. I don't know if it's a good idea fix the limit of how many different answers one authoritative can emit. This can be a problem. It's clear for everyone that it's much more easier to implement this on authoritative side than resolver side, so it need to be clear and easy for both sides. Best regards On 12Feb15, George Michaelson allegedly wrote: > > we've got two agencies who do DNS, and probably have > 20% worldwide > eyeball share in DNS (I don't know, thats a guesstimate) now doing > edns0_client_subnet albiet with whitelist, so its a permit-list, but its > functionally 'there' Whitelists are my biggest bugbear actually. All my other comments are nice-to-haves. I hear that Google now adaptively whitelist which is a nice strategy but I'd really like to see the whitelist approach deprecated as much as possible. (And yes, I understand MarkA's stats that show some small percentage of auth queries will break). I've been in other conversations lately where it was all about how do we get "pick some larger resolver" to whitelist us? We all know that doesn't scale. So interest appears to be growing. > Its probably already more widely deployed than IPv6... On the auth side I think you're right. It's the client side that's the missing link. But this is a classic alignment-of-interest problem. The relatively small number of auths who care implement, but there is little incentive on the resolver side. Mark. -- Marcus Grando
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