Roman Danyliw has entered the following ballot position for draft-ietf-dnsop-nsec-ttl-04: No Objection
When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this introductory paragraph, however.) Please refer to https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html for more information about DISCUSS and COMMENT positions. The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dnsop-nsec-ttl/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------- COMMENT: ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Thank to Tiru Reddy for the SECDIR review. Section 5. Per: An attacker can prevent future records from appearing in a cache by seeding the cache with queries that cause NSEC or NSEC3 responses to be cached, for aggressive use purposes. This document reduces the impact of that attack in cases where the NSEC or NSEC3 TTL is higher than the zone operator intended. Shouldn’t this text read s/An attacker can prevent future records/An attacker can delay future records/? Per Section 9 of RFC8198, “If the resolver is making aggressive use of NSEC/NSEC3, one successful attack would be able to suppress many queries for new names, up to the negative TTL." If the timing is right, this delay could be indefinite. Isn't the mitigation provided here that the attacker needs to seed the cache more often? _______________________________________________ DNSOP mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop
