On 7/29/22, 10:49 AM, "DNSOP on behalf of Paul Wouters" <[email protected] on behalf of [email protected]> wrote: > I would have expected (and have taught) that this was by design to not > disrupt systems with new data unless we knew they were ready for it. I didn’t > realize we first tried to do it without that 😀
This response made me think a bit - besides the early DNSSEC issue, there have been other times when we-collectively did something that should have been a no-brainer but were surprised. After the root zone KSK rollover, during the period where the old key appeared as revoked, there was a concerning rise of queries. Once the revoking record was pulled, the queries abated [lessened]. Note: I made sure my memory of this coincided with Wes H and Duane W. As the situation passed, I don't recall any published study definitively diagnosing the cause although some work may have led to a likely culprit. I'll put a plug here for this paper: https://www.isi.edu/~hardaker/papers/2019-10-ksk-roll.pdf. I don't think is possible to achieve the point where any change can be made avoiding unpredicted repercussions [responses]. The operational state of the system has grown much too complex. Obscure code paths, old versions still running, other home-crafted code all contributes to the randomness. We can only hope to contain operational impacts and have good roll back plans in place. _______________________________________________ DNSOP mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop
