On Mon, 24 Oct 2022, Brian Dickson wrote:

Just to expand on this idea (which I quite like), the original AS112 was 
enhanced to handle new/arbitrary names, so
that AS112 operators don't need to do anything to support being a sink for new 
domains.

This was done in RFC7534 and RFC7535, using the new "empty.as112.arpa" target 
for use via DNAME.
(The DNAME bit is so there isn't a delegation for which the AS112 operator 
would need to have a zone configured.)

Using this via the root zone would be a new kind of entry for the root zone, 
but is otherwise non-controversial
(IMHO).
It would basically look like: 
      alt. DNAME empty.as112.arpa

this is dangerous. Anyone who runs an as112 node, or an attacker who
compromises one, can then serve a "real" .alt to a percentage of
queriers. Imagine millions being lost in some cryptocurrency .alt
non-dns scheme.

Paul

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