S Moonesamy <[email protected]> writes: > I took a quick look at draft-hardaker-dnsop-must-not-ecc-gost-00.
> The Introduction Section states that the security of the ECC-GOST > algorithm has been slowly diminishing over time as various forms of > attacks have weakened its cryptographic underpinning. There isn't any > information in the draft about those various forms of attacks. Is that > like someone the audience (of the draft) is expected to know after > reading the eight RFCs which are referenced by the draft? :-) We could certainly omit the text that says it's diminishing over time, but I think it's widely accepted to be true but all the normative references we'd have to point at are a bit outside the scope of our normal referencing. We could probably point to some informational documentation more easily, and if the WG wants to do that I'm all for it. We should provide some reason why we're deprecating it, and there does seem to be consensus within the DNS portion of the IETF that we should. Or put it differently, if the WG doesn't think there is consensus to do so then the draft shouldn't be published, but if "we" (royal) do then we should publish it. > Appendix C has a reference to draft-hardaker-dnsop-must-not-sha1 > instead of this draft. Yep, noted by a few people. Fixed in future versions, thanks. -- Wes Hardaker USC/ISI _______________________________________________ DNSOP mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop
