Hi, Joe: Thanks for the suggestion. I’ve reviewed the “draft-jaked-cared,” and it’s clearly the closest existing work to what I have in mind. I see that it expired without being adopted by the working group; do you have any idea what was missing for it to move forward, or if there was interest at the time that simply didn’t materialize?
My current approach is slightly different: instead of recommendations, my goal is to develop a problem statement and a requirements document that can serve as the basis for a subsequent draft of solutions. If you’re interested in taking a look, I’d be happy to share a pre-presentation version. Best regards, Aitor Santos Técnico SOC [Irontec] <https://www.irontec.com> Uribitarte Kalea, 6, 48001 Bilbo, Bizkaia + 34 944 048 182 <tel:%20+34%20944%20048%20182> — [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> — www.irontec.com<https://www.irontec.com> LinkedIn <https://es.linkedin.com/company/irontec-internet-y-sistemas-sobre-gnu-linux> — GitHub<https://github.com/irontec> Encontrará información detallada sobre el tratamiento de sus datos personales en www.irontec.com ________________________________ De: Joe Abley <[email protected]> Enviado: viernes, 10 de julio de 2026 15:09 Para: Aitor Santos <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] <[email protected]>; Tommy Jensen <[email protected]> Asunto: Re: [DNSOP] Client authentication for encrypted DNS — interest check Hi Aitor, You may want to take a look at this (expired but recent) draft which is an attempt to answer similar questions. https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-jaked-cared/ I agree these are questions worth answering. Joe On 10 Jul 2026, at 13:24, Aitor Santos <[email protected]> wrote: Hi all, I'm working on a draft addressing a gap in the current encrypted DNS ecosystem: while DoH [RFC8484], DoT [RFC7858], and DoQ [RFC9250] protect DNS queries from on-path observers, none of them define a standard mechanism for a resolver to authenticate its clients. This matters in practice for private and restricted resolvers — self-hosted instances, enterprise deployments, ISP subscription services, and parental control resolvers — where the operator has a legitimate need to limit access to authorized clients only. Today each deployment invents its own approach (token in the URL, IP allowlist, custom headers), with no interoperability. The draft (draft-santos-dnsop-encrypted-dns-client-auth) describes the problem space, the requirements any solution must satisfy, and the constraints each transport imposes on an authentication mechanism. Before I submit the -00, I wanted to check: • Is there existing or ongoing work in this area I should be aware of? • Is there appetite in the WG for a problem statement document, or would a solutions-oriented draft be more appropriate? Happy to share a pre-submission version off-list if anyone wants to take a look. Thanks, Aitor Santos Técnico SOC [Irontec] <https://www.irontec.com> Uribitarte Kalea, 6, 48001 Bilbo, Bizkaia + 34 944 048 182 <tel:%20+34%20944%20048%20182> — [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> — www.irontec.com<https://www.irontec.com> LinkedIn <https://es.linkedin.com/company/irontec-internet-y-sistemas-sobre-gnu-linux> — GitHub<https://github.com/irontec> Encontrará información detallada sobre el tratamiento de sus datos personales en www.irontec.com _______________________________________________ DNSOP mailing list -- [email protected] To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]
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