On Mon, Jul 20, 2026 at 03:35:03AM -0400, Paul Wouters wrote: > > Bas wrote: > > > > If we care for PQ DNSSEC by 2031, what would be the most practical path? > > > We can't be too ambitious. > > > > > > So what are we looking at? The only practical [1] signature scheme > > > available on this timeframe is ML-DSA-44 with 2,420 byte signatures and > > > 1,322 byte public keys. We can't have authoritatives include these by > > > default: it'll break clients that can't fall back to TCP, or are buggy in > > > other ways. > > This assumes we are stuck with the current transport. The real question > is, should we fix the tranport so we then no longer care about size of > signaures, or should we limit the new PQ crypto based on the current > packet size issues. I feel it might be better to think of a DNS protocol > fragmentation support so that from a DNS protocol point of view, we can > just send huge packets.
We have alternative transports, DoQ, and we're working already on a way to signal it for a while with Deleg. The question is will we succeed on time and does DoQ has better prognostics of lower failure rates than Do53 over TCP??? Fred _______________________________________________ DNSOP mailing list -- [email protected] To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]
