Sorry, my mail client mangled the example names in my last message, they
came out as long redirect links. That sentence should just say: the two
names can be anything, two names under different TLDs, a name and its IDN
look-alike, or two completely unrelated names.

Dimitri

On Mon, Oct 26, 2026 09:43 AM, Dimitri Manelidis <[email protected]>
wrote:

> John,
>
> Thanks for reading it and for the questions.
>
> On (2) first, because I think my wording misled you. "Parent" and "child"
> in the draft are not DNS hierarchy. They are just the two roles: the
> established domain that confirms, and the domain being confirmed. They can
> be any two names. https://www.google.com/url?q=http://example.com&source=
> gmail&ust=1793079784897000&sa=E and example.foo, or
> https://www.google.com/url?q=http://example.com&source=
> gmail&ust=1793079784897000&sa=E and the IDN look-alike, or two completely
> different names under different TLDs. No registry or registrar is involved,
> so it works across registry operators. The only thing needed is that both
> operators can publish records in their own zones.
>
> So yes, those cases are exactly the ones I'm trying to cover. Using
> "parent" and "child" in a DNS document was a bad choice on my side. In -01
> I'll rename them to "confirming domain" and "affiliated domain", and say at
> the start that the two can be anywhere in the DNS, with no delegation or
> hierarchy between them.
>
> On (1), you are right that DAC does not tell you a look-alike is an
> impersonation, and I don't think any DNS mechanism can, that is a judgement
> about the name and the content. What it does do for that case:
>
> - if a look-alike claims to be affiliated with the real organization, the
> claim fails, because only the real organization can confirm it. The
> impersonator can register a look-alike of the confirming domain too and
> confirm itself from there, but then all it has shown is a link to another
> unknown domain. A confirmed domain gets no more standing than the domain
> confirming it (Section 8.3), so a chain of look-alikes is worth nothing.
> - the real organization can get a report when someone claims to be
> affiliated with it and it hasn't confirmed (the f= tag, reason
> "unconfirmed-token"), so it learns that someone is claiming to be it.
>
> I'll make both points explicit in -01 so the applicability is clearer.
>
> Dimitri
>
> On Mon, Oct 26, 2026 05:25 AM, John C Klensin <[email protected]> wrote:
>
>> Dimitri,
>>
>> Since I haven't seen other responses to your posted I-D or note to
>> the DNSOP list, some questions:
>>
>> (1) The description in your abstract and your Introduction introduce
>> two problems, the second of which is "Legitimate look-alikes are
>> reported as impersonations".   It seems to me that the opposite
>> problem is also important, i.e., impersonation look-alikes are
>> mistaken for legitimate names.  Am I correct in understanding that
>> you are ignoring that case, even in your Sections 1.4 and 1.5?
>>
>> (2) The most important, or at least very widely reported, cases of
>> look-alike names involve names at the same level in the DNS
>> hierarchy, not parent-child relationships.  For example, one might
>> have questions about whether example.com and exámple.com
>> <http://xn--exmple-qta.com> belonged to
>> the same organization.  That is not a parent-child relationship.  One
>> might be able to answer the question with a variation on DAC and/or
>> one on [I-D.ietf-regext-epp-same-entity], at least assuming the TLD
>> registry is willing to take on such responsibility and, if different
>> registrars were used, even that it has access to sufficient
>> information.  At least some experience suggests that many registries
>> are unable or unwilling to do that.    The even more common case
>> would involve a comparison between example.com and example.foo, where
>> "foo" is some other TLD, supported by a different registry operator
>> than the one for .COM or the one between example.com and example.
>> Am I correct in understanding that you do not address those cases
>> either?
>>
>> If the answer is that those cases are no addressed, my personal
>> (possibly not very useful, depending on what others in DNSOP have to
>> say) is that this proposal is probably not worth the effort except
>> for some very specialized cases... or that the draft needs a rework
>> to make the useful applicability much more clear.
>>
>> good luck with it.
>>    john
>>
>>
>> --On Wednesday, October 21, 2026 15:49 -0700 [email protected]
>> wrote:
>>
>> > Internet-Draft draft-manelidis-dnsop-domain-affiliation-00.txt is
>> > now available.
>> >
>> >    Title:   Domain Affiliation Confirmation (DAC)
>> >    Author:  Dimitri Manelidis
>> >    Name:    draft-manelidis-dnsop-domain-affiliation-00.txt
>> >    Pages:   46
>> >    Dates:   2026-10-21
>> >
>> > Abstract:
>> >
>> >    Security systems assess domain names one at a time.  A new
>> > domain of    an established organization therefore starts with no
>> > reputation, and    a legitimate domain that resembles another
>> > organization's name can be    reported as an impersonation.  This
>> > document defines Domain    Affiliation Confirmation (DAC), by which
>> > the operator of a parent    domain confirms that a child domain is
>> > operated by it or under its    authority.  The child publishes a
>> > DNS record naming the parent and a    random token; the parent
>> > confirms that token, in the DNS or over    HTTPS, by naming the
>> > child.  Verification takes at most three DNS    queries.  The
>> > parent publishes no list of its domains, and an    affiliation is
>> > ended by deleting one record.  The document also    states what a
>> > confirmation means to relying parties such as takedown    services
>> > and reputation systems.
>> >
>> > The IETF datatracker status page for this Internet-Draft is:
>> > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-manelidis-dnsop-domain-affil
>> > iation/
>> >
>> > There is also an HTML version available at:
>> > https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-manelidis-dnsop-domain-affili
>> > ation-00.html
>> >
>> > Internet-Drafts are also available by rsync at:
>> > rsync.ietf.org::internet-drafts
>> >
>> >
>> > _______________________________________________
>> > I-D-Announce mailing list -- [email protected]
>> > To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]
>>
>>
>>
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