All, The recent discussion of draft-manelidis-dnsop-domain-affiliation (DAC), including John Levine's pointer to RDBD and the earlier DBOUND work, led me to look at our own draft again against all three. The draft is draft-barrett-dnsop-domain-set-00 ( https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-barrett-dnsop-domain-set/). It addresses the case John Klensin raised in the DAC thread, impersonation look-alikes being mistaken for legitimate names. Having looked again, we think it is distinct from DAC, RDBD and DBOUND in the following ways.
What domain-set does: an organization publishes the set of registrable domains it wants recognized as its own, in any TLD, with relation types (primary, operating, redirect, defensive). Each link counts as confirmed only when both domains name each other and both directions are retrieved over DNSSEC, or over HTTPS from the publisher's own domain. A consumer can start from one name it trusts and retrieve the organization's whole set. This is how domain-set differs from the others: - From DAC: domain-set is for discovery, not a pairwise check. A consumer gets the organization's full published set, not a yes/no answer about one claimed link. The organization chooses what to include. Defensive registrations such as misspellings usually don't resolve and can simply be left out, so publishing a set doesn't mean disclosing a whole portfolio. - From RDBD: no new RR types and no signature scheme, only TXT at an underscored name. The linking mechanism is close to the simpler design John Levine suggested on the dbound list in 2019, in place of RDBD's signatures: each domain publishes a TXT record under an underscore label pointing at the other. Links are never one-way: an assertion that the other side doesn't return is reported only as "asserted" and must not be treated as evidence. And a link has one defined meaning, common operation by the same organization, not an unspecified relationship. - From DBOUND: domain-set doesn't deal with policy boundaries within a namespace, the cut points the PSL encodes for cookies, certificate wildcards and DMARC. It neither replaces nor consults the PSL. It groups unrelated sibling registrable domains under one organization, and only for operators who choose to publish. - From all three: domain-set is designed to carry independent verification. It works for any organization with more than one public-facing domain, but it is most useful when one member has been verified by a third party, such as a registry that checks eligibility before issuing names. Early interest has come mostly from organizations with names in .bank, .pharmacy, .brand TLDs and ccTLDs that verify their registrants. These organizations often run large portfolios in .com and other legacy TLDs. domain-set doesn't perform that verification. It carries the verified identity, over confirmed links, to the organization's other domains, so a consumer can tell a linked domain from a look-alike with no link. - Consumers: browsers and, increasingly, the AI assistants and agents that people ask whether a site is the real one. They need a machine-readable answer that the organization itself publishes. In the next revision of domain-set we'll consider expanding the related-work section to cite DAC, RDBD and DBOUND and set out these differences in more detail. We'll post to the list when it's available. In the meantime, comments here are welcome. Tom Barrett EnCirca, Inc. -- Schedule a call with me. https://calendar.app.google/BrESmtfgCG4tutSu7 Thomas Barrett President EnCirca, Inc +1.781.942.9975 (office) 400 W. Cummings Park, Suite 1725 Woburn, MA 01801 USA
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