Hi.

Apologizes for new thread.

I got lost in threading for version -12 review and back and forth on the list, so it feels cleaner to start over.

Good news is vast majority of defects is now fixed. I think I found couple more but I consider these to be text clarifications and fixes do not change the protocol on the wire.

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4. Name Server Requirements
When the value of the EDNS(0) DE flag is 0, the server behaves as a server that 
does not implement this specification, i.e., Delegation Types are processed as 
ordinary Data Types.
This wording does not work without further clarification: 'server behaves as a server that does not implement this specification' implies different NSEC(3) chain bitmaps and has far-reaching consequences.

I propose exchanging this paragraph to use a different angle:

"When the value of the EDNS(0) DE flag is 0, server responses MUST be compatible with clients that do not implement this specification. The DE flag MUST NOT change which data are occluded within a zone. In particular, NS-Omitting Delegation Types still trigger the occlusion rules described in RFC 2136 section 7.18. In signed zones, NSEC and NSEC3 type bitmaps MUST include the Delegation Types present at their corresponding names, independently of the DE flag. Existing zone-selection and response-processing rules apply, except where this document specifies otherwise."

Why - an example (taken from DELEG-13 section A.1)
DELEG-aware auth zone content:

test.      DELEG server-ipv6=3fff::33
test.      RRSIG DELEG 13 1 300 20260101000000 (
                        20250101000000 33333 . SigTestDELEG )

test.      NSEC  . RRSIG NSEC DELEG
test.      RRSIG NSEC 13 1 300 20260101000000 (
                        20250101000000 33333 . SigTestNSEC/ )

; a forgotten glue record from legacy (NS) delegation
; it is NOT present in NSEC chain and it is occluded
;
; this can happen e.g. after dynamic UPDATE
a.test.    A     192.0.2.1

If we say
'as a server that does not implement this specification'
or
'ordinary Data Types'
then query for DO=1 DE=0 QNAME=a.test. QTYPE=A would treat
'test. DELEG' RRset the same as if it were
'test. TXT' RRset

But TXT does not cause occlusion and consequently 'a.test. A' should be returned.

That's impossible to do correctly without extra:
- a.test. RRSIG(A)
- the A bit set in 'test. NSEC' type bitmap
- extra a.test. NSEC
... so an implementation would have to have two versions of the NSEC chain and extra RRSIGs.

If we establish a rule there's only one NSEC chain and the auth must use it to generate response, then this is the ~ only possible response for DELEG-unaware client:

;; Authority
.          SOA ...
.          RRSIG SOA ...
test.      NSEC  . RRSIG NSEC DELEG
test.      RRSIG NSEC 13 1 300 20260101000000 (
                        20250101000000 33333 . SigTestNSEC/ )

which is listed in DELEG A.4.2.3.


---------------------


4.1.1. Compact Denial of Existence

This document updates Compact Denial of Existence (CDOE) [RFC9824]. For queries 
with DE=0 and a QNAME below a delegation point containing an NS-Omitting 
Delegation Type RRset but no NS RRset, authoritative servers implementing 
Compact Denial of Existence (CDOE) [RFC9824] MUST NOT use the CDOE method when 
the DE flag is clear. Instead, they MUST return a conventional negative 
response with the corresponding DNSSEC denial-of-existence proof as specified 
in [RFC4035] or [RFC5155], regardless of whether the Compact Answers OK (CO) 
flag is set.

For an NSEC zone, a single NSEC record whose owner name matches the delegation 
point and whose Next Domain Name is formed by prepending the label \043 to the 
delegation point satisfies both components of the Name Error proof. It covers 
both the queried name and the wildcard at the closest encloser, while its Type 
Bit Maps field indicates the types present at the delegation point. The label 
\043 sorts after the wildcard label (\042) in canonical ordering.


CDoE makes my head spin... Apologies if I got this wrong.

I probably misunderstood what this is saying. Unless I'm mistaken, the canonical name order is:

test. < *.test. < +.test. < foo.test.

If the QNAME=foo.test. then the Next Owner cannot be \043 (+) because it would not cover foo.test.

What did I get wrong?

All three NSEC3 records use a Next Hashed Owner Name formed by incrementing the 
corresponding hash value by one.

Honestly I would not know how to do it. "corresponding" makes my head explode.

---------------------


 4.2. Explicit Queries for Delegation Types

When the EDNS(0) DE flag is set to 1 and the QNAME matches a delegation point, 
a query for a Delegation Type MUST result in an authoritative answer if the 
queried Delegation Type exists, or a NODATA response (AA flag set, RCODE=0, 
empty answer section).

This has insufficient detail and over-specification at the same time :-)

I suggest:
- omitting the final () completely
- replace s/authoritative answer/positive answer/
- replace s/QNAME/effective QNAME/

I.e.
"When the EDNS(0) DE flag is set to 1 and the effective QNAME matches a delegation point, a query for a Delegation Type MUST result in an positive answer if the queried Delegation Type exists, or a NODATA response."

A typical trap of re-specifying things. (AA flag set, RCODE=0, empty answer section) is wrong, e.g. CNAME chains thwart this and I don't want to go into the silly AA semantics debate vs. implementation practice. Perhaps just add pointer to RFC 2308 for NODATA spec?


---------------------


 5.2. Referrals

The presence of one or more NS-Omitting Delegation Type RRsets or an NS RRset 
in the Authority section identifies the response as a referral.

Same story, also over-specified and wrong.

I suggest something more generic:

"Referral responses are identified according to the existing DNS response-processing rules. For referral identification, an NS-Omitting Delegation Type RRset in the Authority section serves the same role as an NS RRset."

If more words are desired, something like this can be added:

"The presence of either kind of RRset alone is insufficient to identify a response as a referral. Partial answers followed by referrals remain possible. See RFC 9499 section 4, RFC 2308 section 2, RFC 1034 section 4.3.2."

There is multiple implementations which add NS RRs into authority because they feel like it without creating referral responses.

As an example, the authoritative response from com auth servers looks like this:

;; ANSWER SECTION:
example.com.            86400   IN      DS      2371 13 2 [omitted]
example.com. 86400 IN RRSIG DS 13 2 86400 20261109013359 20261102002359 65344 com. [omitted]

;; AUTHORITY SECTION:
com.                    172800  IN      NS      e.gtld-servers.net.
com.                    172800  IN      NS      f.gtld-servers.net.
com.                    172800  IN      NS      k.gtld-servers.net.
...

It does not feel like referral to me (or current BIND codebase!)


8.2.1. Stripping of Delegation Types from Referrals

A referral lacking this proof MUST be treated as tampered with and MUST be 
ignored.

s/ and MUST be ignored//

How to handle 'tampered with' data is implementation decision. Some cache it as failure, some retry. Mandating ignoring it is not within scope of this document.

---------------------


8.4. Denial-of-Service via DE Flag Manipulation

They MUST instead return a conventional Name Error proof as described in 
Section 4.1.1.

I think Name Error smells like over-specification again. I would prefer 'negative response' as it is less likely to cause problems in corner cases.


---------------------

Examples for DELEXT.

I agree with Libor that lack of examples makes it hard to follow, but I propose to tackle it the other way around: DELEG is now required part of DELEXT, so we can extend DELEG examples and point from DELEXT to DELEG examples.

Keeping the examples together avoids duplication and lets the same delegation demonstrate the interaction between DELEG and the other Delegation Type segments.

I would much rather throw in additional NS-Preserving and On-Demand Delegation Types into DELEG examples, which should be easy to do to and it would demonstrate how it behaves in 'real world', and avoid duplicating all the examples in DELEXT.


Having said that, the idea of exercising (NS-preserving/omitting/on-demand) types along DELEG creates a new conundrum:
What type numbers should be used for this?

Now I think I can see where Libor might have been going with his private range commentary: If each sub-range (NS-preserving/omitting/on-demand) had tiny sub-sub-range dedicated as private, we could throw these in examples safely.

I think this allocation policy would accomplish it:

9.3. Changes to the DNS Parameters RR Types Registry

Decimal  Hex       Registration Procedures  Note

61440-   0xF000-   Expert Review or         NS-Omitting
61551    0xF06F    Standards Action         Delegation TYPEs

61552-   0xF070-   Private Use              NS-Omitting
61567    0xF07F                             Delegation TYPEs

61568-   0xF080-   Expert Review or         NS-Preserving
61679    0xF0EF    Standards Action         Delegation TYPEs

61680-   0xF0F0-   Private Use              NS-Preserving
61695    0xF0FF                             Delegation TYPEs

61696-   0xF100-   Expert Review or         On-Demand
61935    0xF1EF    Standards Action         Delegation TYPEs

61936-   0xF1F0-   Private Use              On-Demand
61951    0xF1FF                             Delegation TYPEs

It affects only IANA policy and is simple for mplementations: They can keep single numeric range per behavior class.

--
Petr Špaček
Internet Systems Consortium
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