Hi DNSOP,

I submitted draft-shigeya-dns-opkey-00, "Using Secure DNS for Originator 
Profile", and would like this group's feedback, both on the DNS design and on 
where the work should go.

https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-shigeya-dns-opkey/

Originator Profile (OP) lets a verifier of web content, advertising, or email 
check who originated it, through signed profiles that issuers attach to the 
originator. A verifier needs to know, through an authenticated channel, that 
the originator's key is current, that its profile has not been revoked by its 
issuer, and that the issuers' own keys are current. The draft uses 
DNSSEC-signed DNS for these signals only. The profiles themselves are not 
distributed through the DNS, and keys are never taken from the DNS.

What the draft defines, all under a new `_op` label:

- OPKEY, a new RR type with the TLSA RDATA format, restricted to usage 3, 
selector 1, and matching type 1 or 2 (a digest of the SubjectPublicKeyInfo). It 
is published at `_issuer-key._op.<issuer>` for issuer keys, and at 
`<label>._originator-key._op.<cp-issuer>` for each originator profile. The 
presence of a Secure RRset means the profile is not revoked; a Secure NXDOMAIN 
or NODATA means it is revoked. Until a type value is allocated, the same RDATA 
is published as TLSA at the same names.
- An SVCB RRset at `_op.<originator>`, naming the issuers the originator 
accepts. An AliasMode record with a TargetName of "." states that the 
originator has no profile.
- A TXT RRset at `<label>._revocation._op.<pa-issuer>`, whose presence revokes 
an annotation on a profile.

Only Secure answers are used. Bogus, Insecure, and indeterminate results are 
failures, never absence, and wildcards are not allowed at these names. The 
draft is intended as Experimental. The experiment is whether a new RR type can 
be put into service by the hosting providers and verifiers involved, so that 
the TLSA form and the fallback can be dropped.

Questions on which I would especially welcome comments:

1. A new RR type with the TLSA format, following SMIMEA and OPENPGPKEY, rather 
than TLSA itself at `_op` names. The draft does this to keep the semantics of 
the two types apart.
2. Using a Secure NXDOMAIN or NODATA as the revocation signal for a profile.
3. The use of SVCB, including AliasMode with ".", to state an originator's 
accepted issuers, or that it has none.
4. TXT for annotation revocation.

I would also like advice on the right home for this work. I understand that the 
call for DNSOP agenda items for IETF 127 closed on October 31, so DNS DISPATCH 
will most likely have to wait until the next meeting. If a slot does open up at 
IETF 127, though, I would be glad to take it.

Related documents (published on October 27th):

- Originator Profile Framework - Architectural Overview: 
https://docs.originator-profile.org/en/aov/
- Originator Profile Framework - Core Specification: 
https://docs.originator-profile.org/en/core/
- Originator Profile Framework - Web Media Use Case Specification: 
https://docs.originator-profile.org/en/web-media/
- Originator Profile Framework - Email Use Case Specification: 
https://docs.originator-profile.org/en/email/

thanks,

Shigeya Suzuki, Ph.D
Keio University / WIDE Project / Originator Profile CIP
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