On Sun, 15 Nov 2026, Erik Nygren wrote:

To close the loop on this, I've proposed a PR to add this to the threat model 
and security considerations explicitly:

https://github.com/ietf-wg-dnsop/draft-ietf-dnsop-domain-verification-techniques/pull/228/changes

I'm ambivalent on whether to add this or not. Whatever makes the
document go forward and not wait a third round of 4 months to the
next IETF.

Paul

On Wed, Oct 14, 2026 at 5:47 AM <[email protected]> 
wrote:

      Thank you for sharing your thoughts. I appreciate your perspective and 
understand the practical concerns you raised. I agree that using unique random
      validation tokens is an important best practice that should be encouraged 
across applications.

      AliasLeap could serve as a useful real-world example illustrating the 
potential security consequences of not adopting this practice. In particular, 
the
      risks are not limited to dangling DNS records but can also arise from 
CNAME following in otherwise legitimate DNS configurations.

      I believe briefly mentioning this scenario could further reinforce the 
importance of the draft's existing recommendations, without requiring any
      substantial changes to its scope or direction.

      Thank you again for considering my suggestions and for your efforts on 
this draft.

      Best regards,
      Ruixuan


      > -----原始邮件-----
      > 发件人: "Paul Wouters" <[email protected]>
      > 发送时间:2026-10-14 05:38:09 (星期三)
      > 收件人: [email protected]
      > 抄送: "Erik Nygren" <[email protected]>, 
[email protected], [email protected], [email protected]
      > 主题: Re: [DNSOP] Re: Security consideration for 
draft-ietf-dnsop-domain-verification-techniques
      >
      > On Tue, 13 Oct 2026, [email protected] 
wrote:
      >
      > > I agree with the draft's recommendation to use unique validation 
tokens, as this is an effective mitigation against the AliasLeap attack. I do not
      think the current
      > > recommendations are incorrect, but they may overlook some security 
risks. Therefore, I believe it would be reasonable to discuss the risks
      highlighted by AliasLeap
      > > in the Threat Model, Security Considerations, or the CNAME usage 
section.
      >
      > The document is mostly about how to do things right, not on explaining
      > the many wrong things one can do. The document aims at a concrete BCP,
      > and this is different from a whitepaper about a found security issue.
      >
      > > For these reasons, I believe that prohibiting CNAME following during 
DCV is a necessary security measure.
      >
      > That is going to be very very difficult, as most people who implement
      > DCV are application developers, and not DNS engineers/experts. They
      > will just use an existing DNS server or library and that in turn
      > will just follow CNAMEs. Asking them to develop some backend code
      > that has custom DNS processing will be very difficult and also
      > error prone.
      >
      > Therefor, randomization remains an essential property that developers
      > should not skip.
      >
      > Paul



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