On Sun, 15 Nov 2026, Erik Nygren wrote:
To close the loop on this, I've proposed a PR to add this to the threat model
and security considerations explicitly:
https://github.com/ietf-wg-dnsop/draft-ietf-dnsop-domain-verification-techniques/pull/228/changes
I'm ambivalent on whether to add this or not. Whatever makes the
document go forward and not wait a third round of 4 months to the
next IETF.
Paul
On Wed, Oct 14, 2026 at 5:47 AM <[email protected]>
wrote:
Thank you for sharing your thoughts. I appreciate your perspective and
understand the practical concerns you raised. I agree that using unique random
validation tokens is an important best practice that should be encouraged
across applications.
AliasLeap could serve as a useful real-world example illustrating the
potential security consequences of not adopting this practice. In particular,
the
risks are not limited to dangling DNS records but can also arise from
CNAME following in otherwise legitimate DNS configurations.
I believe briefly mentioning this scenario could further reinforce the
importance of the draft's existing recommendations, without requiring any
substantial changes to its scope or direction.
Thank you again for considering my suggestions and for your efforts on
this draft.
Best regards,
Ruixuan
> -----原始邮件-----
> 发件人: "Paul Wouters" <[email protected]>
> 发送时间:2026-10-14 05:38:09 (星期三)
> 收件人: [email protected]
> 抄送: "Erik Nygren" <[email protected]>,
[email protected], [email protected], [email protected]
> 主题: Re: [DNSOP] Re: Security consideration for
draft-ietf-dnsop-domain-verification-techniques
>
> On Tue, 13 Oct 2026, [email protected]
wrote:
>
> > I agree with the draft's recommendation to use unique validation
tokens, as this is an effective mitigation against the AliasLeap attack. I do not
think the current
> > recommendations are incorrect, but they may overlook some security
risks. Therefore, I believe it would be reasonable to discuss the risks
highlighted by AliasLeap
> > in the Threat Model, Security Considerations, or the CNAME usage
section.
>
> The document is mostly about how to do things right, not on explaining
> the many wrong things one can do. The document aims at a concrete BCP,
> and this is different from a whitepaper about a found security issue.
>
> > For these reasons, I believe that prohibiting CNAME following during
DCV is a necessary security measure.
>
> That is going to be very very difficult, as most people who implement
> DCV are application developers, and not DNS engineers/experts. They
> will just use an existing DNS server or library and that in turn
> will just follow CNAMEs. Asking them to develop some backend code
> that has custom DNS processing will be very difficult and also
> error prone.
>
> Therefor, randomization remains an essential property that developers
> should not skip.
>
> Paul
_______________________________________________
DNSOP mailing list -- [email protected]
To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]