On Mon, Nov 13, 2006 at 02:01:57PM -0800, william(at)elan.net wrote:
> 
> [This email explains on scenario for what could be called 'NXDOMAIN'
>  DNS DoS which Doug tried to use in his FUD campaign against SPF

Just like in the meeting, I think many of us do not want to spend a
great deal of time exploring all the nooks and crannies of some other
working group's rathole.  It is not even interesting to me whether
SPF is or is not the primary method by which these attacks can be
performed.  So I ask, as I did last Friday, a question in response to
the general issue:

> little to do with SPF. In fact the attack is general dns attack that will 
> work with several other records (MX, SRV, NS, most likely PTR and NAPTR 
> and possibly CNAME [John Levine suggested it, but I don't immediately see 
> using it by  itself]). The issue is that certain applications (including 
> DNS resolver itself) by means of special DNS records can be directed to 
> do several additional lookups. 

I still have no idea, from any of the SPF-blahblah discussion here,
whether there is anything at all that this group needs to do about
the problem.  As nearly as I can see, there are a few possible
answers.  None of the following are positions I'm adopting; I'm just
trying to figure out what questions, if any, to ask.  Also, I bet
this list isn't exhaustive:

1.      Sort of.  There is a DNS problem.  We need to define what that
problem is and what the operational impact might be; but if there is
a protocol problem, we have to ask dnsext to take it up as a work
item.

2.      Yes.  The general topic of DNS-using attacks is a work item
that the group needs to take up.

3.      No.  This is a problem that people have pointed out more than
once when others decided to start loading up the DNS with all these
other kinds of records, and the consequences are here as predicted. 
Since everyone knew this was going to happen, we have nothing to say
about it now.

4.      Yes, but in a limited way.  Some attacks are worse than
others, and each attack type should be evaluated case-by-case, so
that the group can decide whether it is worth investigating.  

5.      No.  This is a topic better handled in operator group forums
like NANOG, RIPE, APNIC, and even OARC, rather than here.

I lean towards (1) or (2) myself, but I can't say I have anything
like a well-formed view on this stuff, so I'd like to hear the views
of others as to what, if anything, to do about these kinds of
attacks.  I pray that we can keep particular examples out of it, but
I suspect we can't.

A

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