On Tue, Mar 17, 2026 at 01:24:13PM +0000, Mostafa Saleh wrote: > On the other hand, for restricted-dma, the memory decryption is deep > in the DMA direct memory allocation and the DMA API callers (for ex > virtio drivers) are clueless about it and can’t pass any attrs. > My proposal was specific to restricted-dma and won’t work for your case.
How is this any different from CC? If the device cannot dma to "encrypted" memory, whatever that means for you, then the DMA API: - Makes dma alloc coherent return "decrypted" memory, and the built in mapping of coherent memory knows about this - Makes dma_map_xxx use SWIOTLB to bounce to decrypted memory There is no need for something like virtio drivers to be aware of any of this. On the other hand if the driver deliberately allocates decrypted memory without using DMA API alloc coherent then it knows it did it and can pass the flag to map it. > I am wondering if the kernel should have a more solid, unified method > for identifying already-decrypted memory instead. Perhaps we need a > way for the DMA API to natively recognize the encryption state of a > physical page (working alongside force_dma_unencrypted(dev)), rather > than relying on caller-provided attributes? Definately not, we do not want the DMA API inspecting things like this. Jason
