Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s) to consider: - [Critical] mm: memcontrol: missing permission checks in mem_cgroup_get_from_fd() - [High] dma-buf: system_heap: 32-bit nr_pages truncation in system_heap_allocate() --
commit e390a33c5307a75778a81c2ca5beff0530617904 Author: Albert Esteve <[email protected]> dma-heap: charge dma-buf memory via explicit memcg This commit adds a charge_fd field to struct dma_heap_allocation_data so that DMA_HEAP_IOCTL_ALLOC can resolve a target pidfd or cgroupfd and charge the exported dma-buf memory to that memcg via mem_cgroup_reserve_dmabuf(). It also removes __GFP_ACCOUNT from system heap page allocations to avoid double counting. > diff --git a/drivers/dma-buf/heaps/system_heap.c > b/drivers/dma-buf/heaps/system_heap.c > index c8959eadc71d1..2bd245e1eab8f 100644 > --- a/drivers/dma-buf/heaps/system_heap.c > +++ b/drivers/dma-buf/heaps/system_heap.c [ ... ] > @@ -388,8 +389,6 @@ static struct page *alloc_largest_available(unsigned long > size, > if (max_order < orders[i]) > continue; > flags = order_flags[i]; > - if (mem_accounting) > - flags |= __GFP_ACCOUNT; > page = alloc_pages(flags, orders[i]); > if (!page) > continue; > @@ -401,11 +400,13 @@ static struct page *alloc_largest_available(unsigned > long size, > static struct dma_buf *system_heap_allocate(struct dma_heap *heap, > unsigned long len, > u32 fd_flags, > - u64 heap_flags) > + u64 heap_flags, > + struct mem_cgroup *memcg) > { > struct system_heap_buffer *buffer; > DEFINE_DMA_BUF_EXPORT_INFO(exp_info); > unsigned long size_remaining = len; > + unsigned int nr_pages = PAGE_ALIGN(len) >> PAGE_SHIFT; > unsigned int max_order = orders[0]; > struct system_heap_priv *priv = dma_heap_get_drvdata(heap); > bool cc_shared = priv->cc_shared; > @@ -416,10 +417,15 @@ static struct dma_buf *system_heap_allocate(struct > dma_heap *heap, > struct page *page, *tmp_page; > int i, ret = -ENOMEM; > > - buffer = kzalloc_obj(*buffer); > - if (!buffer) > + if (!mem_cgroup_reserve_dmabuf(memcg, GFP_KERNEL, nr_pages)) > return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); [Severity: High] As reported by Sashiko on v3 [1], can truncating nr_pages to a 32-bit unsigned int in system_heap_allocate() allow a 64-bit allocation length to bypass memcg memory.max limits? In dma_heap_ioctl_allocate(), heap_allocation->len (__u64) is page-aligned into a 64-bit size_t len and only checked for wrap-around to zero before being passed as an unsigned long len to system_heap_allocate(): drivers/dma-buf/dma-heap.c:dma_heap_ioctl_allocate() { len = PAGE_ALIGN(heap_allocation->len); if (!len) { mem_cgroup_put(memcg); return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); } dmabuf = heap->ops->allocate(heap, len, heap_allocation->fd_flags, heap_allocation->heap_flags, memcg); } In system_heap_allocate(), size_remaining retains the full 64-bit len while nr_pages is truncated to unsigned int. Because __GFP_ACCOUNT is removed from alloc_largest_available(), mem_cgroup_reserve_dmabuf() becomes the only memcg limit check. On a 64-bit system with 4 KiB pages (PAGE_SHIFT == 12), if a user passes len = (1ULL << 44) (or (1ULL << 44) + PAGE_SIZE), PAGE_ALIGN(len) >> PAGE_SHIFT truncates in 32-bit unsigned int nr_pages to 0 (or 1). mem_cgroup_reserve_dmabuf() then charges 0 (or 1) pages and succeeds inside a restricted cgroup, while the while (size_remaining > 0) loop allocates uncharged physical pages for the full 64-bit size_remaining until host RAM is exhausted and the global OOM killer is triggered. Similarly, in dma_buf_export() and mem_cgroup_uncharge_dmabuf(), PAGE_ALIGN(size) >> PAGE_SHIFT is stored in an unsigned int nr_pages and passed to mod_memcg_state(), which takes a signed int val and can overflow to a negative delta when bit 31 of nr_pages is set. Should nr_pages be unsigned long (or should len be bounds-checked before converting to page counts)? [ ... ] > diff --git a/mm/memcontrol.c b/mm/memcontrol.c > index e53dd7eebc3b5..17fdefc56b97f 100644 > --- a/mm/memcontrol.c > +++ b/mm/memcontrol.c > @@ -5661,6 +5661,53 @@ void mem_cgroup_flush_workqueue(void) > flush_workqueue(memcg_wq); > } > > +/** > + * mem_cgroup_get_from_fd - resolve a memcg from a cgroupfd or pidfd > + * @fd: file descriptor (cgroupfd or pidfd) > + * > + * Tries @fd as a cgroupfd first; if that fails, tries it as a pidfd. > + * On success returns a referenced memcg pointer. On failure returns > + * an ERR_PTR. > + */ > +struct mem_cgroup *mem_cgroup_get_from_fd(int fd) > +{ > + struct cgroup_subsys_state *css; > + struct mem_cgroup *memcg; > + struct cgroup *cgrp; > + struct task_struct *task; > + struct mm_struct *mm; > + unsigned int pidfd_flags; > + > + cgrp = cgroup_get_from_fd(fd); > + if (!IS_ERR(cgrp)) { > + rcu_read_lock(); > + css = cgroup_css(cgrp, &memory_cgrp_subsys); > + if (!css || !css_tryget_online(css)) { > + rcu_read_unlock(); > + cgroup_put(cgrp); > + return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT); > + } > + > + memcg = mem_cgroup_from_css(css); > + rcu_read_unlock(); > + cgroup_put(cgrp); > + return memcg; > + } > + > + task = pidfd_get_task(fd, &pidfd_flags); > + if (IS_ERR(task)) > + return ERR_CAST(task); > + > + mm = get_task_mm(task); > + put_task_struct(task); > + if (!mm) > + return ERR_PTR(-ESRCH); > + > + memcg = get_mem_cgroup_from_mm(mm); > + mmput(mm); > + return memcg ?: ERR_PTR(-ENOENT); > +} [Severity: Critical] As reported by Sashiko on v3 [2], does mem_cgroup_get_from_fd() allow an unprivileged caller to charge dma-buf allocations to arbitrary cgroups without permission checks? When dma_heap_ioctl_allocate() calls mem_cgroup_get_from_fd() with a user-supplied charge_fd, the target mem_cgroup is resolved either from a cgroup v2 directory fd (which can be opened with O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY or O_PATH on any world-readable /sys/fs/cgroup directory, including the root cgroup) or from a pidfd obtained via pidfd_open() for any visible process such as PID 1. Neither path verifies DAC permissions, cgroup write access (such as cgroup_may_write() or cgroup_attach_permissions() used by CLONE_INTO_CGROUP in cgroup_css_set_fork()), ptrace_may_access(), or capabilities such as CAP_SYS_ADMIN / CAP_SYS_RESOURCE. When system_heap_allocate() then calls mem_cgroup_reserve_dmabuf(memcg, GFP_KERNEL, nr_pages) -> try_charge(), targeting root_mem_cgroup returns 0 immediately and bypasses the caller's memory.max and memory.high limits, while targeting another cgroup can trigger reclaim and OOM kills in that victim cgroup. In addition, when a remote target memcg exceeds memory.high during try_charge_memcg(), the over-high penalty and reclaim in __mem_cgroup_handle_over_high() are applied against current->mm's memcg rather than the remotely charged memcg. Later commits in the series ("security: dma-buf: Add dma_buf_charge_task LSM hook", "security: dma-buf: Add dma_buf_charge_cgroup LSM hook", "selinux: Restrict cross-cgroup dma-buf charging", and "selinux: Restrict dma-buf direct cgroup charging") add LSM hooks and SELinux policy checks, but still leave no baseline DAC, capability, cgroup write permission, or ptrace_may_access() checks when CONFIG_SECURITY is disabled, when SELinux is not the active LSM, or when a cgroup v2 directory uses default genfscon labeling without an explicit security.selinux kernfs xattr (where selinux_dma_buf_charge_cgroup() sees kernfs_xattr_get() == -ENODATA and returns 0). Should baseline permission checks be enforced before allowing a process to charge memory to another task's or cgroup's memcg? [1] https://lore.kernel.org/r/20261027-v2_20230123_tjmercier_google_com-v3-2-78d2c4cb8...@redhat.com [2] https://lore.kernel.org/r/20261027-v2_20230123_tjmercier_google_com-v3-2-78d2c4cb8...@redhat.com -- Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261104-v2_20230123_tjmercier_google_com-v4-0-1819a0170...@redhat.com?part=2
