On Mon, Nov 16, 2026 at 07:28:42PM +0530, Aneesh Kumar K.V wrote:
> Fuad Tabba <[email protected]> writes:
> 
> > Hi Aneesh,
> >
> > On Mon, 16 Nov 2026 at 09:12, Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
> > <[email protected]> wrote:
> > [...]
> >> Keep allocations on platforms without memory encryption on the ordinary 
> >> page
> >> allocator path so the original GFP constraints, including __GFP_ZERO, 
> >> remain
> >> intact. Remove post-transition memset() calls that are now redundant and
> >> explicitly clear allocations on paths where no transition occurs.
> >>
> >> This intentionally makes every private-to-shared transition destructive;
> >> callers can no longer use set_memory_decrypted() to preserve existing 
> >> contents.
> >
> > pKVM shares memory in place, and a guest has to be able to share
> > memory it has already set up, as Vincent pointed out [1]. That was one
> > of the primary reasons for in-place conversion in guest_memfd.
> >
> > Cheers,
> > /fuad
> >
> > [1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
> 
> 
> Thanks for catching this. We discussed it before, but I reached the
> opposite conclusion:
> 
> https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]
> 
> My mistake. How do you suggest we handle this? We want to avoid zeroing
> pages multiple times with different CoCo configurations. For example, to
> allocate a zeroed page, we currently do:
> 
> alloc_pages(__GFP_ZERO)
> set_memory_decrypted()
> memset(0, PAGE_SIZE)

Just like you are wrapping set_memory_decrypted() in an allocator API
the user that wants to have the no-change sharing needs its own
special API too.

Then you can bury a special implementation for pkvm there.

Where is this special user in the kernel anyhow?

Jason

Reply via email to