On Mon, Nov 16, 2026 at 07:28:42PM +0530, Aneesh Kumar K.V wrote: > Fuad Tabba <[email protected]> writes: > > > Hi Aneesh, > > > > On Mon, 16 Nov 2026 at 09:12, Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm) > > <[email protected]> wrote: > > [...] > >> Keep allocations on platforms without memory encryption on the ordinary > >> page > >> allocator path so the original GFP constraints, including __GFP_ZERO, > >> remain > >> intact. Remove post-transition memset() calls that are now redundant and > >> explicitly clear allocations on paths where no transition occurs. > >> > >> This intentionally makes every private-to-shared transition destructive; > >> callers can no longer use set_memory_decrypted() to preserve existing > >> contents. > > > > pKVM shares memory in place, and a guest has to be able to share > > memory it has already set up, as Vincent pointed out [1]. That was one > > of the primary reasons for in-place conversion in guest_memfd. > > > > Cheers, > > /fuad > > > > [1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/ > > > Thanks for catching this. We discussed it before, but I reached the > opposite conclusion: > > https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected] > > My mistake. How do you suggest we handle this? We want to avoid zeroing > pages multiple times with different CoCo configurations. For example, to > allocate a zeroed page, we currently do: > > alloc_pages(__GFP_ZERO) > set_memory_decrypted() > memset(0, PAGE_SIZE)
Just like you are wrapping set_memory_decrypted() in an allocator API the user that wants to have the no-change sharing needs its own special API too. Then you can bury a special implementation for pkvm there. Where is this special user in the kernel anyhow? Jason
