On Sat, Jan 10, 2009 at 12:37:16AM -0800, Eric Day wrote: > Thanks for the insight! As Kristian noted in another reply, part of > this decision is from the Drizzle direction of putting more trust in > the client than MySQL does (like auth being off by default). The other > reason is that, in my opinion, this type of DoS protection belongs > only in the server, and should not be part of the protocol. I think > having a pre-parse memory limit is valuable, but this should not be > exposed to the client. Perhaps we can rename max_allowed_packet to > something more server-internal specific, and just take it out of the > protocol negotiation.
++ What could be interesting is plugin hooks to do things like limit data transfer in session, per user, and perhaps over time period. but protocol should be flexible - especially when it's things like server materialising things, duplicating things and other such nonsense that it shouldn't do. -- Stewart Smith _______________________________________________ Mailing list: https://launchpad.net/~drizzle-discuss Post to : [email protected] Unsubscribe : https://launchpad.net/~drizzle-discuss More help : https://help.launchpad.net/ListHelp
