All,

Recently, the Angular Team announced a *critical* Server-Side Request 
Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Angular SSR (CVE-2026-27739)


   - 
   
https://github.com/angular/angular-cli/security/advisories/GHSA-x288-3778-4hhx
   

In this vulnerability, Angular reported that both the "Host" and 
"X-Forwarded-Host" HTTP Headers were not being properly validated, which 
could allow for an SSRF attack if the application utilized these headers. While 
DSpace doesn't use "X-Forwarded-Host" directly, it does use the "Host" 
header in a few places.

After detailed analysis and verification, we have determined that *all 
versions of DSpace 7.x.x/8.x/9.x are* *only vulnerable to this attack if 
you are NOT using a properly configured Apache/Nginx (or similar) proxy *(as 
described in our Frontend Installation documentation 
<https://wiki.lyrasis.org/display/DSDOC9x/Installing+DSpace#InstallingDSpace-FrontendInstallation>,
 
step 8 "Add HTTPS support")

Specifically, your DSpace site is safe as long as you have an Apache/Nginx 
proxy configured with name-based Virtual Hosts 
<https://httpd.apache.org/docs/trunk/vhosts/name-based.html#using> (this 
link goes to an Apace example, but the same setting exists in Nginx and 
other proxies).  So, please check that your DSpace site has a proxy that 
is using "ServerName" (for Apache) or "server_name" (for Nginx) virtual 
hosts configured with trusted hostname(s).  This setup will ensure that 
your proxy will only pass requests to DSpace where there is a valid, 
trusted "Host" header.

As additional layers of protection, we are working on the following:

   - DSpace 9.x will be updated to the latest version of Angular 20.x, 
   which patches this vulnerability directly. This update will first be 
   available in DSpace 9.3 (release date TBD), but we will share an early 
   patch for sites that wish to update Angular early.
   - It is not possible to upgrade DSpace 7.x.x and 8.x to a patched 
      version of Angular, as they both use older Angular releases.
      - An additional patch is in the works to remove direct usages of the 
   "Host" header from the DSpace user interface.  This patch will add a layer 
   of protection by removing the primary attack method in DSpace (direct usage 
   of the "Host" header in DSpace UI code). It should be possible to apply 
   this upcoming patch to 7.x.x, 8.x and 9.x instances.
   

We'll let you know once the additional patches are available. In the 
meantime, your best protection is a well configured proxy!

(Thanks to Kim Shepherd for his work in helping to analyze this 
vulnerability's impact on DSpace.)

Tim Donohue, on behalf of the Committers

-- 
All messages to this mailing list should adhere to the Code of Conduct: 
https://lyrasis.org/code-of-conduct/
--- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"DSpace Community" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to [email protected].
To view this discussion visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/dspace-community/c1451b68-a084-4ddf-bf36-9c966671be3cn%40googlegroups.com.

Reply via email to