> Subject: 
>         IP: Serious new CALIFORNIA Drivers License ID RISK: [risks] Risks Digest 
>21.29
>   Date: 
>         Sun, 25 Mar 2001 21:07:29 -0500
>   From: 
>         "R. A. Hettinga" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>     To: 
>         Digital Bearer Settlement List <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> 
> 
> --- begin forwarded text
> 
> 
> Delivered-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Delivered-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Date: Sun, 25 Mar 2001 19:25:26 -0500
> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> From: David Farber <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Subject: IP: Serious new CALIFORNIA Drivers License ID RISK: [risks] Risks
>   Digest 21.29
> Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Status: U
> 
> 
> >Date: Wed, 21 Mar 2001 16:03:12 -0800
> >From: "Peter V. Cornell" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> >Subject: Serious new CA Drivers License ID RISK
> >
> >This is really happening!
> >
> >Almost exactly one decade ago Chris Hibbert posted a RISKS article
> >describing the (then) new California Drivers License (CDL). He gave a
> >warning to us all. That little piece is still on server:
> >   http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/11.03.html#subj10
> >[and has been updated by Chris since.  PGN]
> >
> >That warning, given in 1991, has blossomed into a nightmare.
> >
> >Recently, The California driver license and ID card have been declared as
> >PRIMARY IDENTIFICATION DOCUMENTS in this state by the California
> >legislature.
> >
> >http://www.dmv.ca.gov/faq/dlfaq.htm#2504
> >http://www.lbl.gov/Workplace/HumanResources/irss/dmv.html
> >
> >Guess why?  A great convenience for bankers, but enabling serious new ID
> >fraud RISKS based on easily obtained fake driver licenses and data.
> >
> >http://www.fakeidsite.com/
> >http://www.photoidcards.com/
> >http://www.wdia.com/home-entrypage.htm
> >http://www.spyheadquarters.com/
> >
> >Courtesy of the California legislature, *anyone* who has a fake California
> >drivers license with YOUR correct data, but with *his* picture and *his*
> >version of your signature, can steal your money in many different ways. For
> >example, if he knows your Social Security Number, bank, and account number,
> >(easily obtained online or by mail theft) he can walk into any branch office
> >and receive cash. Tens of thousands have been stolen from my (no longer
> >existent) Wells Fargo accounts.
> >
> >I must be one of the very first victims of this new kind of identity
> >theft. I have been scouring the internet for months and have found no
> >mention of it. Of course there are gigabytes of stuff about the old credit
> >card scams, alive and still growing, but no mention of use of drivers
> >licenses to impersonate bank customers and withdraw cash directly.
> >
> >With that fake drivers license, that fraudster becomes YOU.  All he need do
> >is write a bad check drawn on another bank's bogus name account set up for
> >that purpose, with the victim (you) as payee. He then walks into (in my
> >case) a Wells Fargo branch and, impersonating the victim, cashes the
> >check. When the check bounces, Wells Fargo (probably others, too) simply
> >debits the victims account.
> >
> >The banking industry has arranged the law (California Commercial Code
> >Sections 4401-4407 and 3101-3119) to ensure that the customer takes the
> >hit. So that, among other conveniences, THE LAW allows banks to rely
> >*solely* on the CDL data to confirm the identity of a customer with no risk
> >exposure whatsoever. "IF THE CUSTOMER PROVES" means you must sue the
> >bank. They have it written so you'd lose anyway, but the amounts, however
> >painful, are not nearly enough to pay a lawyer. (See excerpts from the
> >California Commercial Code below.)
> >
> >So, with my CDL data in circulation, if I want to keep a checking account, I
> >must change banks regularly. There are at least two fraud artists still
> >using my ID.
> >
> >The banks DO check your CDL number as well as date of birth at the teller
> >window. But there is no possible way to change any of my drivers license
> >data. The California Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) web site says to go
> >to a local office to change your drivers license number. That just plain
> >doesn't work. Many of the items on their ID Theft page simply do not work in
> >actual practice. It *looks* pretty.
> >
> >http://caag.state.ca.us/identity.htm
> >
> >The DMV local says they'll replace your picture ID with one that has no
> >picture while your request is being processed which may take
> >months. Impossible! They also require a letter from the bank. But none of
> >the Wells Fargo's "headsets" (customer service phone reps) or "robots"
> >(branch employees) are able or willing to do that. They'll give you forms to
> >fill out which are totally inadequate for this new kind of ID fraud. Bank
> >customers are thus denied any access to the bank officers responsible and
> >accountable for bank policy.
> >
> >Bankers have their political money well spent. With their
> >credit cards, computers, headsets and robots, their ethics,
> >"good faith" and accountability were abandoned long ago.
> >
> >Peter V Cornell <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> >
> >  - - - -
> >
> >CALIFORNIA CODES COMMERCIAL CODE SECTION 4406 [excerpted]
> >
> >    (d) (2) The customer's unauthorized signature or alteration by the same
> >wrongdoer on ANY OTHER ITEM paid in good faith by the bank if the payment
> >was made before the bank received notice from the customer of the
> >unauthorized signature or alteration and after the customer had been
> >afforded a reasonable period of time, NOT EXCEEDING 30 DAYS, in which to
> >examine the item or statement of account and notify the bank.
> >
> >     (e) If subdivision (d) applies and the CUSTOMER PROVES that the bank
> >failed to exercise ORDINARY CARE in paying the item and that the failure
> >contributed to loss, the loss is allocated between the customer precluded
> >and the bank asserting the preclusion according to the extent to which the
> >failure of the customer to comply with subdivision (c) and the failure of
> >the bank to exercise ORDINARY CARE contributed to the loss.  IF THE CUSTOMER
> >PROVES that the bank did not pay the item in good faith, the preclusion
> >under subdivision (d) does not apply.
> >
> >CALIFORNIA CODES COMMERCIAL CODE SECTION 3103.
> >    (a) (7) ORDINARY CARE "... in the case of a bank that takes an instrument
> >for processing for collection or payment by automated means, reasonable
> >commercial standards DO NOT REQUIRE THE BANK TO EXAMINE THE INSTRUMENT..."
> >
> >(To see the complete text of the above California Commercial Code Sections,
> >go to http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/calaw.html Check the "Commercial Code" box,
> >enter keyword "4401", then click search.)
> >
> >------------------------------
> 
> 
> 
> For archives see: http://www.interesting-people.org/
> 
> --- end forwarded text
> 
> 
> -- 
> -----------------
> R. A. Hettinga <mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
> "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
> [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
> experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
>

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