> Subject: > IP: Serious new CALIFORNIA Drivers License ID RISK: [risks] Risks Digest >21.29 > Date: > Sun, 25 Mar 2001 21:07:29 -0500 > From: > "R. A. Hettinga" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > To: > Digital Bearer Settlement List <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > > --- begin forwarded text > > > Delivered-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Delivered-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Date: Sun, 25 Mar 2001 19:25:26 -0500 > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > From: David Farber <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > Subject: IP: Serious new CALIFORNIA Drivers License ID RISK: [risks] Risks > Digest 21.29 > Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Status: U > > > >Date: Wed, 21 Mar 2001 16:03:12 -0800 > >From: "Peter V. Cornell" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > >Subject: Serious new CA Drivers License ID RISK > > > >This is really happening! > > > >Almost exactly one decade ago Chris Hibbert posted a RISKS article > >describing the (then) new California Drivers License (CDL). He gave a > >warning to us all. That little piece is still on server: > > http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/11.03.html#subj10 > >[and has been updated by Chris since. PGN] > > > >That warning, given in 1991, has blossomed into a nightmare. > > > >Recently, The California driver license and ID card have been declared as > >PRIMARY IDENTIFICATION DOCUMENTS in this state by the California > >legislature. > > > >http://www.dmv.ca.gov/faq/dlfaq.htm#2504 > >http://www.lbl.gov/Workplace/HumanResources/irss/dmv.html > > > >Guess why? A great convenience for bankers, but enabling serious new ID > >fraud RISKS based on easily obtained fake driver licenses and data. > > > >http://www.fakeidsite.com/ > >http://www.photoidcards.com/ > >http://www.wdia.com/home-entrypage.htm > >http://www.spyheadquarters.com/ > > > >Courtesy of the California legislature, *anyone* who has a fake California > >drivers license with YOUR correct data, but with *his* picture and *his* > >version of your signature, can steal your money in many different ways. For > >example, if he knows your Social Security Number, bank, and account number, > >(easily obtained online or by mail theft) he can walk into any branch office > >and receive cash. Tens of thousands have been stolen from my (no longer > >existent) Wells Fargo accounts. > > > >I must be one of the very first victims of this new kind of identity > >theft. I have been scouring the internet for months and have found no > >mention of it. Of course there are gigabytes of stuff about the old credit > >card scams, alive and still growing, but no mention of use of drivers > >licenses to impersonate bank customers and withdraw cash directly. > > > >With that fake drivers license, that fraudster becomes YOU. All he need do > >is write a bad check drawn on another bank's bogus name account set up for > >that purpose, with the victim (you) as payee. He then walks into (in my > >case) a Wells Fargo branch and, impersonating the victim, cashes the > >check. When the check bounces, Wells Fargo (probably others, too) simply > >debits the victims account. > > > >The banking industry has arranged the law (California Commercial Code > >Sections 4401-4407 and 3101-3119) to ensure that the customer takes the > >hit. So that, among other conveniences, THE LAW allows banks to rely > >*solely* on the CDL data to confirm the identity of a customer with no risk > >exposure whatsoever. "IF THE CUSTOMER PROVES" means you must sue the > >bank. They have it written so you'd lose anyway, but the amounts, however > >painful, are not nearly enough to pay a lawyer. (See excerpts from the > >California Commercial Code below.) > > > >So, with my CDL data in circulation, if I want to keep a checking account, I > >must change banks regularly. There are at least two fraud artists still > >using my ID. > > > >The banks DO check your CDL number as well as date of birth at the teller > >window. But there is no possible way to change any of my drivers license > >data. The California Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) web site says to go > >to a local office to change your drivers license number. That just plain > >doesn't work. Many of the items on their ID Theft page simply do not work in > >actual practice. It *looks* pretty. > > > >http://caag.state.ca.us/identity.htm > > > >The DMV local says they'll replace your picture ID with one that has no > >picture while your request is being processed which may take > >months. Impossible! They also require a letter from the bank. But none of > >the Wells Fargo's "headsets" (customer service phone reps) or "robots" > >(branch employees) are able or willing to do that. They'll give you forms to > >fill out which are totally inadequate for this new kind of ID fraud. Bank > >customers are thus denied any access to the bank officers responsible and > >accountable for bank policy. > > > >Bankers have their political money well spent. With their > >credit cards, computers, headsets and robots, their ethics, > >"good faith" and accountability were abandoned long ago. > > > >Peter V Cornell <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > > > > - - - - > > > >CALIFORNIA CODES COMMERCIAL CODE SECTION 4406 [excerpted] > > > > (d) (2) The customer's unauthorized signature or alteration by the same > >wrongdoer on ANY OTHER ITEM paid in good faith by the bank if the payment > >was made before the bank received notice from the customer of the > >unauthorized signature or alteration and after the customer had been > >afforded a reasonable period of time, NOT EXCEEDING 30 DAYS, in which to > >examine the item or statement of account and notify the bank. > > > > (e) If subdivision (d) applies and the CUSTOMER PROVES that the bank > >failed to exercise ORDINARY CARE in paying the item and that the failure > >contributed to loss, the loss is allocated between the customer precluded > >and the bank asserting the preclusion according to the extent to which the > >failure of the customer to comply with subdivision (c) and the failure of > >the bank to exercise ORDINARY CARE contributed to the loss. IF THE CUSTOMER > >PROVES that the bank did not pay the item in good faith, the preclusion > >under subdivision (d) does not apply. > > > >CALIFORNIA CODES COMMERCIAL CODE SECTION 3103. > > (a) (7) ORDINARY CARE "... in the case of a bank that takes an instrument > >for processing for collection or payment by automated means, reasonable > >commercial standards DO NOT REQUIRE THE BANK TO EXAMINE THE INSTRUMENT..." > > > >(To see the complete text of the above California Commercial Code Sections, > >go to http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/calaw.html Check the "Commercial Code" box, > >enter keyword "4401", then click search.) > > > >------------------------------ > > > > For archives see: http://www.interesting-people.org/ > > --- end forwarded text > > > -- > ----------------- > R. A. Hettinga <mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED]> > The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> > 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA > "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, > [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to > experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' > --- You are currently subscribed to e-gold-list as: [email protected] To unsubscribe send a blank email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
