My computer and Net crazy son tells me that basically I'm a "lurker," which is
not quite correct [I once replied to some foolishness on a world wide web
discussion of the Chicago Cubs], but an aspect of the ECOFEM discussion of
meat-eating [and the desire of some to have none of it--in both senses] has
prompted me to go from pillar to post. I think an aspect of the discussion
opens up an important question for any set of "environmental" concerns and so
for ecofeminism. (1) Much of the discussion had a deja vu feel about it for
someone in my "profession," that is, someone who occasionally teaches
introductory ethics courses. In particular, I refer to the question, "How do we
know that carrots don't feel pain?" A good deal of the pros and cons on the
question of what one might think about this was carried on as if the language we
use has no connection to the world about which we would like to talk and so
connected to clear cases of things that feel pain such as humans and dogs. For some
it is just that they have never thought about such questions and believe they
can say whatever they like and it will be meaningful. For others, who may have
done some thinking about such notions, it is because they are more impressed
with structuralist, post-structuralist, deconstructionist views of language than
I am or than one should be. That is, they think language is a system of
arbitrary signs arbitrarily connected which construct the world of the language
group [this crops up in claims that heterosexuality is an arbitrary
power-enforced system and others of the ways of thinking that someone referred
to here as a new "irrational vitalism"]. This is probably not the place to
discuss the philosophy of language, yet, the meat-eating discussion and the
manner in which it was discussed raises the deeper question to which I referred.
(2) It appeared to some in the discussion that questions of what kind of ethical
view an ecofeminist held was of no concern. Many said their view of food was a
"personal" choice or ethics, that there were no claims to be made on us in
general regarding such things, etc. Here I had a flashback to a puzzle of
Plato's: What value would all the knowledge one could gather have if one did
not know the form of "the good?" My puzzle is: What value would ecofeminism
have if it had no view of what is good in the topics that interest it? Without
such a concern would it be anything different from any other interest group? Is
ecofeminism really no different in logical or moral structure than any other
trade group [instead of agrifarmers the constituency is females?]. I see a kind
of allegiance to a sort of "land ethic" in some of the discussion, but it should
be obvious that that view is in no sense "feminist."
Ken W. Gatzke, Philosophy
Southern Connecticut State University
New Haven, CT 06515
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
