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Subject: Re: Regarding your page on Neopaganism!
<color><param>7F00,0000,0000</param>> In a message dated 98-09-12 21:56:02=
EDT, you write:
>
> <<<< So what is the punishment if you believe in Darwin's theory of evol=
ution?
> >>
> Hi!
>
</color><FontFamily><param>Times New Roman</param> =
Tools, Language and Text: The Serial Isomorphic
Evolution of =
Symbolic Capacity in Human Consciousn=
ess
By Joe E. Dees
Abstract- Tool use and language use evolve though an identical
succession of developmental structures, and the evolution of text shares
most of these stages. Notwithstanding this isomorphism, these three
successively abstract further and further from the unmediated
action/perception gestalt contexture from which their form derives.
Thus each phase of the evolution of textual representation depends upon
the prior completion of the evolution of a similar phase of language use,
which in turn depends upon the prior completion of the same phase of the
evolution of tool use. This can be observed in child development, and
archeological and historical evidence suggests that the evolution of
symbolic capacity in human consciousness pursued the same course.
<paraindent><param>out</param> The Substrate: Perception, Recursion and C=
onscious Self-awareness</paraindent>
<paraindent><param>out</param>Adult higher apes and infants eighteen month=
s old and older
demonstrate self-awareness as registered in the mirror test (<underline>So=
cial
Cognition and the Acquisition of Self</underline>, Lewis and Brooks-Gunn, =
1979).
When their noses are daubed with red paint and they are presented with
themselves in a mirror, they will touch their own noses rather than the
reflected ones, demonstrating that they recognize that the images are of
themselves rather than of conspecifics (other apes or children). Lesser
apes and infants one year old or younger attend to the reflected noses,
indicating a lack of self- awareness. The appearance of self-awareness is=
a result of the internalization, by the infant, of the distinction between=
persons as material yet purposively mobile (responding to their
entreaties) and physical objects as material and either inert,
purposelessly mobile, or moved by persons. This internalization links
the infant=92s awareness =96 its spatio-temporal sense of a distinct posit=
ion
to which perceptions flow and from which actions emerge -- with its
bodily location, as a unique subjectivity separate from others. As the
awareness of others leads the infant to an awareness of self, the
organism/environment interface is elaborated into the more complex
schema of self/soma/world/society.
<paraindent><param>out</param>Why is it that higher apes achieve self-awar=
eness and lesser apes do
not? For that matter, why does self-awareness manifest when it does in
child development, rather than earlier or later?
<paraindent><param>out</param>I hypothesize that this is when the number o=
f brain cells, combined
with the degree and structure of complexity of their interconnections,
passes a Godelian limit. Kurt Godel proved that any system of sufficient
complexity could not be both complete and completely true (1931). The
reason for this is the emergence of self-reference. When System A
achieves a certain complexity, it is capable of generating a self-
referential Statement B, which, in effect, asserts that it is not a part o=
f
System A. If Statement B is nevertheless included in System A, then it is=
false, and System A cannot be completely true; if, on the other hand, it i=
s
excluded, then it becomes true, and System A remains incomplete.
<paraindent><param>out</param>When this Godelian limit is breached in the =
brain, the capacity for
self-reference emerges in an organism which is already aware; in other
words, participating in a dynamic interchange of action and perception
with its environment. It becomes aware of inhabiting a unique
perspective, neither identical with nor isolated from its surroundings.
Perceived information provides the array from which attention, itself an
action, selects and focuses upon an object, thus directing and refining it=
s
perception and setting the stage for action upon the object, action which
itself will result in perceptual change. See how the feedback loop
spirals? When this feedback loop is applied self-referentially (in
phenomenology, not to the <italic>noema</italic> but to the <italic>noesis=
</italic>), that is, not to the
perceived and acted upon but to the perceiving and acting of the organism
itself, self-awareness results. The two conditions necessary for this are=
the size/complexity quotient of the brain and the conditioning of a both
physical and social environment.
<paraindent><param>out</param>That this system is incomplete, that is, ope=
n, allows for creative
action when presented with novel situations rather than having its
responses to stimuli circumscribed by instinct alone. Jean Piaget would
say (<underline>The Grasp of Consciousness</underline>, 1976) that the mom=
ents when habits
fail are those which impel reflection, a recursion provoking the advent of=
self-awareness, and that self-construction and world-construction are
isomorphic and correlative processes, evolving from the central
interface between organism and environment into progressively more
elaborate polar self- and world- schemas. It also entails that conscious
and self-aware beings can be neither completely self-transparent nor
omniscient; nor can they completely forget either their own existence or
the world=92s. They can be neither gods nor things; each must be its own
particular subjectivity, absorbing, through experience, its own memories,
and using their constituents as building blocks to create its own
imaginings and to choose towards which of these to strive.
<paraindent><param>out</param> (How) Are We Different from Chimps?</parain=
dent>
<paraindent><param>out</param>The great apes breach the Godelian limit, bu=
t just barely. While they
demonstrate self-awareness, it is, at best, at the Piagetian level of
concrete operations, and most likely remains at the pre-operational level.=
They hand-modify objects into implements in response to the exigencies
of a present need, then discard them. They neither use a tool in the
manufacture of an implement, nor do they retain the implement once its
immediate purpose is achieved, much less assemble a toolkit, and they
rarely combine implements in action. Their gestures are likewise
prompted solely by the circumstance in which they occur (Tran Duc
Thao, <underline>Investigations into the Origin of Language and Consciousn=
ess</underline>,
1984). They have a limited vocabulary of mostly instinctually based
calls, with at best traces of syntax. While it is true that they can be
trained to some degree in rudimentary forms of communication, they
have not been observed to spontaneously create or transmit open-ended
syntactical systems in the wild. They invent neither composite
technology, nor languages composed of arbitrary and mutually defining
signs, and the creation of text systems is far beyond them. We may share
98% of our DNA with apes, but that other 2% is responsible for
immense differences.
<paraindent><param>out</param> The Genesis and Development of Symbolic Cap=
acity in Children</paraindent>
<paraindent><param>out</param>Infants engage their world first through the=
engagement of the
caregiver and the exploration of their bodily motility. When they can
begin to coordinate actions with perceptions (age three to eight months),
they begin an investigation of the properties of physical objects and thei=
r
ability to affect them (experiments with contingency). As they learn
person permanence, self-permanence, object permanence, means-ends
relationships (rudimentary causality) and the self-other distinction (age
eight to twelve months), they begin to experience specific emotional
states and to exhibit imitative behavior. Between one and two years of
age, children undergo a rapid linguistic assimilation, a grasp of more
complex causal chains and the onset of symbolic representation (Lewis
and Brooks Gunn, <italic>op. Cit.</italic>). They speak in single words, =
then in pairs,
then with progressively differentiated syntax. (<underline>The Language of=
Children</underline>,
Mathilda Holzman, 1997). Their vocabulary grows from the most
concrete generic (=93cat=94, =93dog=94) into the more integrated general
(=93animal=94) and the more differentiated particular (=93Persian=94, =93S=
iamese=94,
=93poodle=94 =93terrier=94)(<underline>The Modularity of Mind</underline>,=
Jerry Fodor, 1983). They
rarely can be taught to begin reading before the age of three, and
generally not until the age of four or five.
<paraindent><param>out</param> The Evolution of Technology </paraindent>
<paraindent><param>out</param>This evolution emerges from the substrate of=
bodily action, which
involves the unmediated appropriation of the object. The second stage
consists of the use of unmodified implements as a means of imitative
bodily extension (using a stick to reach, strike or fend off). Next comes=
the bodily modification of the implement to more efficiently accomplish
the task. The succeeding stage, which adds another layer of mediation, is=
the first appearance of a true tool, in which one object (the tool) is use=
d
to modify another (the implement) for the task, and toolkits may be
assembled. At this point, true creativity begins: implements begin to be
fashioned which perform their designated tasks in manners other than
imitative extensions of bodily action. This is the stage where brute
signification of created (rather than natural) objects occurs, and their
meaning is identical with (a mental image of) their use. There are,
however, only a finite (and small) number of basic shapes available; these=
are refined into multipurpose tool types (wheel, lever, wedge, spring,
etc.), where the use of the tool in the particular task is subsumed by a
conceptually idealized shape which facilitates general applicability. At
this point the revolution begins. The <underline>machine principle of tec=
hnology</underline> is
developed; objects that are useless in isolation and derive their
significance solely from their use as connectors are combined with these
tool types into useful composite wholes, which themselves may serve as
modules in more complex constructions, as long as they obey physical
constraints. Now an endless variety of machines may possibly be
constructed, an unlimited diversity of tasks may potentially be
performed, and the ranges of action and perception may be extended into
the micros and the cosmos, although certain standard machine types will
predominate. Finally, in the theoretical physical sciences (physics,
chemistry, etc.), all specific applications are transcended; such abstract=
principles may be instantiated for application to any task.
<paraindent><param>out</param> The Evolution of Language</paraindent>
<paraindent><param>out</param>This evolution also emerges from the substra=
te of bodily action, and
begins with calls or movements intended to elicit the attention of a
responsive other. Next comes the indicative gesture, which directs the
attention of the other away from the gesturer toward something upon
which the gesturer wishes the other to focus. This may be seen as arising
from imitative bodily extension in the absence of an implement; one is
pointing at that which one would have touched with a stick had one had a
stick in hand. This indirect bodily action, directed toward a responsive
other, constitutes primordial communication. The third stage involves
modifying natural vocalization into an imitative representation of an
absent referent (onomatopoeic words probably have their origin here). A
small array of primitive signals may be assembled, but many objects
make no sound to imitate. Genuine creativity makes its appearance here;
the advent of rudimentary but genuine sign systems, where the signs still
have specific referents, but are no longer constrained to imitate them.
These are refined into multipurpose signs (number names, primary color
and shape names, etc.), where the use of a sign to indicate whole, single
and particular things is subsumed by its employment to represent general
attributes which have been abstracted from them. Still, the array of
possible monosyllabic sounds is inadequate for efficient discourse. A
revolution, the <underline>phonemic principle of language</underline>, is =
required, where sounds
that are meaningless in themselves are combined into meaningful wholes,
some of which are multipurpose signs and some of which derive their
significance solely from their use as links connecting and relating these
multipurpose signs in varying ways. These words may be combined into
sentences obeying syntactic laws that must themselves, to be useful,
facilitate a reliable representation and communication of the physical
entities, situations and relations being described. Now an unlimited
number of signs may be created, and spun into boundless streams of
discourse, although certain standardized constructions will predominate.
Finally, in algebra and symbolic logic, all specific references are
transcended, and any referent may be abstractly represented.
<paraindent><param>out</param>
(6) The Evolution of Text
<paraindent><param>out</param>This evolution also emerges from the substra=
te of bodily action, and
is initiated by the need to direct attention to others, such as predators,=
prey or conspecifics. It begins with mimicry, or bodily imitation
(representation) of the movements of present or absent others, most
likely paired with indicative gestures to indicate either the other(s) bei=
ng
mimicked (if present) or the direction in which the absent other(s) lie(s)=
..
Inanimate things (such as landmarks) are much harder to mimic,
however, and if absent can not be pointed out. In such cases, the
mimicry, or subjective bodily representation, would require external
objectification into the depiction of things and maps (drawing in the dirt=
seems a likely first step). The picture represents by means of imitation,=
and is intended to evoke in the viewer the mental image of that which it
depicts, or at least the capacity to recognize the depicted, when one
encounters it, by means of its depiction=92s remembered similarity to it. =
In
the case of maps, the territory as a whole is the represented object.
These pictures become simplified and standardized into glyphs.
However, many meanings are not of corporeal entities; they are thus not
subject to depiction. The glyphs therefore accumulate secondary
meanings, which metaphorically refer to these undepictables. Such a
glyphic vocabulary is unwieldy, however; the Chinese system has over
one hundred thousand separate characters, many of which are barely
distinguishable and easily confused. The <underline>phonetic principle of=
text</underline>
overcame this difficulty. A small number of glyphs (an alphabet of
letters and numerals) which have progressively lost their original
reference meaning, are used to represent the phonemes of spoken
language and the basic numbers. They may thus be efficiently combined
into textual representations of any word or quantity, by means of
punctuation (such as: ; ! ? etc.) and arithmetical symbols (+, -, =3D, etc=
..),
which possess purpose solely as differing subspecies of mediations
between representational groups.
(7) Similarities, Differences and Dependencies
<paraindent><param>out</param>Technology and language both pass through th=
e stages of direct
bodily action, mediated bodily action, imitative action, creative action,
eclipse of particularity by structure, the creation of composites, and
abstract generalization. Text evolves from mimicry through depiction of
types and numbers of objects to the representation of their linguistic
referents, first as individual glyphs and counting marks, then as
alphabetical and numeric composites. Technology involves a physical
action upon objects; language involves a symbolic reference to anything
conceivable. The creation of tools also created meaning not found in
nature =96the tool came to represent its use. Thus the first signs were
tools, and technology evolved prior to and was a condition for the
possibility of language. Texts are both systems of signs in their own
right, and tools by means of which we represent the language upon which
their present form of existence depends. Text underwent (from its
divergence as depiction) an independent though structurally similar
evolution to language - independent due to the differences inherent in
auditory versus visual media, similar since they were referred by the
same species of mind to the same world. Once the phonemic principle
of language took hold, however, the phonetic principle of text, with some
exceptions (not all societies are literate), followed. Thereafter, as the
increasing capabilities of an expanding spoken vocabulary co-opted
progressively more of the tasks previously requiring depiction, text was
primarily placed (with certain exceptions, such as maps, mathematics and
musical notation) in the service of language representation, and graphic
depiction was increasingly relegated to the realm of art.
(8) The Communication of Information in the Pre-linguistic Domain
<paraindent><param>out</param>Before <italic>telling</italic> (a kind of <=
italic>saying</italic>) became a viable means to
communicate a <italic>knowing</italic>, it had to be transmitted by demons=
tration, or
<italic>showing.</italic> This is the most intimate and concrete mode of
communication, requiring the spatio-temporal co-presence of the
show<italic>er</italic>, the thing <italic>shown</italic>, the show<italic=
>ing</italic> of this thing, and those <italic>to whom</italic> <italic>it=
is shown</italic>. In fact, in this mode, the <italic>showing</italic> an=
d the <italic>thing shown</italic> are
only divisible if the latter is a separate physical object (pointing
something out). If what is being shown is a <italic>doing</italic>, such =
as swimming, or
a <italic>making</italic> (which is a kind of doing) such as knapping a ha=
ndaxe, the
instrumentality and the expressiveness of the body (or the =91what to
do/make=92 and the =91how to do/make=92) are seamless. This knowing is
transmitted through observation and imitation of the doing or making, and
immediate feedback is available from the world concerning whether or
not those shown are gaining the <italic>having</italic> of the knowledge f=
or themselves
(or whether they, too, can make/do). This knowing would most likely be
best retained by routinizing the sequence of actions involved (<underline>=
Mind over
Machine</underline>, Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986; <underline>The Logic of Prac=
tice</underline>, Pierre
Bourdieu, 1990), a procedure easily generalizable into ritual.
(9) Linguistic Information Communication
<paraindent><param>out</param>Once people possessed a common language, a k=
nowing could be
transmitted by <italic>telling</italic>, which was more flexible than show=
ing. The tell<italic>er</italic>,
the tell<italic>ing</italic> and those <italic>to whom it was told</italic=
> must still be spatio-temporally
co-present, but the presence of the thing <italic>told</italic> is not req=
uired. This frees
events to be communicated to those absent from their occurrence, but
permits lying, mistakes, miscommunication and misunderstanding, for
the feedback from the world required in a showing may be omitted. One
can tell another what/how to do or make without doing or making
oneself; one can <underline>only</underline> show by one=92s own doing or =
making. Telling also
permits the transmission of abstractions such as theories, speculations,
and ideas, which, lacking physical instantiation, can not be shown.
<paraindent><param>out</param>Unlike showing, telling is a coding of the t=
hing told. One listens to
telling not as a showing is observed, as a presentation of an event, but a=
s a
string of symbols bereft of any spatio-temporality which belongs to that
told of rather than to its telling. There is no environmental context, no
gestalt; the knowing received through telling carries no memory.
Mnemonics such as rhythm, sibilance and rhyme (<underline>Goatfoot Milkton=
gue
Twinbird</underline>, 1978, Donald Hall), used to retain the told as it wa=
s told, would
naturally form the basis for early poetic epics.
<paraindent><param>out</param> The Advent of Text</paraindent>
<paraindent><param>out</param>A common written code further abstracts the =
knowing from any
particular event. The <italic>writing</italic> must of course be co-prese=
nt with the
writ<italic>er</italic>, but the presence of neither the written<italic> o=
f </italic>nor the written <italic>to</italic> is
required. The fluidity of discourse can be frozen like ice on a sheet of
papyrus, ripped from the lived worlds of both the teller and the told, and=
sent unchanging across space-time to anonymous readers. Now history
can be recorded and knowledge accumulated and preserved, freed from
the vagaries of memory and the passing of masters. Science begins to
gleam in the alchemical eye of superstition, music takes the first steps
from melody to symphony, and from the synthesis of ritual and poetry,
theatre may be born. Logo-centric =91religions of the book=92 may supplan=
t
prehistoric pagan rites and contend with each other, and philosophy may
begin to probe both their assertions and its own.
<bold>
</bold>(11) A Recapitulation of Terms
<paraindent><param>out</param><italic>Being, knowing </italic>and <italic>=
having</italic> are<bold> states</bold>; <italic>doing, saying</italic> an=
d <italic>making
</italic>are <bold>processes</bold>. Knowing and having are modes of bein=
g, and knowing is a
having of knowledge. Likewise, saying and making are modes of doing,
and saying is a making of discourse. There are other dependencies, also;
one must <italic>be</italic> (although since life is involved in dynamic
organism/environment exchange even when at rest, all living <italic>being<=
/italic> is
actually a <italic>becoming</italic>) in order to <italic>do</italic>, one=
must <italic>know</italic> in order to <italic>say</italic>, and
one must <italic>have</italic> in order to <italic>make</italic>. Showing=
, telling and writing may
involve <italic>doing</italic> or <italic>making</italic>, but are essenti=
ally forms of <italic>saying</italic>.
(12) Why Technology Had to Precede Language, and the March of the
<italic>Ur</italic>-Meme
<paraindent><param>out</param>The coordinated system of perception and act=
ion which humans
possess took millions of years to develop, and our huge and finely
articulated brains required constant selective reinforcement from the
environment in order to evolve. In this sense, our quick strong bright
nimbleness is a result of the pre-reproductive demise of a lot of slow
weak clumsy dumb ancestors. These are individual skills; those with
them have a <italic>prima facie</italic> reproductive advantage over those=
without them.
Language, however, is social. What possible use could it have been for
the first mutant to have a modest capacity for linguistic expression in th=
e
absence of interlocutors? Language facility is simply not a likely
candidate for gradual evolution in the same manner as hunting and
gathering skills. It is much more likely that a genetically dominant
second order mutation in brain systems organization hijacked an already
elaborated hand-eye coordination system and applied it to the =93mouth-
ear=94 nexus (<underline>Uniquely Human</underline>, Philip Lieberman, 199=
1). In this way, the
social benefits could be realized in just a few generations. Once this
mutation spread within a group of hunter-gatherers, its members could
yell for help better and both express and apprehend more subtle
emotional states =96 useful skills in a nomadic foraging band. Being
informationally rather than biologically based, the machine, phonetic and
phonemic principles of tools, signs and texts were nevertheless most
likely extrapolated from the gestalt contexture of action/perception; the
structures underlining these therefore appear to constitute a
combinatorial <italic>Ur</italic>-meme (<underline>The Selfish Gene</under=
line>, Richard Dawkins, 1976).
Remember the Gaia Hypothesis (James Lovelock, 1979)? It states that
the aggregate of terrestrial life tends to regulate its own environment to=
facilitate its own perpetuation. Now, imagine human minds as, due to the
evolution of their somatic perceptual structuring of their surroundings,
already favorably disposed environments in which these principles,
considered as informational forms of life, take root. They would need to
protect their niches and to replicate; the first is accomplished by
evolving to give the host environment a reason to have them around
(much like <italic>E. Coli </italic>bacteria facilitate digestion) and the=
second by
evolving ease of infection (transmitting/teaching the principles to
others). Once tool-craft got going, tool forms would evolve to give the
best selective advantage to those possessing them at the same time
humans would evolve to more quickly and efficiently conceive of and
produce better and better tools. Once language piggybacked onto the co-
opted coordination system, it would evolve to be most easily absorbed
into children=92s brains at the same time it would offer a progressively
greater selective social advantage to those children whose brains were
most permeable to it (<underline>The Symbolic Species</underline>, Terrenc=
e W. Deacon,
1997). The evolutionary imperative is in this case exactly the opposite
of that of biotic killers such as influenza, measles, and gonorrhea, which=
had to evolve to become less virulent to allow for their transmission
before the death of the host. In their case, the more efficient lose the
competition to those strains which manifest slower or less completely.
On the contrary, incubation of these informational life forms grants a
selective reproductive advantage to those infected; the evolutionary
exigencies therefore gravitate towards more communicable forms with
faster incubation and more global mental infestation. Rather than
virulent, these memes are budding symbionts; like mental mitochondria.
And so telling is more easily and widely communicable than showing, and
writing more amenable to distribution than telling. So far this may seem=
mere speculation, but watch how it dovetails with history.
<paraindent><param>out</param> Once texts began to be created, they becam=
e more desired as the
literati gained power and influence. Scholars and scribes seemed to exist=
solely for the task of creating and replicating libraries of texts, which
seemed to exist solely to employ scribes and train scholars. Mass
production of tools and texts has led to corporate culture, labor division=
and assembly lines, which in turn have allowed the construction of mass
communications systems, and mass transit systems to distribute both the
codes and their carriers. These dendritic hybrids of tool, sign and text
are connecting human =91neurons=92 into a terran brain, communicating our
codes by means of metacodes. Not only has the ground of past history
beneath our feet been excavated by means of our textually informed gaze,
but the horizon of the future has been dissolved into the present as our
televisions and telephones abolish space-time through instantaneous
communication (<underline>The Spell of the Sensuous</underline>, David Abr=
am, 1996). And
we have made countless copies of them all.
(13) Staring at a Screen Darkly
<paraindent><param>out</param>The advent of the Internet recombines the ab=
olition of space-time
barriers to communication with the constant and instant availability of
(potentially) practically all textual knowledge, as computer aided design
and computer assisted manufacture threaten to leave the proletariat with
little beyond bourgeois leisure and a subsistence stipend. The underclass=
will be known not as the unwashed, but as the unwired. With every
computer terminal a <italic>samizdat</italic>, governments (and religions)=
will
progressively lose their ability to tell the big lies and make them stick
(see <italic>Zapatista</italic>). Guerilla semioticians will increasingly=
=91poach=92 the
icons and symbols of governmental, religious and corporate institutions
and imbue them with different and frequently subversive meanings (<underli=
ne>The
Practice of Everyday Life</underline>, Michel de Certeau, 1984). Authorit=
y will
issue not from age, race, gender or status, but from the internal
consistency, logical cogency, linguistic clarity and external coherence of=
one=92s positions. Spoken and written language forms will continue
vanishing as quickly as endangered species, as informational selection
takes its Darwinian toll. The hegemony of employment over location
will melt away as more and more jobs can be performed from anywhere
with power and a telephone line. Global democracy will supercede
multiple national sovereignty as humanity=92s attachments to borders and
boundaries will shrink along with their relevance to the lives of an
increasingly individually sovereign citizenry (as Francis Fukuyama
foresaw in <underline>The End Of History</underline>, 1992). The policy =
debates now
occurring within electronic =91town meetings=92 will be settled by cyber-
votes. The Human Genome Project will allow human beings to
genetically know themselves (Socrates and Hippocrates would be
pleased) and to re-engineer their codes to remove textual errors
(inherited defects). If they like the result, genocopies (clones) will be=
possible, and there is already talk of exploiting the shared binary codes
of computer language and the double helix to create DNA computers.
The meme will then have traveled full circle, finding its way back to the
gene. In the coming millenium, <italic>homo sapiens</italic> will be both=
weavers of
and woven by, for better or for worse, the informational warp and
communicational weft of a co-evolutionary New Web Order.
<color><param>7F00,0000,0000</param><FontFamily><param>Arial</param>> Wher=
e the only things you were taught about Christianity is fear and
> punishment? Did anyone take the time to tell you about the rewards of
> spirituality?
>
> It is as if you were taught the religion of fear and punishment? Fear i=
s not
> faith and God is forgiving - I would think you would be forgiven for not
> believing in your own soul - but why go there?
>
> The question would be "What is the reward for believing in Darwin's theo=
ry?"
> So you live to die? Just be born, live and die -evolve and no reasoning
> inbetween - then you could just eat bananas and swing from trees like th=
e
> other monkeys and be content with that? Could you be? I need more stimu=
lation
> - Being a real person spiritually involves evolving your brain and heart=
-
> learning and growing - our ability to reason something we humans have
> different from the other animals - now why is that? How would Darwin ex=
plain
> that - if we were just animals without souls how would Darwin describe t=
he
> human brain - explain that? It should be obvious to us by now that we =
evolve
> differently then other animals - but why? Who/what gave us that ability=
to
> reason? We act on more then just instinct - why? Are the questions we =
should
> be asking. Maybe Darwin had it half right? The human brain should be t=
he
> marvel that defeats his theory!
>
> Love,
> Angela
>
