Of course. And malarial mosquitoes and guinea worm and all those other well evolved creatures.

Nature is not good, Nature is neutral. What is natural is what works. Nature is like a businessman who is only concerned about making money, he may do good by creating jobs and producing products that people want, but he may also get rich by manufacturing flamable baby clothes and other undesirable things. Just because Nature took a long time getting us where we are today does not mean that the current natural state is the best of all possible worlds.

Bill Silvert

----- Original Message ----- From: "Martin Meiss" <[email protected]>
To: <[email protected]>
Sent: quarta-feira, 12 de Maio de 2010 17:17
Subject: Re: [ECOLOG-L] Ecology Terminology and associated phenomena Colonizing species etc


So, Mr. Patton, if you could, would you re-introduce smallpox and polio? It
took nature millions of years to get them working properly on the human
population.
            Martin Meiss

2010/5/12 Jan Ygberg <[email protected]>

Humans are not part of nature? No wonder the planet is sick.....

On Tue, May 11, 2010 at 10:15 PM, Geoffrey Patton <[email protected]
>wrote:

> This has been an especially interesting and worthwhile discussion,
> particularly on the ethics front. My ethics derive from an ecologist
whose
> name I can no longer recall but whose mantra was that Nature took
millions
> of years to sort out the current state and any human-caused change is, > by
> definition, adverse. Where people have a hand in it, it is bad,
regardless
> of any perceived shot-term benefit. Pedagogical but true in my view.
>
> Cordially yours,
>  Geoff Patton, Ph.D.  2208 Parker Ave., Wheaton, MD 20902
 301.221.9536
>
> --- On Tue, 5/11/10, James Crants <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> From: James Crants <[email protected]>
> Subject: Re: [ECOLOG-L] Ecology Terminology and associated phenomena
> Colonizing species etc
> To: [email protected]
> Date: Tuesday, May 11, 2010, 10:47 AM
>
> I think I have not made my arguments clearly enough.  I merely intended
> to summarize my moral case for suppressing invasives as part of my
summary
> of the off-forum conversation.  My numbered paragraphs were intended to
> address the claim that there is no ecological difference between native
and
> exotic species, and the claim that there is no ecological difference
> between
> human-mediated dispersal and dispersal by any other agent. My > responses
to
> Matt's responses to those paragraphs are below:
>
>
> JC(1) Exotic species, on average, interact with fewer species than > native
>
> > species, and their interactions are  weaker, on average.  In
particular,
> > they have fewer parasites, pathogens, and predators, counted in > > either
> > individuals or species.  This is especially true of plants, and
> especially
> > non-crop plants.  I suspect, but have not heard, that exotic plants
also
> > have fewer mycorrhizal associates than native ones, but I doubt that
they
> > have significantly fewer pollinators or dispersers. Meanwhile, back > > in
> > their native ranges, the same species have the same number of
> associations
> > as any other native species.
> > MC(1) Natural selection only produces interactions good enough to
persist
> > under prevailing conditions; there is no gold standard. By > > definition,
> 50%
> > of all species interact with fewer species than average, and  50% of
all
> > interactions are weaker than average.  Preferring stronger, more
complex
> > interactions means preferring more tightly-coupled (and therefore)
> > 'riskier'
> > systems with a higher likelihood of failure.
> >
> JC (1b) The argument about how many species interact with fewer species
> than
> average misses my point. I'm saying that, if you counted the > biological > interactions for each native species and each exotic species in some > area
> (could be a square meter, could be the world), I believe you would find
> that
> the average number for exotic species would be significantly lower than
the
> average for exotic species.  Thus, exotic species are ecologically
> different
> from native species.
>
> Actually, having more interactions may mean greater stability, on
average,
> since some of those interactions are functionally redundant.  I would
have
> to brush up on my community ecology to be sure I'm not being overly
> simplistic, but I know this is true in pollination systems; pollinators
> that
> interact with more angiosperm species have greater population > stability,
on
> average, and angiosperms with more pollinator species have greater
> reproductive stability, on average (though I don't know if this leads > to
> greater population stability for long-lived species).
>
> I'm not sure what you mean by "systems with a higher likelihood of
> failure."  It seems to me that failure is a matter of human values not
> being
> realized.  If, by "failure," you mean "rapid change," well, that hardly
> seems to be a problem for you.  I would have to agree that systems
managed
> to promote natives at the expense of exotics are more prone to failure
than
> those where any and all ecological outcomes are deemed acceptable, but
> that's only because "failure" in the former group means invasion and
> domination by exotic species, while there is no such thing as "failure"
in
> the latter group.
>
> >
> > JC(2) Very-long-distance dispersal by humans confers a fitness
advantage
> > over very-long-distance dispersal by other agents, on average, for > > two
> > reasons.  First, humans often disperse organisms in groups, such
> > as containers of seeds, shipments of mature plants and animals, or
large
> > populations contained in ballast water, allowing them to overcome the
> Allee
> > effects (lack of mates, inbreeding depression) their populations > > would
> face
> > if introduced as one or a few individuals. We also often take pains > > to
> > maximize the establishment success of organisms we disperse, by
shipping
> > healthy, mature plants and animals and propogating them when they
arrive,
> > while non-human dispersal agents usually introduce small numbers of
> > organisms, often nowhere near their peak fitness potential (e.g.,
seeds,
> > spores, starving and dehydrated animals).
> > MC(2). JC appears to be arguing that once rare occurrences are no
longer
> > rare.  I agree.  But I draw the opposite conclusion, because he is
> arguing
> > that to generate such changes is morally wrong, while I am just > > saying:
> > when
> > these conditions prevail, long distance dispersal becomes normal.
> >
> JC(2b) I'm not saying anything (here) about whether the recent > commonness
> of
> previously-rare dispersal events is morally wrong.  I'm countering the
> argument that human-mediated dispersal confers no fitness advantage
> over dispersal by any other agent.  Others may be aware of an invasive
> exotic species that was not imported by humans in far greater numbers
than
> we could reasonably expect from any other agent, even if it had 100,000
> years to work, but I am not.
>
> Furthermore, most invasive species were carefully planted and tended
across
> large areas.  Others may know of a dispersal agent that takes such care
of
> the species it disperses AND has any realistic potential of dispersing
> something over 1,000 miles, but I do not.  Human-mediated dispersal is
> unlike dispersal mediated by any other agent.
>
>
> > JC(3) Although the population dynamics of invasive species do not
differ
> by
> > what agent introduced them (whether humans brought them, some other
agent
> > did, or they evolved in situ), it is ecologically consequential that
> human
> > activities are generating so many more invasive species than natural
> > processes usually do.  Aside from maybe continents or oceans merging
> > through
> > plate tectonics, nothing non-human introduces such a flood of new
species
> > to
> > new environments as we humans have in the last several centuries.
> > MC(3). See MC(2).  What was once normal is no longer normal.
> 'Ecologically
> > consequential' in this context is standing in for 'morally
> consequential'.
> > Ecologically, change is change.
> >
> JC(3b) By this logic, ice ages are ecologically inconsequential. I'm > not > making a moral judgement (here). I'm only pointing out that humans > have
> accelerated the frequency of invasion by new species by many orders of
> magnitude, and that this is having the sort of dramatic ecological
effects
> you would, in theory, expect it to have.  Again, this goes toward
> countering
> the claim that there is no ecological difference between human-mediated
> dispersal and dispersal by other agents.  If we are increasing the
> probability of intercontinental dispersal by many orders of magnitude
over
> what you find for all other agents combined, there is an ecologically
> important difference between human-mediated dispersal and dispersal by
> other
> agents.
>
> >
> > JC(4) To arrive at the conclusion that the terms "native" and > > "exotic"
> (or
> > "alien") are ecologically meaningless, you must approach the issue > > this
> > way:  if there is no set of criteria by which one can reliably
categorize
> > an
> > organism as native or exotic in the absence of historical evidence, > > the
> > distinction is meaningless.  I think the valid approach is this:  if
> there
> > is no set of criteria by which one can reliably distinguish the
category
> > "native species" from the category "exotic species" (*after* the
> > categorization is done based on geographic history), the distinction > > is > > meaningless. By analogy, the first approach is like saying that > > there
is
> > no
> > difference in height between men and women because one cannot > > reliably > > identify the height of a person by their sex, while the second > > approach
> is
> > like saying that there is a difference in height between men and > > women
> > because men are, on average, significantly taller than women.
> > MC(4).  JC undermines his argument here by trying to make the
difference
> > between natives and aliens morally inconsequential.  I think we can
> assume
> > that he sees no moral imperative emerging from the statistical
likelihood
> > that men are (and have been) taller than women.  But we know he
believes
> a
> > moral imperative emerges from the claims he makes in (1-3).  So his
> analogy
> > isn't really an analogy.   A better analogy would be a claim that men
> are,
> > on average, more politically powerful than women, evaluated in light > > of
a
> > moral claim that no such difference should exist.  But even that
analogy
> > would only recommend equalizing average fitness; leveling the playing
> > field.
> > And it flies in the face of the "past = desired future" formula
inherent
> in
> > anti-alien sentiment. Finally, if Williamson's legendary '10s' rule > > is
> > even
> > remotely accurate, the aliens are already disadvantaged by multiple
> orders
> > of magnitude. Long distance transport is now vastly more likely, but
> > establishment at the other end is still a long shot.
> >
> JC(4b) Again, I'm not making a moral argument at all.  You (and others)
> have
> said that native and exotic species cannot be distinguished > ecologically. > One way I've seen other people arrive at this conclusion is by > observing > that there are no ecological criteria that can perfectly predict > whether
a
> species is native or exotic (e.g., there are invasive natives, there > are
> exotic plants with more insect herbivores than related natives, etc.).
 I'm
> saying that this approach is like trying to predict people's sex based
> on their height, noting that you often guess wrong this way, and
concluding
> that sex is not relevant to height.
>
>
>
>
>


--
Jan Ygberg
Juan Fanning 380
Lima 18
Peru
INT+(511) 446 1099

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