This was fixed in ecryptfs-utils-74.
- pam_ecryptfs.c: don't try to unwrap key for users not using pam
mounting
:-Dustin
** Changed in: ecryptfs
Importance: Undecided => Medium
** Changed in: ecryptfs
Status: New => Fix Committed
** Changed in: ecryptfs
Assignee: (unassigned) => Dustin Kirkland (kirkland)
** Changed in: ecryptfs
Status: Fix Committed => Fix Released
--
Inadvertent opening of encrypted dir
https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/370627
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Status in eCryptfs - Enterprise Cryptographic Filesystem: Fix Released
Bug description:
I've found what I think is quite a significant bug in ecryptfs. I am a user who
has auto-login enabled so it means that ecryptfs correctly (as designed) does
not automatically mount ~/.Private/. I've discovered that any time you use
"sudo" that your password get installed in the kernel keyring and your
~/.Private dir becomes automatically available to be mounted merely by
(anybody) clicking on the standard "Access your Private data" link. No
password/passphrase is then required to be explicitly entered to open your
private dir. The same problem applies even if you don't use auto-login - you
may think you have closed off private access with ecryptfs-umount-private but a
simple sudo somewhere else makes your private directory available again without
entering a password.
It is un-reasonable and dangerous that a typical naive user should have to be
aware that he has exposed his private dir just because he did an sudo somewhere
completely unrelated. There should be no correlation between sudo and this
ecryptfs functionality.
I'm using ecryptfs-utils version 73-0ubuntu6 on jaunty.
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