Revision: 16380
http://sourceforge.net/p/edk2/code/16380
Author: qlong
Date: 2014-11-14 08:41:12 +0000 (Fri, 14 Nov 2014)
Log Message:
-----------
UEFI 2.4 X509 Certificate Hash and RFC3161 Timestamp Verification support for
Secure Boot
Main ChangeLogs includes:
1. Introduce the new GUID and structure definitions for certificate hash and
timestamp support;
2. Update Image Verification Library to support DBT signature checking;
3. Update the related SecureBoot Configuration Pages;
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Qin Long <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Guo Dong <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Siyuan Fu <[email protected]>
Modified Paths:
--------------
trunk/edk2/MdePkg/Include/Guid/ImageAuthentication.h
trunk/edk2/MdePkg/MdePkg.dec
trunk/edk2/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c
trunk/edk2/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.h
trunk/edk2/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.inf
trunk/edk2/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/RuntimeDxe/AuthService.c
trunk/edk2/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/RuntimeDxe/Variable.c
trunk/edk2/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfig.vfr
trunk/edk2/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigDxe.inf
trunk/edk2/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigFileExplorer.c
trunk/edk2/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigImpl.c
trunk/edk2/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigImpl.h
trunk/edk2/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigNvData.h
trunk/edk2/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigStrings.uni
Modified: trunk/edk2/MdePkg/Include/Guid/ImageAuthentication.h
===================================================================
--- trunk/edk2/MdePkg/Include/Guid/ImageAuthentication.h 2014-11-14
00:39:04 UTC (rev 16379)
+++ trunk/edk2/MdePkg/Include/Guid/ImageAuthentication.h 2014-11-14
08:41:12 UTC (rev 16380)
@@ -1,23 +1,24 @@
/** @file
Image signature database are defined for the signed image validation.
- Copyright (c) 2009 - 2013, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
- This program and the accompanying materials
- are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD
License
- which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be
found at
- http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php
+ Copyright (c) 2009 - 2014, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
+ This program and the accompanying materials
+ are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD
License
+ which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be
found at
+ http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php
- THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,
- WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR
IMPLIED.
+ THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,
+ WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.
@par Revision Reference:
- GUIDs defined in UEFI 2.3.1 spec.
+ GUIDs defined in UEFI 2.4 spec.
**/
#ifndef __IMAGE_AUTHTICATION_H__
#define __IMAGE_AUTHTICATION_H__
#include <Guid/GlobalVariable.h>
+#include <Protocol/Hash.h>
#define EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID \
{ \
@@ -25,15 +26,20 @@
}
///
-/// Varialbe name with guid EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID
+/// Varialbe name with guid EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID
/// for the authorized signature database.
///
#define EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE L"db"
///
-/// Varialbe name with guid EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID
+/// Varialbe name with guid EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID
/// for the forbidden signature database.
///
#define EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1 L"dbx"
+///
+/// Variable name with guid EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID
+/// for the timestamp signature database.
+///
+#define EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE2 L"dbt"
#define SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE 1
#define SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE 0
@@ -45,7 +51,7 @@
// Signature Database
//***********************************************************************
///
-/// The format of a signature database.
+/// The format of a signature database.
///
#pragma pack(1)
@@ -76,17 +82,50 @@
///
/// Size of each signature.
///
- UINT32 SignatureSize;
+ UINT32 SignatureSize;
///
- /// Header before the array of signatures. The format of this header is
specified
+ /// Header before the array of signatures. The format of this header is
specified
/// by the SignatureType.
/// UINT8 SignatureHeader[SignatureHeaderSize];
///
- /// An array of signatures. Each signature is SignatureSize bytes in length.
+ /// An array of signatures. Each signature is SignatureSize bytes in length.
/// EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA Signatures[][SignatureSize];
///
} EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST;
+typedef struct {
+ ///
+ /// The SHA256 hash of an X.509 certificate's To-Be-Signed contents.
+ ///
+ EFI_SHA256_HASH ToBeSignedHash;
+ ///
+ /// The time that the certificate shall be considered to be revoked.
+ ///
+ EFI_TIME TimeOfRevocation;
+} EFI_CERT_X509_SHA256;
+
+typedef struct {
+ ///
+ /// The SHA384 hash of an X.509 certificate's To-Be-Signed contents.
+ ///
+ EFI_SHA384_HASH ToBeSignedHash;
+ ///
+ /// The time that the certificate shall be considered to be revoked.
+ ///
+ EFI_TIME TimeOfRevocation;
+} EFI_CERT_X509_SHA384;
+
+typedef struct {
+ ///
+ /// The SHA512 hash of an X.509 certificate's To-Be-Signed contents.
+ ///
+ EFI_SHA512_HASH ToBeSignedHash;
+ ///
+ /// The time that the certificate shall be considered to be revoked.
+ ///
+ EFI_TIME TimeOfRevocation;
+} EFI_CERT_X509_SHA512;
+
#pragma pack()
///
@@ -103,7 +142,7 @@
/// This identifies a signature containing an RSA-2048 key. The key (only the
modulus
/// since the public key exponent is known to be 0x10001) shall be stored in
big-endian
/// order.
-/// The SignatureHeader size shall always be 0. The SignatureSize shall always
be 16 (size
+/// The SignatureHeader size shall always be 0. The SignatureSize shall always
be 16 (size
/// of SignatureOwner component) + 256 bytes.
///
#define EFI_CERT_RSA2048_GUID \
@@ -112,8 +151,8 @@
}
///
-/// This identifies a signature containing a RSA-2048 signature of a SHA-256
hash. The
-/// SignatureHeader size shall always be 0. The SignatureSize shall always be
16 (size of
+/// This identifies a signature containing a RSA-2048 signature of a SHA-256
hash. The
+/// SignatureHeader size shall always be 0. The SignatureSize shall always be
16 (size of
/// SignatureOwner component) + 256 bytes.
///
#define EFI_CERT_RSA2048_SHA256_GUID \
@@ -131,8 +170,8 @@
}
///
-/// TThis identifies a signature containing a RSA-2048 signature of a SHA-1
hash. The
-/// SignatureHeader size shall always be 0. The SignatureSize shall always be
16 (size of
+/// TThis identifies a signature containing a RSA-2048 signature of a SHA-1
hash. The
+/// SignatureHeader size shall always be 0. The SignatureSize shall always be
16 (size of
/// SignatureOwner component) + 256 bytes.
///
#define EFI_CERT_RSA2048_SHA1_GUID \
@@ -142,11 +181,11 @@
///
/// This identifies a signature based on an X.509 certificate. If the
signature is an X.509
-/// certificate then verification of the signature of an image should validate
the public
-/// key certificate in the image using certificate path verification, up to
this X.509
+/// certificate then verification of the signature of an image should validate
the public
+/// key certificate in the image using certificate path verification, up to
this X.509
/// certificate as a trusted root. The SignatureHeader size shall always be
0. The
-/// SignatureSize may vary but shall always be 16 (size of the SignatureOwner
component) +
-/// the size of the certificate itself.
+/// SignatureSize may vary but shall always be 16 (size of the SignatureOwner
component) +
+/// the size of the certificate itself.
/// Note: This means that each certificate will normally be in a separate
EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST.
///
#define EFI_CERT_X509_GUID \
@@ -172,7 +211,7 @@
#define EFI_CERT_SHA384_GUID \
{ \
0xff3e5307, 0x9fd0, 0x48c9, {0x85, 0xf1, 0x8a, 0xd5, 0x6c, 0x70, 0x1e,
0x1} \
- }
+ }
///
/// This identifies a signature containing a SHA-512 hash. The SignatureHeader
size shall
@@ -185,6 +224,45 @@
}
///
+/// This identifies a signature containing the SHA256 hash of an X.509
certificate's
+/// To-Be-Signed contents, and a time of revocation. The SignatureHeader size
shall
+/// always be 0. The SignatureSize shall always be 16 (size of the
SignatureOwner component)
+/// + 48 bytes for an EFI_CERT_X509_SHA256 structure. If the TimeOfRevocation
is non-zero,
+/// the certificate should be considered to be revoked from that time and
onwards, and
+/// otherwise the certificate shall be considered to always be revoked.
+///
+#define EFI_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID \
+ { \
+ 0x3bd2a492, 0x96c0, 0x4079, {0xb4, 0x20, 0xfc, 0xf9, 0x8e, 0xf1, 0x03,
0xed } \
+ }
+
+///
+/// This identifies a signature containing the SHA384 hash of an X.509
certificate's
+/// To-Be-Signed contents, and a time of revocation. The SignatureHeader size
shall
+/// always be 0. The SignatureSize shall always be 16 (size of the
SignatureOwner component)
+/// + 64 bytes for an EFI_CERT_X509_SHA384 structure. If the TimeOfRevocation
is non-zero,
+/// the certificate should be considered to be revoked from that time and
onwards, and
+/// otherwise the certificate shall be considered to always be revoked.
+///
+#define EFI_CERT_X509_SHA384_GUID \
+ { \
+ 0x7076876e, 0x80c2, 0x4ee6, {0xaa, 0xd2, 0x28, 0xb3, 0x49, 0xa6, 0x86,
0x5b } \
+ }
+
+///
+/// This identifies a signature containing the SHA512 hash of an X.509
certificate's
+/// To-Be-Signed contents, and a time of revocation. The SignatureHeader size
shall
+/// always be 0. The SignatureSize shall always be 16 (size of the
SignatureOwner component)
+/// + 80 bytes for an EFI_CERT_X509_SHA512 structure. If the TimeOfRevocation
is non-zero,
+/// the certificate should be considered to be revoked from that time and
onwards, and
+/// otherwise the certificate shall be considered to always be revoked.
+///
+#define EFI_CERT_X509_SHA512_GUID \
+ { \
+ 0x446dbf63, 0x2502, 0x4cda, {0xbc, 0xfa, 0x24, 0x65, 0xd2, 0xb0, 0xfe,
0x9d } \
+ }
+
+///
/// This identifies a signature containing a DER-encoded PKCS #7 version 1.5
[RFC2315]
/// SignedData value.
///
@@ -192,13 +270,13 @@
{ \
0x4aafd29d, 0x68df, 0x49ee, {0x8a, 0xa9, 0x34, 0x7d, 0x37, 0x56, 0x65,
0xa7} \
}
-
+
//***********************************************************************
// Image Execution Information Table Definition
//***********************************************************************
typedef UINT32 EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_ACTION;
-#define EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTHENTICATION 0x00000007
+#define EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTHENTICATION 0x00000007
#define EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_UNTESTED 0x00000000
#define EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FAILED 0x00000001
#define EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_PASSED 0x00000002
@@ -208,7 +286,7 @@
#define EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INITIALIZED 0x00000008
//
-// EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO is added to EFI System Configuration Table
+// EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO is added to EFI System Configuration Table
// and assigned the GUID EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID.
//
typedef struct {
@@ -221,24 +299,24 @@
///
UINT32 InfoSize;
///
- /// If this image was a UEFI device driver (for option ROM, for example)
this is the
- /// null-terminated, user-friendly name for the device. If the image was for
an application,
- /// then this is the name of the application. If this cannot be determined,
then a simple
+ /// If this image was a UEFI device driver (for option ROM, for example)
this is the
+ /// null-terminated, user-friendly name for the device. If the image was for
an application,
+ /// then this is the name of the application. If this cannot be determined,
then a simple
/// NULL character should be put in this position.
/// CHAR16 Name[];
///
///
- /// For device drivers, this is the device path of the device for which this
device driver
- /// was intended. In some cases, the driver itself may be stored as part of
the system
- /// firmware, but this field should record the device's path, not the
firmware path. For
- /// applications, this is the device path of the application. If this cannot
be determined,
+ /// For device drivers, this is the device path of the device for which this
device driver
+ /// was intended. In some cases, the driver itself may be stored as part of
the system
+ /// firmware, but this field should record the device's path, not the
firmware path. For
+ /// applications, this is the device path of the application. If this cannot
be determined,
/// a simple end-of-path device node should be put in this position.
/// EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL DevicePath;
///
///
- /// Zero or more image signatures. If the image contained no signatures,
+ /// Zero or more image signatures. If the image contained no signatures,
/// then this field is empty.
///
EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST Signature;
@@ -249,16 +327,16 @@
///
/// Number of EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO structures.
///
- UINTN NumberOfImages;
+ UINTN NumberOfImages;
///
/// Number of image instances of EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO structures.
///
- // EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO InformationInfo[]
+ // EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO InformationInfo[]
} EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INFO_TABLE;
extern EFI_GUID gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid;
extern EFI_GUID gEfiCertSha256Guid;
-extern EFI_GUID gEfiCertRsa2048Guid;
+extern EFI_GUID gEfiCertRsa2048Guid;
extern EFI_GUID gEfiCertRsa2048Sha256Guid;
extern EFI_GUID gEfiCertSha1Guid;
extern EFI_GUID gEfiCertRsa2048Sha1Guid;
@@ -266,6 +344,9 @@
extern EFI_GUID gEfiCertSha224Guid;
extern EFI_GUID gEfiCertSha384Guid;
extern EFI_GUID gEfiCertSha512Guid;
+extern EFI_GUID gEfiCertX509Sha256Guid;
+extern EFI_GUID gEfiCertX509Sha384Guid;
+extern EFI_GUID gEfiCertX509Sha512Guid;
extern EFI_GUID gEfiCertPkcs7Guid;
-#endif
+#endif
\ No newline at end of file
Modified: trunk/edk2/MdePkg/MdePkg.dec
===================================================================
--- trunk/edk2/MdePkg/MdePkg.dec 2014-11-14 00:39:04 UTC (rev 16379)
+++ trunk/edk2/MdePkg/MdePkg.dec 2014-11-14 08:41:12 UTC (rev 16380)
@@ -201,7 +201,7 @@
# Script Opcodes. These OpCode will be restored by S3
# related modules.
S3BootScriptLib|Include/Library/S3BootScriptLib.h
-
+
## @libraryclass I/O and MMIO Library Services that do I/O and also enable
# the I/O operatation to be replayed during an S3 resume.
# This library class maps directly on top of the IoLib
class.
@@ -222,7 +222,7 @@
# operatation to be replayed during an S3 resume. This
# library class maps directly on top of the Timer class.
S3StallLib|Include/Library/S3StallLib.h
-
+
## @libraryclass Defines library APIs used by modules to get/set print
error level.
DebugPrintErrorLevelLib|Include/Library/DebugPrintErrorLevelLib.h
@@ -238,7 +238,7 @@
## @libraryclass Provides services to enable/disable periodic SMI handlers.
#
SmmPeriodicSmiLib|Include/Library/SmmPeriodicSmiLib.h
-
+
[LibraryClasses.IPF]
## @libraryclass The SAL Library provides a service to make a SAL CALL.
SalLib|Include/Library/SalLib.h
@@ -248,7 +248,7 @@
## @libraryclass Provides library services to make Extended SAL Calls.
ExtendedSalLib|Include/Library/ExtendedSalLib.h
-
+
[Guids]
#
# GUID defined in UEFI2.1/UEFI2.0/EFI1.1
@@ -523,6 +523,11 @@
## Include/Guid/FmpCapsule.h
gEfiFmpCapsuleGuid = { 0x6dcbd5ed, 0xe82d, 0x4c44, {0xbd, 0xa1,
0x71, 0x94, 0x19, 0x9a, 0xd9, 0x2a }}
+ ## Include/Guid/ImageAuthentication.h
+ gEfiCertX509Sha256Guid = { 0x3bd2a492, 0x96c0, 0x4079, {0xb4, 0x20,
0xfc, 0xf9, 0x8e, 0xf1, 0x03, 0xed }}
+ gEfiCertX509Sha384Guid = { 0x7076876e, 0x80c2, 0x4ee6, {0xaa, 0xd2,
0x28, 0xb3, 0x49, 0xa6, 0x86, 0x5b }}
+ gEfiCertX509Sha512Guid = { 0x446dbf63, 0x2502, 0x4cda, {0xbc, 0xfa,
0x24, 0x65, 0xd2, 0xb0, 0xfe, 0x9d }}
+
## Include/Protocol/Rng.h
gEfiRngAlgorithmSp80090Hash256Guid = { 0xa7af67cb, 0x603b, 0x4d42, {0xba,
0x21, 0x70, 0xbf, 0xb6, 0x29, 0x3f, 0x96 }}
gEfiRngAlgorithmSp80090Hmac256Guid = { 0xc5149b43, 0xae85, 0x4f53, {0x99,
0x82, 0xb9, 0x43, 0x35, 0xd3, 0xa9, 0xe7 }}
@@ -535,7 +540,7 @@
gEfiAdapterInfoMediaStateGuid = { 0xD7C74207, 0xA831, 0x4A26, {0xB1,
0xF5, 0xD1, 0x93, 0x06, 0x5C, 0xE8, 0xB6 }}
gEfiAdapterInfoNetworkBootGuid = { 0x1FBD2960, 0x4130, 0x41E5, {0x94,
0xAC, 0xD2, 0xCF, 0x03, 0x7F, 0xB3, 0x7C }}
gEfiAdapterInfoSanMacAddressGuid = { 0x114da5ef, 0x2cf1, 0x4e12, {0x9b,
0xbb, 0xc4, 0x70, 0xb5, 0x52, 0x5, 0xd9 }}
-
+
#
# GUID defined in PI1.0
#
@@ -611,7 +616,7 @@
#
## Include/Guid/EventGroup.h
gEfiEndOfDxeEventGroupGuid = { 0x2ce967a, 0xdd7e, 0x4ffc, { 0x9e,
0xe7, 0x81, 0xc, 0xf0, 0x47, 0x8, 0x80 }}
-
+
## Include/Guid/FirmwareContentsSigned.h
gEfiFirmwareContentsSignedGuid = { 0xf9d89e8, 0x9259, 0x4f76, { 0xa5,
0xaf, 0xc, 0x89, 0xe3, 0x40, 0x23, 0xdf }}
@@ -629,7 +634,7 @@
gEfiIa32X64ErrorTypeBusCheckGuid = { 0x1CF3F8B3, 0xC5B1, 0x49a2, { 0xAA,
0x59, 0x5E, 0xEF, 0x92, 0xFF, 0xA6, 0x3C }}
## Include/Guid/Cper.h
- gEfiIa32X64ErrorTypeMsCheckGuid = { 0x48AB7F57, 0xDC34, 0x4f6c, { 0xA7,
0xD3, 0xB0, 0xB5, 0xB0, 0xA7, 0x43, 0x14 }}
+ gEfiIa32X64ErrorTypeMsCheckGuid = { 0x48AB7F57, 0xDC34, 0x4f6c, { 0xA7,
0xD3, 0xB0, 0xB5, 0xB0, 0xA7, 0x43, 0x14 }}
[Ppis]
## Include/Ppi/MasterBootMode.h
@@ -733,7 +738,7 @@
#
# PPIs defined in PI 1.3.
#
-
+
## Include/Ppi/I2cMaster.h
gEfiPeiI2cMasterPpiGuid = { 0xb3bfab9b, 0x9f9c, 0x4e8b, { 0xad,
0x37, 0x7f, 0x8c, 0x51, 0xfc, 0x62, 0x80 }}
@@ -924,16 +929,16 @@
## Include/Protocol/PiPcd.h
gEfiPcdProtocolGuid = { 0x13a3f0f6, 0x264a, 0x3ef0, { 0xf2, 0xe0, 0xde,
0xc5, 0x12, 0x34, 0x2f, 0x34 } }
-
+
## Include/Protocol/FirmwareVolumeBlock.h
gEfiFirmwareVolumeBlock2ProtocolGuid = { 0x8f644fa9, 0xe850, 0x4db1, {0x9c,
0xe2, 0xb, 0x44, 0x69, 0x8e, 0x8d, 0xa4 } }
## Include/Protocol/CpuIo2.h
gEfiCpuIo2ProtocolGuid = {0xad61f191, 0xae5f, 0x4c0e, {0xb9, 0xfa, 0xe8,
0x69, 0xd2, 0x88, 0xc6, 0x4f } }
-
+
## Include/Protocol/LegacyRegion2.h
gEfiLegacyRegion2ProtocolGuid = {0x70101eaf, 0x85, 0x440c, {0xb3, 0x56,
0x8e, 0xe3, 0x6f, 0xef, 0x24, 0xf0 } }
-
+
## Include/Protocol/McaInitPmi.h
gEfiSalMcaInitPmiProtocolGuid = { 0xb60dc6e8, 0x3b6f, 0x11d5, {0xaf, 0x9,
0x0, 0xa0, 0xc9, 0x44, 0xa0, 0x5b } }
@@ -1331,7 +1336,7 @@
## Include/Protocol/IpSec.h
gEfiIpSecProtocolGuid = { 0xdfb386f7, 0xe100, 0x43ad, {0x9c,
0x9a, 0xed, 0x90, 0xd0, 0x8a, 0x5e, 0x12 }}
-
+
## Include/Protocol/IpSec.h
gEfiIpSec2ProtocolGuid = { 0xa3979e64, 0xace8, 0x4ddc, {0xbc,
0x7, 0x4d, 0x66, 0xb8, 0xfd, 0x9, 0x77 }}
@@ -1361,7 +1366,7 @@
## Include/Protocol/Rng.h
gEfiRngProtocolGuid = { 0x3152bca5, 0xeade, 0x433d, {0x86,
0x2e, 0xc0, 0x1c, 0xdc, 0x29, 0x1f, 0x44 }}
-
+
## Include/Protocol/AdapterInformation.h
gEfiAdapterInformationProtocolGuid = { 0xE5DD1403, 0xD622, 0xC24E, {0x84,
0x88, 0xC7, 0x1B, 0x17, 0xF5, 0xE8, 0x02 }}
@@ -1780,4 +1785,4 @@
gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdDefaultTerminalType|0|UINT8|0x00000024
[UserExtensions.TianoCore."ExtraFiles"]
- MdePkgExtra.uni
+ MdePkgExtra.uni
\ No newline at end of file
Modified:
trunk/edk2/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c
===================================================================
---
trunk/edk2/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c
2014-11-14 00:39:04 UTC (rev 16379)
+++
trunk/edk2/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c
2014-11-14 08:41:12 UTC (rev 16380)
@@ -64,11 +64,11 @@
};
HASH_TABLE mHash[] = {
- { L"SHA1", 20, &mHashOidValue[0], 5, Sha1GetContextSize, Sha1Init,
Sha1Update, Sha1Final },
- { L"SHA224", 28, &mHashOidValue[5], 9, NULL, NULL,
NULL, NULL },
- { L"SHA256", 32, &mHashOidValue[14], 9, Sha256GetContextSize,Sha256Init,
Sha256Update, Sha256Final},
- { L"SHA384", 48, &mHashOidValue[23], 9, NULL, NULL,
NULL, NULL },
- { L"SHA512", 64, &mHashOidValue[32], 9, NULL, NULL,
NULL, NULL }
+ { L"SHA1", 20, &mHashOidValue[0], 5, Sha1GetContextSize, Sha1Init,
Sha1Update, Sha1Final },
+ { L"SHA224", 28, &mHashOidValue[5], 9, NULL, NULL,
NULL, NULL },
+ { L"SHA256", 32, &mHashOidValue[14], 9, Sha256GetContextSize, Sha256Init,
Sha256Update, Sha256Final},
+ { L"SHA384", 48, &mHashOidValue[23], 9, Sha384GetContextSize, Sha384Init,
Sha384Update, Sha384Final},
+ { L"SHA512", 64, &mHashOidValue[32], 9, Sha512GetContextSize, Sha512Init,
Sha512Update, Sha512Final}
};
/**
@@ -99,11 +99,11 @@
@param FileHandle Pointer to the file handle to read the PE/COFF image.
@param FileOffset Offset into the PE/COFF image to begin the read
operation.
- @param ReadSize On input, the size in bytes of the requested read
operation.
+ @param ReadSize On input, the size in bytes of the requested read
operation.
On output, the number of bytes actually read.
@param Buffer Output buffer that contains the data read from the
PE/COFF image.
-
- @retval EFI_SUCCESS The specified portion of the PE/COFF image was read
and the size
+
+ @retval EFI_SUCCESS The specified portion of the PE/COFF image was read
and the size
**/
EFI_STATUS
EFIAPI
@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@
UINTN EndPosition;
if (FileHandle == NULL || ReadSize == NULL || Buffer == NULL) {
- return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
if (MAX_ADDRESS - FileOffset < *ReadSize) {
@@ -306,7 +306,7 @@
SectionHeader = NULL;
Status = FALSE;
- if ((HashAlg != HASHALG_SHA1) && (HashAlg != HASHALG_SHA256)) {
+ if ((HashAlg >= HASHALG_MAX)) {
return FALSE;
}
@@ -315,13 +315,28 @@
//
ZeroMem (mImageDigest, MAX_DIGEST_SIZE);
- if (HashAlg == HASHALG_SHA1) {
- mImageDigestSize = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE;
- mCertType = gEfiCertSha1Guid;
- } else if (HashAlg == HASHALG_SHA256) {
- mImageDigestSize = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE;
- mCertType = gEfiCertSha256Guid;
- } else {
+ switch (HashAlg) {
+ case HASHALG_SHA1:
+ mImageDigestSize = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE;
+ mCertType = gEfiCertSha1Guid;
+ break;
+
+ case HASHALG_SHA256:
+ mImageDigestSize = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE;
+ mCertType = gEfiCertSha256Guid;
+ break;
+
+ case HASHALG_SHA384:
+ mImageDigestSize = SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE;
+ mCertType = gEfiCertSha384Guid;
+ break;
+
+ case HASHALG_SHA512:
+ mImageDigestSize = SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE;
+ mCertType = gEfiCertSha512Guid;
+ break;
+
+ default:
return FALSE;
}
@@ -347,8 +362,8 @@
//
if (mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.Machine == IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_IA64 &&
mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {
//
- // NOTE: Some versions of Linux ELILO for Itanium have an incorrect magic
value
- // in the PE/COFF Header. If the MachineType is Itanium(IA64) and
the
+ // NOTE: Some versions of Linux ELILO for Itanium have an incorrect magic
value
+ // in the PE/COFF Header. If the MachineType is Itanium(IA64) and the
// Magic value in the OptionalHeader is
EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC
// then override the magic value to EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC
//
@@ -359,7 +374,7 @@
//
Magic = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic;
}
-
+
//
// 3. Calculate the distance from the base of the image header to the image
checksum address.
// 4. Hash the image header from its base to beginning of the image
checksum.
@@ -466,7 +481,7 @@
if (!Status) {
goto Done;
}
- }
+ }
}
//
@@ -604,7 +619,7 @@
@param[in] AuthData Pointer to the Authenticode Signature
retrieved from signed image.
@param[in] AuthDataSize Size of the Authenticode Signature in bytes.
-
+
@retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED Hash algorithm is not supported.
@retval EFI_SUCCESS Hash successfully.
@@ -804,6 +819,124 @@
}
/**
+ Check whether the hash of an given X.509 certificate is in forbidden
database (DBX).
+
+ @param[in] Certificate Pointer to X.509 Certificate that is searched
for.
+ @param[in] CertSize Size of X.509 Certificate.
+ @param[in] SignatureList Pointer to the Signature List in forbidden
database.
+ @param[in] SignatureListSize Size of Signature List.
+ @param[out] RevocationTime Return the time that the certificate was
revoked.
+
+ @return TRUE The certificate hash is found in the forbidden database.
+ @return FALSE The certificate hash is not found in the forbidden database.
+
+**/
+BOOLEAN
+IsCertHashFoundInDatabase (
+ IN UINT8 *Certificate,
+ IN UINTN CertSize,
+ IN EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *SignatureList,
+ IN UINTN SignatureListSize,
+ OUT EFI_TIME *RevocationTime
+ )
+{
+ BOOLEAN IsFound;
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *DbxList;
+ UINTN DbxSize;
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *CertHash;
+ UINTN CertHashCount;
+ UINTN Index;
+ UINT32 HashAlg;
+ VOID *HashCtx;
+ UINT8 CertDigest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
+ UINT8 *DbxCertHash;
+ UINTN SiglistHeaderSize;
+
+ IsFound = FALSE;
+ DbxList = SignatureList;
+ DbxSize = SignatureListSize;
+ HashCtx = NULL;
+ HashAlg = HASHALG_MAX;
+
+ ASSERT (RevocationTime != NULL);
+
+ while ((DbxSize > 0) && (SignatureListSize >= DbxList->SignatureListSize)) {
+ //
+ // Determine Hash Algorithm of Certificate in the forbidden database.
+ //
+ if (CompareGuid (&DbxList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Sha256Guid)) {
+ HashAlg = HASHALG_SHA256;
+ } else if (CompareGuid (&DbxList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Sha384Guid))
{
+ HashAlg = HASHALG_SHA384;
+ } else if (CompareGuid (&DbxList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Sha512Guid))
{
+ HashAlg = HASHALG_SHA512;
+ } else {
+ DbxSize -= DbxList->SignatureListSize;
+ DbxList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) DbxList +
DbxList->SignatureListSize);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Calculate the hash value of current db certificate for comparision.
+ //
+ if (mHash[HashAlg].GetContextSize == NULL) {
+ goto Done;
+ }
+ ZeroMem (CertDigest, MAX_DIGEST_SIZE);
+ HashCtx = AllocatePool (mHash[HashAlg].GetContextSize ());
+ if (HashCtx == NULL) {
+ goto Done;
+ }
+ Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashInit (HashCtx);
+ if (!Status) {
+ goto Done;
+ }
+ Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashUpdate (HashCtx, Certificate, CertSize);
+ if (!Status) {
+ goto Done;
+ }
+ Status = mHash[HashAlg].HashFinal (HashCtx, CertDigest);
+ if (!Status) {
+ goto Done;
+ }
+
+ SiglistHeaderSize = sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) +
DbxList->SignatureHeaderSize;
+ CertHash = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) DbxList +
SiglistHeaderSize);
+ CertHashCount = (DbxList->SignatureListSize - SiglistHeaderSize) /
DbxList->SignatureSize;
+ for (Index = 0; Index < CertHashCount; Index++) {
+ //
+ // Iterate each Signature Data Node within this CertList for verify.
+ //
+ DbxCertHash = CertHash->SignatureData;
+ if (CompareMem (DbxCertHash, CertDigest, mHash[HashAlg].DigestLength) ==
0) {
+ //
+ // Hash of Certificate is found in forbidden database.
+ //
+ IsFound = TRUE;
+
+ //
+ // Return the revocation time.
+ //
+ CopyMem (RevocationTime, (EFI_TIME *)(DbxCertHash +
mHash[HashAlg].DigestLength), sizeof (EFI_TIME));
+ goto Done;
+ }
+ CertHash = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertHash +
DbxList->SignatureSize);
+ }
+
+ DbxSize -= DbxList->SignatureListSize;
+ DbxList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) DbxList +
DbxList->SignatureListSize);
+ }
+
+Done:
+ if (HashCtx != NULL) {
+ FreePool (HashCtx);
+ }
+
+ return IsFound;
+}
+
+/**
Check whether signature is in specified database.
@param[in] VariableName Name of database variable that is searched
in.
@@ -831,6 +964,7 @@
UINTN Index;
UINTN CertCount;
BOOLEAN IsFound;
+
//
// Read signature database variable.
//
@@ -890,24 +1024,296 @@
}
/**
- Verify PKCS#7 SignedData using certificate found in Variable which formatted
- as EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST. The Variable may be PK, KEK, DB or DBX.
+ Check whether the timestamp is valid by comparing the signing time and the
revocation time.
- @param[in] AuthData Pointer to the Authenticode Signature retrieved
from signed image.
- @param[in] AuthDataSize Size of the Authenticode Signature in bytes.
- @param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to search for Certificate.
- @param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.
+ @param SigningTime A pointer to the signing time.
+ @param RevocationTime A pointer to the revocation time.
- @retval TRUE Image pass verification.
- @retval FALSE Image fail verification.
+ @retval TRUE The SigningTime is not later than the
RevocationTime.
+ @retval FALSE The SigningTime is later than the RevocationTime.
**/
BOOLEAN
-IsPkcsSignedDataVerifiedBySignatureList (
+IsValidSignatureByTimestamp (
+ IN EFI_TIME *SigningTime,
+ IN EFI_TIME *RevocationTime
+ )
+{
+ if (SigningTime->Year != RevocationTime->Year) {
+ return (BOOLEAN) (SigningTime->Year < RevocationTime->Year);
+ } else if (SigningTime->Month != RevocationTime->Month) {
+ return (BOOLEAN) (SigningTime->Month < RevocationTime->Month);
+ } else if (SigningTime->Day != RevocationTime->Day) {
+ return (BOOLEAN) (SigningTime->Day < RevocationTime->Day);
+ } else if (SigningTime->Hour != RevocationTime->Hour) {
+ return (BOOLEAN) (SigningTime->Hour < RevocationTime->Hour);
+ } else if (SigningTime->Minute != RevocationTime->Minute) {
+ return (BOOLEAN) (SigningTime->Minute < RevocationTime->Minute);
+ }
+
+ return (BOOLEAN) (SigningTime->Second <= RevocationTime->Second);
+}
+
+/**
+ Check if the given time value is zero.
+
+ @param[in] Time Pointer of a time value.
+
+ @retval TRUE The Time is Zero.
+ @retval FALSE The Time is not Zero.
+
+**/
+BOOLEAN
+IsTimeZero (
+ IN EFI_TIME *Time
+ )
+{
+ if ((Time->Year == 0) && (Time->Month == 0) && (Time->Day == 0) &&
+ (Time->Hour == 0) && (Time->Minute == 0) && (Time->Second == 0)) {
+ return TRUE;
+ }
+
+ return FALSE;
+}
+
+/**
+ Check whether the timestamp signature is valid and the signing time is also
earlier than
+ the revocation time.
+
+ @param[in] AuthData Pointer to the Authenticode signature retrieved
from signed image.
+ @param[in] AuthDataSize Size of the Authenticode signature in bytes.
+ @param[in] RevocationTime The time that the certificate was revoked.
+
+ @retval TRUE Timestamp signature is valid and signing time is no later
than the
+ revocation time.
+ @retval FALSE Timestamp signature is not valid or the signing time is
later than the
+ revocation time.
+
+**/
+BOOLEAN
+PassTimestampCheck (
+ IN UINT8 *AuthData,
+ IN UINTN AuthDataSize,
+ IN EFI_TIME *RevocationTime
+ )
+{
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ BOOLEAN VerifyStatus;
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *CertList;
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *Cert;
+ UINT8 *DbtData;
+ UINTN DbtDataSize;
+ UINT8 *RootCert;
+ UINTN RootCertSize;
+ UINTN Index;
+ UINTN CertCount;
+ EFI_TIME SigningTime;
+
+ //
+ // Variable Initialization
+ //
+ VerifyStatus = FALSE;
+ DbtData = NULL;
+ CertList = NULL;
+ Cert = NULL;
+ RootCert = NULL;
+ RootCertSize = 0;
+
+ //
+ // If RevocationTime is zero, the certificate shall be considered to always
be revoked.
+ //
+ if (IsTimeZero (RevocationTime)) {
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // RevocationTime is non-zero, the certificate should be considered to be
revoked from that time and onwards.
+ // Using the dbt to get the trusted TSA certificates.
+ //
+ DbtDataSize = 0;
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE2,
&gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DbtDataSize, NULL);
+ if (Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
+ DbtData = (UINT8 *) AllocateZeroPool (DbtDataSize);
+ if (DbtData == NULL) {
+ goto Done;
+ }
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE2,
&gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DbtDataSize, (VOID *) DbtData);
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ goto Done;
+ }
+ }
+
+ CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) DbtData;
+ while ((DbtDataSize > 0) && (DbtDataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {
+ if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {
+ Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof
(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);
+ CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) -
CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;
+ for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {
+ //
+ // Iterate each Signature Data Node within this CertList for verify.
+ //
+ RootCert = Cert->SignatureData;
+ RootCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize - sizeof (EFI_GUID);
+ //
+ // Get the signing time if the timestamp signature is valid.
+ //
+ if (ImageTimestampVerify (AuthData, AuthDataSize, RootCert,
RootCertSize, &SigningTime)) {
+ //
+ // The signer signature is valid only when the signing time is
earlier than revocation time.
+ //
+ if (IsValidSignatureByTimestamp (&SigningTime, RevocationTime)) {
+ VerifyStatus = TRUE;
+ goto Done;
+ }
+ }
+ Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert +
CertList->SignatureSize);
+ }
+ }
+ DbtDataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;
+ CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList +
CertList->SignatureListSize);
+ }
+
+Done:
+ if (DbtData != NULL) {
+ FreePool (DbtData);
+ }
+
+ return VerifyStatus;
+}
+
+/**
+ Check whether the image signature is forbidden by the forbidden database
(dbx).
+ The image is forbidden to load if any certificates for signing are revoked
before signing time.
+
+ @param[in] AuthData Pointer to the Authenticode signature retrieved
from the signed image.
+ @param[in] AuthDataSize Size of the Authenticode signature in bytes.
+
+ @retval TRUE Image is forbidden by dbx.
+ @retval FALSE Image is not forbidden by dbx.
+
+**/
+BOOLEAN
+IsForbiddenByDbx (
+ IN UINT8 *AuthData,
+ IN UINTN AuthDataSize
+ )
+{
+ EFI_STATUS Status;
+ BOOLEAN IsForbidden;
+ UINT8 *Data;
+ UINTN DataSize;
+ UINTN Index;
+ UINT8 *CertBuffer;
+ UINTN BufferLength;
+ UINT8 *TrustedCert;
+ UINTN TrustedCertLength;
+ UINT8 CertNumber;
+ UINT8 *CertPtr;
+ UINT8 *Cert;
+ UINTN CertSize;
+ EFI_TIME RevocationTime;
+
+ //
+ // Variable Initialization
+ //
+ IsForbidden = FALSE;
+ Data = NULL;
+ Cert = NULL;
+ CertBuffer = NULL;
+ BufferLength = 0;
+ TrustedCert = NULL;
+ TrustedCertLength = 0;
+
+ //
+ // The image will not be forbidden if dbx can't be got.
+ //
+ DataSize = 0;
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1,
&gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, NULL);
+ if (Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
+ Data = (UINT8 *) AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);
+ if (Data == NULL) {
+ return IsForbidden;
+ }
+
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1,
&gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, (VOID *) Data);
+ }
+ if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ return IsForbidden;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Retrieve the certificate stack from AuthData
+ // The output CertStack format will be:
+ // UINT8 CertNumber;
+ // UINT32 Cert1Length;
+ // UINT8 Cert1[];
+ // UINT32 Cert2Length;
+ // UINT8 Cert2[];
+ // ...
+ // UINT32 CertnLength;
+ // UINT8 Certn[];
+ //
+ Pkcs7GetSigners (AuthData, AuthDataSize, &CertBuffer, &BufferLength,
&TrustedCert, &TrustedCertLength);
+ if (BufferLength == 0) {
+ IsForbidden = TRUE;
+ goto Done;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // Check if any certificates in AuthData is in the forbidden database.
+ //
+ CertNumber = (UINT8) (*CertBuffer);
+ CertPtr = CertBuffer + 1;
+ for (Index = 0; Index < CertNumber; Index++) {
+ CertSize = (UINTN) ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *)CertPtr);
+ Cert = (UINT8 *)CertPtr + sizeof (UINT32);
+ if (IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, Cert,
&gEfiCertX509Guid, CertSize)) {
+ //
+ // Raw certificate in dbx means the image signed by the certificate is
forbidden.
+ //
+ IsForbidden = TRUE;
+ goto Done;
+ }
+
+ if (IsCertHashFoundInDatabase (Cert, CertSize, (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)Data,
DataSize, &RevocationTime)) {
+ //
+ // Check the timestamp signature and signing time to determine if the
image can be trusted.
+ //
+ IsForbidden = TRUE;
+ if (PassTimestampCheck (AuthData, AuthDataSize, &RevocationTime)) {
+ IsForbidden = FALSE;
+ }
+ goto Done;
+ }
+
+ CertPtr = CertPtr + sizeof (UINT32) + CertSize;
+ }
+
+Done:
+ if (Data != NULL) {
+ FreePool (Data);
+ }
+
+ Pkcs7FreeSigners (CertBuffer);
+ Pkcs7FreeSigners (TrustedCert);
+
+ return IsForbidden;
+}
+
+/**
+ Check whether the image signature can be verified by the trusted
certificates in DB database.
+
+ @param[in] AuthData Pointer to the Authenticode signature retrieved
from signed image.
+ @param[in] AuthDataSize Size of the Authenticode signature in bytes.
+
+ @retval TRUE Image passed verification using certificate in db.
+ @retval FALSE Image didn't pass verification using certificate in db.
+
+**/
+BOOLEAN
+IsAllowedByDb (
IN UINT8 *AuthData,
- IN UINTN AuthDataSize,
- IN CHAR16 *VariableName,
- IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid
+ IN UINTN AuthDataSize
)
{
EFI_STATUS Status;
@@ -929,14 +1335,14 @@
VerifyStatus = FALSE;
DataSize = 0;
- Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, NULL, &DataSize,
NULL);
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE,
&gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, NULL);
if (Status == EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
Data = (UINT8 *) AllocateZeroPool (DataSize);
if (Data == NULL) {
return VerifyStatus;
}
- Status = gRT->GetVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, NULL, &DataSize,
(VOID *) Data);
+ Status = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE,
&gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, (VOID *) Data);
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
goto Done;
}
@@ -947,14 +1353,15 @@
CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) Data;
while ((DataSize > 0) && (DataSize >= CertList->SignatureListSize)) {
if (CompareGuid (&CertList->SignatureType, &gEfiCertX509Guid)) {
- Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof
(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);
- CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof
(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;
+ Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof
(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);
+ CertCount = (CertList->SignatureListSize - sizeof
(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) - CertList->SignatureHeaderSize) / CertList->SignatureSize;
+
for (Index = 0; Index < CertCount; Index++) {
//
// Iterate each Signature Data Node within this CertList for verify.
//
- RootCert = Cert->SignatureData;
- RootCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize - sizeof (EFI_GUID);
+ RootCert = Cert->SignatureData;
+ RootCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize - sizeof (EFI_GUID);
//
// Call AuthenticodeVerify library to Verify Authenticode struct.
@@ -968,12 +1375,14 @@
mImageDigestSize
);
if (VerifyStatus) {
- SecureBootHook (VariableName, VendorGuid, CertList->SignatureSize,
Cert);
+ SecureBootHook (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE,
&gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, CertList->SignatureSize, Cert);
goto Done;
}
+
Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) Cert +
CertList->SignatureSize);
}
}
+
DataSize -= CertList->SignatureListSize;
CertList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) CertList +
CertList->SignatureListSize);
}
@@ -1108,7 +1517,7 @@
}
//
- // The policy QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION and
ALLOW_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION
+ // The policy QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION and
ALLOW_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION
// violates the UEFI spec and has been removed.
//
ASSERT (Policy != QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION && Policy !=
ALLOW_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION);
@@ -1183,8 +1592,8 @@
if (mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.Machine == IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_IA64 &&
mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {
//
- // NOTE: Some versions of Linux ELILO for Itanium have an incorrect magic
value
- // in the PE/COFF Header. If the MachineType is Itanium(IA64) and
the
+ // NOTE: Some versions of Linux ELILO for Itanium have an incorrect magic
value
+ // in the PE/COFF Header. If the MachineType is Itanium(IA64) and the
// Magic value in the OptionalHeader is
EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC
// then override the magic value to EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC
//
@@ -1195,7 +1604,7 @@
//
Magic = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic;
}
-
+
if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {
//
// Use PE32 offset.
@@ -1203,7 +1612,7 @@
NumberOfRvaAndSizes = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.NumberOfRvaAndSizes;
if (NumberOfRvaAndSizes > EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY) {
SecDataDir = (EFI_IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY *)
&mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY];
- }
+ }
} else {
//
// Use PE32+ offset.
@@ -1219,7 +1628,7 @@
//
if (SecDataDir == NULL || SecDataDir->Size == 0) {
//
- // This image is not signed. The SHA256 hash value of the image must match
a record in the security database "db",
+ // This image is not signed. The SHA256 hash value of the image must match
a record in the security database "db",
// and not be reflected in the security data base "dbx".
//
if (!HashPeImage (HASHALG_SHA256)) {
@@ -1247,7 +1656,7 @@
}
//
- // Verify the signature of the image, multiple signatures are allowed as per
PE/COFF Section 4.7
+ // Verify the signature of the image, multiple signatures are allowed as per
PE/COFF Section 4.7
// "Attribute Certificate Table".
// The first certificate starts at offset (SecDataDir->VirtualAddress) from
the start of the file.
//
@@ -1259,13 +1668,13 @@
(SecDataDir->VirtualAddress + SecDataDir->Size - OffSet) <
WinCertificate->dwLength) {
break;
}
-
+
//
// Verify the image's Authenticode signature, only DER-encoded PKCS#7
signed data is supported.
//
if (WinCertificate->wCertificateType == WIN_CERT_TYPE_PKCS_SIGNED_DATA) {
//
- // The certificate is formatted as WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS which is
described in the
+ // The certificate is formatted as WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS which is
described in the
// Authenticode specification.
//
PkcsCertData = (WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS *) WinCertificate;
@@ -1298,11 +1707,11 @@
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
continue;
}
-
+
//
// Check the digital signature against the revoked certificate in
forbidden database (dbx).
//
- if (IsPkcsSignedDataVerifiedBySignatureList (AuthData, AuthDataSize,
EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid)) {
+ if (IsForbiddenByDbx (AuthData, AuthDataSize)) {
Action = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FAILED;
VerifyStatus = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;
break;
@@ -1312,7 +1721,7 @@
// Check the digital signature against the valid certificate in allowed
database (db).
//
if (EFI_ERROR (VerifyStatus)) {
- if (IsPkcsSignedDataVerifiedBySignatureList (AuthData, AuthDataSize,
EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid)) {
+ if (IsAllowedByDb (AuthData, AuthDataSize)) {
VerifyStatus = EFI_SUCCESS;
}
}
@@ -1337,7 +1746,7 @@
//
VerifyStatus = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;
}
-
+
if (!EFI_ERROR (VerifyStatus)) {
return EFI_SUCCESS;
} else {
@@ -1407,7 +1816,7 @@
return ;
}
- ImageExeInfoTable->NumberOfImages = 0;
+ ImageExeInfoTable->NumberOfImages = 0;
gBS->InstallConfigurationTable (&gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, (VOID *)
ImageExeInfoTable);
}
@@ -1434,10 +1843,10 @@
//
EfiCreateEventReadyToBootEx (
TPL_CALLBACK,
- OnReadyToBoot,
- NULL,
+ OnReadyToBoot,
+ NULL,
&Event
- );
+ );
return RegisterSecurity2Handler (
DxeImageVerificationHandler,
Modified:
trunk/edk2/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.h
===================================================================
---
trunk/edk2/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.h
2014-11-14 00:39:04 UTC (rev 16379)
+++
trunk/edk2/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.h
2014-11-14 08:41:12 UTC (rev 16380)
@@ -2,13 +2,13 @@
The internal header file includes the common header files, defines
internal structure and functions used by ImageVerificationLib.
-Copyright (c) 2009 - 2013, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
-This program and the accompanying materials
-are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD
License
-which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be
found at
+Copyright (c) 2009 - 2014, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
+This program and the accompanying materials
+are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD
License
+which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be
found at
http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php
-THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,
+THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,
WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.
**/
@@ -76,9 +76,9 @@
#define HASHALG_MAX 0x00000005
//
-// Set max digest size as SHA256 Output (32 bytes) by far
+// Set max digest size as SHA512 Output (64 bytes) by far
//
-#define MAX_DIGEST_SIZE SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE
+#define MAX_DIGEST_SIZE SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE
//
//
// PKCS7 Certificate definition
@@ -204,4 +204,4 @@
HASH_FINAL HashFinal;
} HASH_TABLE;
-#endif
+#endif
\ No newline at end of file
Modified:
trunk/edk2/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.inf
===================================================================
---
trunk/edk2/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.inf
2014-11-14 00:39:04 UTC (rev 16379)
+++
trunk/edk2/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.inf
2014-11-14 08:41:12 UTC (rev 16380)
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
FILE_GUID = 0CA970E1-43FA-4402-BC0A-81AF336BFFD6
MODULE_TYPE = DXE_DRIVER
VERSION_STRING = 1.0
- LIBRARY_CLASS = NULL|DXE_DRIVER DXE_RUNTIME_DRIVER
DXE_SAL_DRIVER DXE_SMM_DRIVER UEFI_APPLICATION UEFI_DRIVER
+ LIBRARY_CLASS = NULL|DXE_DRIVER DXE_RUNTIME_DRIVER
DXE_SAL_DRIVER DXE_SMM_DRIVER UEFI_APPLICATION UEFI_DRIVER
CONSTRUCTOR = DxeImageVerificationLibConstructor
#
@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@
[Guids]
## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES ## Variable:L"DB"
## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES ## Variable:L"DBX"
+ ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES ## Variable:L"DBT"
## PRODUCES ## SystemTable
## CONSUMES ## SystemTable
gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid
@@ -74,16 +75,26 @@
## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES ## GUID # Unique ID for the type of the
signature.
## SOMETIMES_PRODUCES ## GUID # Unique ID for the type of the
signature.
gEfiCertSha1Guid
-
+
## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES ## GUID # Unique ID for the type of the
signature.
## SOMETIMES_PRODUCES ## GUID # Unique ID for the type of the
signature.
gEfiCertSha256Guid
+ ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES ## GUID # Unique ID for the type of the
signature.
+ ## SOMETIMES_PRODUCES ## GUID # Unique ID for the type of the
signature.
+ gEfiCertSha384Guid
+
+ ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES ## GUID # Unique ID for the type of the
signature.
+ ## SOMETIMES_PRODUCES ## GUID # Unique ID for the type of the
signature.
+ gEfiCertSha512Guid
+
gEfiCertX509Guid ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES ## GUID #
Unique ID for the type of the signature.
+ gEfiCertX509Sha256Guid ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES ## GUID #
Unique ID for the type of the signature.
+ gEfiCertX509Sha384Guid ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES ## GUID #
Unique ID for the type of the signature.
+ gEfiCertX509Sha512Guid ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES ## GUID #
Unique ID for the type of the signature.
gEfiCertPkcs7Guid ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES ## GUID #
Unique ID for the type of the certificate.
-
+
[Pcd]
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOptionRomImageVerificationPolicy
## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdRemovableMediaImageVerificationPolicy
## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES
gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdFixedMediaImageVerificationPolicy
## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES
-
\ No newline at end of file
Modified: trunk/edk2/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/RuntimeDxe/AuthService.c
===================================================================
--- trunk/edk2/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/RuntimeDxe/AuthService.c
2014-11-14 00:39:04 UTC (rev 16379)
+++ trunk/edk2/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/RuntimeDxe/AuthService.c
2014-11-14 08:41:12 UTC (rev 16380)
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
Variable attribute should also be checked to avoid authentication bypass.
The whole SMM authentication variable design relies on the integrity of
flash part and SMM.
which is assumed to be protected by platform. All variable code and
metadata in flash/SMM Memory
- may not be modified without authorization. If platform fails to protect
these resources,
+ may not be modified without authorization. If platform fails to protect
these resources,
the authentication service provided in this driver will be broken, and the
behavior is undefined.
ProcessVarWithPk(), ProcessVarWithKek() and ProcessVariable() are the
function to do
@@ -77,7 +77,10 @@
{EFI_CERT_X509_GUID, 0, ((UINT32) ~0)},
{EFI_CERT_SHA224_GUID, 0, 28 },
{EFI_CERT_SHA384_GUID, 0, 48 },
- {EFI_CERT_SHA512_GUID, 0, 64 }
+ {EFI_CERT_SHA512_GUID, 0, 64 },
+ {EFI_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID, 0, 48 },
+ {EFI_CERT_X509_SHA384_GUID, 0, 64 },
+ {EFI_CERT_X509_SHA512_GUID, 0, 80 }
};
/**
@@ -88,7 +91,7 @@
@retval TRUE This variable is protected, only a physical present user
could set this variable.
@retval FALSE This variable is not protected.
-
+
**/
BOOLEAN
NeedPhysicallyPresent(
@@ -100,7 +103,7 @@
|| (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid) && (StrCmp
(VariableName, EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME) == 0))) {
return TRUE;
}
-
+
return FALSE;
}
@@ -122,7 +125,7 @@
if (Variable.CurrPtr != NULL && *(GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr)) ==
CUSTOM_SECURE_BOOT_MODE) {
return TRUE;
}
-
+
return FALSE;
}
@@ -256,7 +259,7 @@
Data = GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr);
ASSERT ((DataSize != 0) && (Data != NULL));
//
- // "AuthVarKeyDatabase" is an internal variable. Its DataSize is always
ensured not to exceed mPubKeyStore buffer size(See definition before)
+ // "AuthVarKeyDatabase" is an internal variable. Its DataSize is always
ensured not to exceed mPubKeyStore buffer size(See definition before)
// Therefore, there is no memory overflow in underlying CopyMem.
//
CopyMem (mPubKeyStore, (UINT8 *) Data, DataSize);
@@ -269,7 +272,7 @@
} else {
DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s exists.\n", EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME));
}
-
+
//
// Create "SetupMode" variable with BS+RT attribute set.
//
@@ -293,7 +296,7 @@
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
return Status;
}
-
+
//
// Create "SignatureSupport" variable with BS+RT attribute set.
//
@@ -390,12 +393,12 @@
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
return Status;
}
-
+
DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME,
CustomMode));
//
// Check "certdb" variable's existence.
- // If it doesn't exist, then create a new one with
+ // If it doesn't exist, then create a new one with
// EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.
//
Status = FindVariable (
@@ -423,7 +426,7 @@
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
return Status;
}
- }
+ }
//
// Check "VendorKeysNv" variable's existence and create "VendorKeys"
variable accordingly.
@@ -480,7 +483,7 @@
Add public key in store and return its index.
@param[in] PubKey Input pointer to Public Key data
- @param[in] VariableDataEntry The variable data entry
+ @param[in] VariableDataEntry The variable data entry
@return Index of new added item
@@ -543,7 +546,7 @@
//
return 0;
}
-
+
Status = Reclaim (
mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal.NonVolatileVariableBase,
&mVariableModuleGlobal->NonVolatileLastVariableOffset,
@@ -573,7 +576,7 @@
Data = GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr);
ASSERT ((DataSize != 0) && (Data != NULL));
//
- // "AuthVarKeyDatabase" is an internal used variable. Its DataSize is
always ensured not to exceed mPubKeyStore buffer size(See definition before)
+ // "AuthVarKeyDatabase" is an internal used variable. Its DataSize is
always ensured not to exceed mPubKeyStore buffer size(See definition before)
// Therefore, there is no memory overflow in underlying CopyMem.
//
CopyMem (mPubKeyStore, (UINT8 *) Data, DataSize);
@@ -581,7 +584,7 @@
if (mPubKeyNumber == mMaxKeyNumber) {
return 0;
- }
+ }
}
//
@@ -656,7 +659,7 @@
UINT8 Digest[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
VOID *Rsa;
UINTN PayloadSize;
-
+
PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO_SIZE;
Rsa = NULL;
CertData = NULL;
@@ -885,7 +888,7 @@
}
/**
- Check input data form to make sure it is a valid EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST for
PK/KEK/db/dbx variable.
+ Check input data form to make sure it is a valid EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST for
PK/KEK/db/dbx/dbt variable.
@param[in] VariableName Name of Variable to be check.
@param[in] VendorGuid Variable vendor GUID.
@@ -894,7 +897,7 @@
@return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Invalid signature list format.
@return EFI_SUCCESS Passed signature list format check
successfully.
-
+
**/
EFI_STATUS
CheckSignatureListFormat(
@@ -921,9 +924,10 @@
if (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid) && (StrCmp
(VariableName, EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME) == 0)){
IsPk = TRUE;
- } else if ((CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid) && StrCmp
(VariableName, EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME) == 0) ||
- (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid) &&
- (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE) == 0 ||
StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1) == 0))){
+ } else if ((CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid) && (StrCmp
(VariableName, EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME) == 0)) ||
+ (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid) &&
+ ((StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE) == 0) ||
(StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1) == 0) ||
+ (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE2) == 0)))) {
IsPk = FALSE;
} else {
return EFI_SUCCESS;
@@ -942,10 +946,10 @@
for (Index = 0; Index < (sizeof (mSupportSigItem) / sizeof
(EFI_SIGNATURE_ITEM)); Index++ ) {
if (CompareGuid (&SigList->SignatureType,
&mSupportSigItem[Index].SigType)) {
//
- // The value of SignatureSize should always be 16 (size of
SignatureOwner
+ // The value of SignatureSize should always be 16 (size of
SignatureOwner
// component) add the data length according to signature type.
//
- if (mSupportSigItem[Index].SigDataSize != ((UINT32) ~0) &&
+ if (mSupportSigItem[Index].SigDataSize != ((UINT32) ~0) &&
(SigList->SignatureSize - sizeof (EFI_GUID)) !=
mSupportSigItem[Index].SigDataSize) {
return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
@@ -986,7 +990,7 @@
return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
SigCount += (SigList->SignatureListSize - sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) -
SigList->SignatureHeaderSize) / SigList->SignatureSize;
-
+
SigDataSize -= SigList->SignatureListSize;
SigList = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) ((UINT8 *) SigList +
SigList->SignatureListSize);
}
@@ -1007,7 +1011,7 @@
@return EFI_SUCCESS Variable is updated successfully.
@return Others Failed to update variable.
-
+
**/
EFI_STATUS
VendorKeyIsModified (
@@ -1021,7 +1025,7 @@
return EFI_SUCCESS;
}
mVendorKeyState = VENDOR_KEYS_MODIFIED;
-
+
FindVariable (EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_NV_VARIABLE_NAME, &gEfiVendorKeysNvGuid,
&Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);
Status = UpdateVariable (
EFI_VENDOR_KEYS_NV_VARIABLE_NAME,
@@ -1093,10 +1097,10 @@
UINT8 *Payload;
UINTN PayloadSize;
- if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) == 0 ||
+ if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) == 0 ||
(Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0) {
//
- // PK, KEK and db/dbx should set EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE attribute and
should be a time-based
+ // PK, KEK and db/dbx/dbt should set EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE attribute
and should be a time-based
// authenticated variable.
//
return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
@@ -1221,7 +1225,7 @@
if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) == 0 ||
(Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0) {
//
- // DB and DBX should set EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE attribute and should be
a time-based
+ // DB, DBX and DBT should set EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE attribute and
should be a time-based
// authenticated variable.
//
return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
@@ -1253,7 +1257,7 @@
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
return Status;
}
-
+
Status = UpdateVariable (
VariableName,
VendorGuid,
@@ -1338,23 +1342,23 @@
//
return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
}
-
+
//
// A time-based authenticated variable and a count-based authenticated
variable
// can't be updated by each other.
- //
- if (Variable->CurrPtr != NULL) {
+ //
+ if (Variable->CurrPtr != NULL) {
if (((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) &&
((Variable->CurrPtr->Attributes &
EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0)) {
- return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
+ return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
}
-
- if (((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) !=
0) &&
+
+ if (((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) !=
0) &&
((Variable->CurrPtr->Attributes &
EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0)) {
- return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
+ return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
}
}
-
+
//
// Process Time-based Authenticated variable.
//
@@ -1392,7 +1396,7 @@
KeyIndex = Variable->CurrPtr->PubKeyIndex;
IsFirstTime = FALSE;
}
- } else if ((Variable->CurrPtr != NULL) &&
+ } else if ((Variable->CurrPtr != NULL) &&
((Variable->CurrPtr->Attributes &
(EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS |
EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS)) != 0)
) {
//
@@ -1423,7 +1427,7 @@
if (!IsFirstTime) {
//
// 2 cases need to check here
- // 1. Internal PubKey variable. PubKeyIndex is always 0
+ // 1. Internal PubKey variable. PubKeyIndex is always 0
// 2. Other counter-based AuthVariable. Check input PubKey.
//
if (KeyIndex == 0 || CompareMem (PubKey, mPubKeyStore + (KeyIndex - 1) *
EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE, EFI_CERT_TYPE_RSA2048_SIZE) != 0) {
@@ -1478,7 +1482,7 @@
@param[in, out] Data Pointer to original EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST.
@param[in] DataSize Size of Data buffer.
- @param[in] FreeBufSize Size of free data buffer
+ @param[in] FreeBufSize Size of free data buffer
@param[in] NewData Pointer to new EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST to be
appended.
@param[in] NewDataSize Size of NewData buffer.
@param[out] MergedBufSize Size of the merged buffer
@@ -1714,7 +1718,7 @@
//
// Check whether VariableName matches.
//
- if ((NameSize == StrLen (VariableName)) &&
+ if ((NameSize == StrLen (VariableName)) &&
(CompareMem (Data + Offset, VariableName, NameSize * sizeof
(CHAR16)) == 0)) {
Offset = Offset + NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16);
@@ -1723,7 +1727,7 @@
}
if (CertDataSize != NULL) {
- *CertDataSize = CertSize;
+ *CertDataSize = CertSize;
}
if (CertNodeOffset != NULL) {
@@ -1744,7 +1748,7 @@
}
}
- return EFI_NOT_FOUND;
+ return EFI_NOT_FOUND;
}
/**
@@ -1778,7 +1782,7 @@
if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL) || (CertData == NULL) ||
(CertDataSize == NULL)) {
return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
-
+
//
// Get variable "certdb".
//
@@ -1788,7 +1792,7 @@
&CertDbVariable,
&mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,
FALSE
- );
+ );
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
return Status;
}
@@ -1851,7 +1855,7 @@
if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL)) {
return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
-
+
//
// Get variable "certdb".
//
@@ -1861,7 +1865,7 @@
&CertDbVariable,
&mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,
FALSE
- );
+ );
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
return Status;
}
@@ -1929,8 +1933,8 @@
//
// Set "certdb".
- //
- VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS |
EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS |
EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;
+ //
+ VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS |
EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS |
EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;
Status = UpdateVariable (
EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,
&gEfiCertDbGuid,
@@ -1984,7 +1988,7 @@
if ((VariableName == NULL) || (VendorGuid == NULL) || (CertData == NULL)) {
return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
-
+
//
// Get variable "certdb".
//
@@ -1994,7 +1998,7 @@
&CertDbVariable,
&mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,
FALSE
- );
+ );
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
return Status;
}
@@ -2030,7 +2034,7 @@
// Construct new data content of variable "certdb".
//
NameSize = (UINT32) StrLen (VariableName);
- CertNodeSize = sizeof (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA) + (UINT32) CertDataSize +
NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16);
+ CertNodeSize = sizeof (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA) + (UINT32) CertDataSize +
NameSize * sizeof (CHAR16);
NewCertDbSize = (UINT32) DataSize + CertNodeSize;
if (NewCertDbSize > mMaxCertDbSize) {
return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
@@ -2053,7 +2057,7 @@
CopyMem (&Ptr->CertNodeSize, &CertNodeSize, sizeof (UINT32));
CopyMem (&Ptr->NameSize, &NameSize, sizeof (UINT32));
CopyMem (&Ptr->CertDataSize, &CertDataSize, sizeof (UINT32));
-
+
CopyMem (
(UINT8 *) Ptr + sizeof (AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA),
VariableName,
@@ -2065,11 +2069,11 @@
CertData,
CertDataSize
);
-
+
//
// Set "certdb".
- //
- VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS |
EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS |
EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;
+ //
+ VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS |
EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS |
EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;
Status = UpdateVariable (
EFI_CERT_DB_NAME,
&gEfiCertDbGuid,
@@ -2349,7 +2353,7 @@
} else if (AuthVarType == AuthVarTypePriv) {
//
- // Process common authenticated variable except PK/KEK/DB/DBX.
+ // Process common authenticated variable except PK/KEK/DB/DBX/DBT.
// Get signer's certificates from SignedData.
//
VerifyStatus = Pkcs7GetSigners (
@@ -2376,7 +2380,7 @@
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
goto Exit;
}
-
+
if ((CertStackSize != CertsSizeinDb) ||
(CompareMem (SignerCerts, CertsInCertDb, CertsSizeinDb) != 0)) {
goto Exit;
@@ -2419,7 +2423,7 @@
Cert = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) CertList + sizeof
(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + CertList->SignatureHeaderSize);
RootCert = Cert->SignatureData;
RootCertSize = CertList->SignatureSize - (sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) -
1);
-
+
// Verify Pkcs7 SignedData via Pkcs7Verify library.
//
VerifyStatus = Pkcs7Verify (
@@ -2469,4 +2473,3 @@
&CertData->TimeStamp
);
}
-
Modified: trunk/edk2/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/RuntimeDxe/Variable.c
===================================================================
--- trunk/edk2/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/RuntimeDxe/Variable.c
2014-11-14 00:39:04 UTC (rev 16379)
+++ trunk/edk2/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/RuntimeDxe/Variable.c
2014-11-14 08:41:12 UTC (rev 16380)
@@ -592,14 +592,14 @@
Check the PubKeyIndex is a valid key or not.
- This function will iterate the NV storage to see if this PubKeyIndex is
still referenced
+ This function will iterate the NV storage to see if this PubKeyIndex is
still referenced
by any valid count-based auth variabe.
-
+
@param[in] PubKeyIndex Index of the public key in public key store.
@retval TRUE The PubKeyIndex is still in use.
@retval FALSE The PubKeyIndex is not referenced by any
count-based auth variabe.
-
+
**/
BOOLEAN
IsValidPubKeyIndex (
@@ -617,20 +617,20 @@
VariableStoreEnd = GetEndPointer ((VARIABLE_STORE_HEADER *) (UINTN)
mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal.NonVolatileVariableBase);
while (IsValidVariableHeader (Variable, VariableStoreEnd)) {
- if ((Variable->State == VAR_ADDED || Variable->State ==
(VAR_IN_DELETED_TRANSITION & VAR_ADDED)) &&
+ if ((Variable->State == VAR_ADDED || Variable->State ==
(VAR_IN_DELETED_TRANSITION & VAR_ADDED)) &&
Variable->PubKeyIndex == PubKeyIndex) {
return TRUE;
}
Variable = GetNextVariablePtr (Variable);
}
-
+
return FALSE;
}
/**
Get the number of valid public key in PubKeyStore.
-
+
@param[in] PubKeyNumber Number of the public key in public key store.
@return Number of valid public key in PubKeyStore.
@@ -645,13 +645,13 @@
UINT32 Counter;
Counter = 0;
-
+
for (PubKeyIndex = 1; PubKeyIndex <= PubKeyNumber; PubKeyIndex++) {
if (IsValidPubKeyIndex (PubKeyIndex)) {
Counter++;
}
}
-
+
return Counter;
}
@@ -659,7 +659,7 @@
Filter the useless key in public key store.
- This function will find out all valid public keys in public key database,
save them in new allocated
+ This function will find out all valid public keys in public key database,
save them in new allocated
buffer NewPubKeyStore, and give the new PubKeyIndex. The caller is
responsible for freeing buffer
NewPubKeyIndex and NewPubKeyStore with FreePool().
@@ -668,10 +668,10 @@
@param[out] NewPubKeyIndex Point to an array of new PubKeyIndex
corresponds to NewPubKeyStore.
@param[out] NewPubKeyStore Saved all valid public keys in PubKeyStore.
@param[out] NewPubKeySize Buffer size of the NewPubKeyStore.
-
+
@retval EFI_SUCCESS Trim operation is complete successfully.
@retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES No enough memory resources, or no useless
key in PubKeyStore.
-
+
**/
EFI_STATUS
PubKeyStoreFilter (
@@ -685,7 +685,7 @@
UINT32 PubKeyIndex;
UINT32 CopiedKey;
UINT32 NewPubKeyNumber;
-
+
NewPubKeyNumber = GetValidPubKeyNumber (PubKeyNumber);
if (NewPubKeyNumber == PubKeyNumber) {
return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
@@ -739,7 +739,7 @@
@param[in] NewVariable Pointer to new variable.
@param[in] NewVariableSize New variable size.
@param[in] ReclaimPubKeyStore Reclaim for public key database or
not.
-
+
@return EFI_SUCCESS Reclaim operation has finished
successfully.
@return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES No enough memory resources or variable
space.
@return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR The public key database doesn't exist.
@@ -873,7 +873,7 @@
while (IsValidVariableHeader (Variable, GetEndPointer
(VariableStoreHeader))) {
NextVariable = GetNextVariablePtr (Variable);
if (Variable->State == VAR_ADDED || Variable->State ==
(VAR_IN_DELETED_TRANSITION & VAR_ADDED)) {
- if ((StrCmp (GetVariableNamePtr (Variable), AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME) == 0)
&&
+ if ((StrCmp (GetVariableNamePtr (Variable), AUTHVAR_KEYDB_NAME) == 0)
&&
(CompareGuid (&Variable->VendorGuid,
&gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid))) {
//
// Skip the public key database, it will be reinstalled later.
@@ -882,7 +882,7 @@
Variable = NextVariable;
continue;
}
-
+
VariableSize = (UINTN) NextVariable - (UINTN) Variable;
CopyMem (CurrPtr, (UINT8 *) Variable, VariableSize);
((VARIABLE_HEADER*) CurrPtr)->PubKeyIndex =
NewPubKeyIndex[Variable->PubKeyIndex];
@@ -909,7 +909,7 @@
Variable->DataSize = NewPubKeySize;
StrCpy (GetVariableNamePtr (Variable), GetVariableNamePtr (PubKeyHeader));
CopyMem (GetVariableDataPtr (Variable), NewPubKeyStore, NewPubKeySize);
- CurrPtr = (UINT8*) GetNextVariablePtr (Variable);
+ CurrPtr = (UINT8*) GetNextVariablePtr (Variable);
CommonVariableTotalSize += (UINTN) CurrPtr - (UINTN) Variable;
} else {
//
@@ -1524,7 +1524,7 @@
@param[in] Attributes Variable attributes for Variable entries.
@param ... The variable argument list with type
VARIABLE_ENTRY_CONSISTENCY *.
- A NULL terminates the list. The VariableSize
of
+ A NULL terminates the list. The VariableSize of
VARIABLE_ENTRY_CONSISTENCY is the variable
data size as input.
It will be changed to variable total size as
output.
@@ -1803,7 +1803,7 @@
VariableEntry[0].VariableSize = ISO_639_2_ENTRY_SIZE + 1;
VariableEntry[0].Guid = &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid;
VariableEntry[0].Name = EFI_LANG_VARIABLE_NAME;
-
+
VariableEntry[1].VariableSize = AsciiStrSize (BestPlatformLang);
VariableEntry[1].Guid = &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid;
VariableEntry[1].Name = EFI_PLATFORM_LANG_VARIABLE_NAME;
@@ -2009,7 +2009,7 @@
Status = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
goto Done;
}
-
+
//
// Only variable that have RT attributes can be updated/deleted in
Runtime.
//
@@ -2103,20 +2103,21 @@
CopyMem (BufferForMerge, (UINT8 *) ((UINTN) Variable->CurrPtr +
DataOffset), Variable->CurrPtr->DataSize);
//
- // Set Max Common Variable Data Size as default MaxDataSize
+ // Set Max Common Variable Data Size as default MaxDataSize
//
MaxDataSize = PcdGet32 (PcdMaxVariableSize) - DataOffset;
if ((CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid) &&
- ((StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE) == 0) ||
(StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1) == 0))) ||
- (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid) && (StrCmp
(VariableName, EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME) == 0))) {
+ ((StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE) == 0) ||
(StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1) == 0) ||
+ (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE2) == 0))) ||
+ (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid) && (StrCmp
(VariableName, EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME) == 0))) {
//
// For variables with formatted as EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST, the driver
shall not perform an append of
// EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA values that are already part of the existing
variable value.
//
Status = AppendSignatureList (
BufferForMerge,
- Variable->CurrPtr->DataSize,
+ Variable->CurrPtr->DataSize,
MaxDataSize - Variable->CurrPtr->DataSize,
Data,
DataSize,
@@ -2530,8 +2531,8 @@
/**
Check if a Unicode character is a hexadecimal character.
- This function checks if a Unicode character is a
- hexadecimal character. The valid hexadecimal character is
+ This function checks if a Unicode character is a
+ hexadecimal character. The valid hexadecimal character is
L'0' to L'9', L'a' to L'f', or L'A' to L'F'.
@@ -2701,7 +2702,7 @@
@retval TRUE This variable is read-only variable.
@retval FALSE This variable is NOT read-only variable.
-
+
**/
BOOLEAN
IsReadOnlyVariable (
@@ -2722,7 +2723,7 @@
return TRUE;
}
}
-
+
return FALSE;
}
@@ -3077,8 +3078,8 @@
if ((UINTN)(~0) - PayloadSize < StrSize(VariableName)){
//
- // Prevent whole variable size overflow
- //
+ // Prevent whole variable size overflow
+ //
return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
@@ -3184,8 +3185,9 @@
Status = ProcessVarWithPk (VariableName, VendorGuid, Data, DataSize,
&Variable, Attributes, TRUE);
} else if (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid) && (StrCmp
(VariableName, EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME) == 0)) {
Status = ProcessVarWithPk (VariableName, VendorGuid, Data, DataSize,
&Variable, Attributes, FALSE);
- } else if (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid) &&
- ((StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE) == 0) ||
(StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1) == 0))) {
+ } else if (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid) &&
+ ((StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE) == 0) ||
(StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1) == 0))
+ || (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE2)) == 0) {
Status = ProcessVarWithPk (VariableName, VendorGuid, Data, DataSize,
&Variable, Attributes, FALSE);
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
Status = ProcessVarWithKek (VariableName, VendorGuid, Data, DataSize,
&Variable, Attributes);
@@ -3937,4 +3939,3 @@
return Status;
}
-
Modified:
trunk/edk2/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfig.vfr
===================================================================
---
trunk/edk2/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfig.vfr
2014-11-14 00:39:04 UTC (rev 16379)
+++
trunk/edk2/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfig.vfr
2014-11-14 08:41:12 UTC (rev 16380)
@@ -1,13 +1,13 @@
/** @file
VFR file used by the SecureBoot configuration component.
-Copyright (c) 2011 - 2013, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
-This program and the accompanying materials
-are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD
License
-which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be
found at
+Copyright (c) 2011 - 2014, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
+This program and the accompanying materials
+are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD
License
+which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be
found at
http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php
-THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,
+THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,
WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.
**/
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
varid = SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION_VARSTORE_ID,
name = SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION,
guid = SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_FORM_SET_GUID;
-
+
//
// ##1 Form "Secure Boot Configuration"
//
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@
help = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SECURE_BOOT_STATE_HELP),
text = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SECURE_BOOT_STATE_PROMPT),
text = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SECURE_BOOT_STATE_CONTENT);
-
+
//
// Define of Check Box: Attempt Secure Boot
//
@@ -48,8 +48,8 @@
help = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NULL),
flags = INTERACTIVE,
endcheckbox;
- endif;
-
+ endif;
+
//
// Display of Check Box: Attempt Secure Boot
//
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@
flags = INTERACTIVE | RESET_REQUIRED,
endcheckbox;
endif;
-
+
//
// Display of Oneof: 'Secure Boot Mode'
//
@@ -75,14 +75,14 @@
endoneof;
endif;
oneof name = SecureBootMode,
- questionid = KEY_SECURE_BOOT_MODE,
+ questionid = KEY_SECURE_BOOT_MODE,
prompt = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_PROMPT),
help = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_HELP),
flags = INTERACTIVE | NUMERIC_SIZE_1,
option text = STRING_TOKEN(STR_STANDARD_MODE), value =
SECURE_BOOT_MODE_STANDARD, flags = DEFAULT;
option text = STRING_TOKEN(STR_CUSTOM_MODE), value =
SECURE_BOOT_MODE_CUSTOM, flags = 0;
endoneof;
-
+
//
//
// Display of 'Current Secure Boot Mode'
@@ -97,55 +97,63 @@
endif;
endif;
endform;
-
+
//
// ##2 Form: 'Custom Secure Boot Options'
//
form formid = FORMID_SECURE_BOOT_OPTION_FORM,
title = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SECURE_BOOT_OPTION_TITLE);
-
+
subtitle text = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NULL);
-
+
goto FORMID_SECURE_BOOT_PK_OPTION_FORM,
prompt = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SECURE_BOOT_PK_OPTION),
help = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SECURE_BOOT_PK_OPTION_HELP),
flags = INTERACTIVE,
key = KEY_SECURE_BOOT_PK_OPTION;
-
+
subtitle text = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NULL);
-
+
goto FORMID_SECURE_BOOT_KEK_OPTION_FORM,
prompt = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SECURE_BOOT_KEK_OPTION),
help = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SECURE_BOOT_KEK_OPTION_HELP),
flags = INTERACTIVE,
key = KEY_SECURE_BOOT_KEK_OPTION;
-
+
subtitle text = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NULL);
-
+
goto FORMID_SECURE_BOOT_DB_OPTION_FORM,
prompt = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SECURE_BOOT_DB_OPTION),
help = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SECURE_BOOT_DB_OPTION_HELP),
flags = INTERACTIVE,
key = KEY_SECURE_BOOT_DB_OPTION;
-
+
subtitle text = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NULL);
-
+
goto FORMID_SECURE_BOOT_DBX_OPTION_FORM,
prompt = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SECURE_BOOT_DBX_OPTION),
help = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SECURE_BOOT_DBX_OPTION_HELP),
flags = INTERACTIVE,
key = KEY_SECURE_BOOT_DBX_OPTION;
+ subtitle text = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NULL);
+
+ goto FORMID_SECURE_BOOT_DBT_OPTION_FORM,
+ prompt = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SECURE_BOOT_DBT_OPTION),
+ help = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SECURE_BOOT_DBT_OPTION_HELP),
+ flags = INTERACTIVE,
+ key = KEY_SECURE_BOOT_DBT_OPTION;
+
endform;
-
+
//
// ##3 Form: 'PK Options'
//
form formid = FORMID_SECURE_BOOT_PK_OPTION_FORM,
title = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SECURE_BOOT_PK_OPTION);
-
+
subtitle text = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NULL);
-
+
//
// Define of Check Box: 'Delete PK'
//
@@ -155,7 +163,7 @@
help = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NULL),
endcheckbox;
endif;
-
+
grayoutif ideqval SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION.HasPk == 1;
goto FORMID_ENROLL_PK_FORM,
prompt = STRING_TOKEN(STR_ENROLL_PK),
@@ -163,28 +171,28 @@
flags = INTERACTIVE,
key = KEY_ENROLL_PK;
endif;
-
+
subtitle text = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NULL);
-
+
//
- // Display of Check Box: 'Delete Pk'
+ // Display of Check Box: 'Delete Pk'
//
grayoutif ideqval SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION.HideSecureBoot == 1;
checkbox varid = SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION.DeletePk,
questionid = KEY_SECURE_BOOT_DELETE_PK,
- prompt = STRING_TOKEN(STR_DELETE_PK),
+ prompt = STRING_TOKEN(STR_DELETE_PK),
help = STRING_TOKEN(STR_DELETE_PK_HELP),
flags = INTERACTIVE | RESET_REQUIRED,
endcheckbox;
endif;
endform;
-
+
//
// ##4 Form: 'Enroll PK'
//
form formid = FORMID_ENROLL_PK_FORM,
title = STRING_TOKEN(STR_ENROLL_PK);
-
+
subtitle text = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NULL);
goto FORM_FILE_EXPLORER_ID_PK,
@@ -193,7 +201,7 @@
flags = INTERACTIVE,
key = SECUREBOOT_ADD_PK_FILE_FORM_ID;
endform;
-
+
//
// ##5 Form: 'KEK Options'
//
@@ -201,29 +209,29 @@
title = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SECURE_BOOT_KEK_OPTION);
//
- // Display of 'Enroll KEK'
+ // Display of 'Enroll KEK'
//
goto FORMID_ENROLL_KEK_FORM,
prompt = STRING_TOKEN(STR_ENROLL_KEK),
help = STRING_TOKEN(STR_ENROLL_KEK_HELP),
flags = INTERACTIVE;
-
- subtitle text = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NULL);
-
+
+ subtitle text = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NULL);
+
//
- // Display of 'Delete KEK'
+ // Display of 'Delete KEK'
//
goto FORMID_DELETE_KEK_FORM,
prompt = STRING_TOKEN(STR_DELETE_KEK),
help = STRING_TOKEN(STR_DELETE_KEK_HELP),
flags = INTERACTIVE,
key = KEY_DELETE_KEK;
-
- subtitle text = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NULL);
+
+ subtitle text = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NULL);
endform;
//
- // ##6 Form: 'Enroll KEK'
+ // ##6 Form: 'Enroll KEK'
//
form formid = FORMID_ENROLL_KEK_FORM,
title = STRING_TOKEN(STR_ENROLL_KEK_TITLE);
@@ -258,7 +266,7 @@
help = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SAVE_AND_EXIT),
flags = INTERACTIVE,
key = KEY_VALUE_SAVE_AND_EXIT_KEK;
-
+
goto FORMID_SECURE_BOOT_OPTION_FORM,
prompt = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NO_SAVE_AND_EXIT),
help = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NO_SAVE_AND_EXIT),
@@ -269,15 +277,15 @@
//
// ##7 Form: 'Delete KEK'
- //
+ //
form formid = FORMID_DELETE_KEK_FORM,
title = STRING_TOKEN(STR_DELETE_KEK_TITLE);
label LABEL_KEK_DELETE;
label LABEL_END;
-
+
subtitle text = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NULL);
-
+
endform;
//
@@ -300,7 +308,7 @@
help = STRING_TOKEN (STR_SECURE_BOOT_DELETE_SIGNATURE),
flags = INTERACTIVE,
key = SECUREBOOT_DELETE_SIGNATURE_FROM_DB;
-
+
endform;
//
@@ -327,6 +335,29 @@
endform;
//
+ // ##9 Form: 'DBT Options'
+ //
+ form formid = FORMID_SECURE_BOOT_DBT_OPTION_FORM,
+ title = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SECURE_BOOT_DBT_OPTION);
+
+ subtitle text = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NULL);
+
+ goto SECUREBOOT_ENROLL_SIGNATURE_TO_DBT,
+ prompt = STRING_TOKEN (STR_SECURE_BOOT_ENROLL_SIGNATURE),
+ help = STRING_TOKEN (STR_SECURE_BOOT_ENROLL_SIGNATURE),
+ flags = 0;
+
+ subtitle text = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NULL);
+
+ goto SECUREBOOT_DELETE_SIGNATURE_FROM_DBT,
+ prompt = STRING_TOKEN (STR_SECURE_BOOT_DELETE_SIGNATURE),
+ help = STRING_TOKEN (STR_SECURE_BOOT_DELETE_SIGNATURE),
+ flags = INTERACTIVE,
+ key = SECUREBOOT_DELETE_SIGNATURE_FROM_DBT;
+
+ endform;
+
+ //
// Form: 'Delete Signature' for DB Options.
//
form formid = SECUREBOOT_DELETE_SIGNATURE_FROM_DB,
@@ -335,7 +366,7 @@
label LABEL_DB_DELETE;
label LABEL_END;
subtitle text = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NULL);
-
+
endform;
//
@@ -347,10 +378,22 @@
label LABEL_DBX_DELETE;
label LABEL_END;
subtitle text = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NULL);
-
+
endform;
//
+ // Form: 'Delete Signature' for DBT Options.
+ //
+ form formid = SECUREBOOT_DELETE_SIGNATURE_FROM_DBT,
+ title = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SECURE_BOOT_DELETE_SIGNATURE);
+
+ label LABEL_DBT_DELETE;
+ label LABEL_END;
+ subtitle text = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NULL);
+
+ endform;
+
+ //
// Form: 'Enroll Signature' for DB options.
//
form formid = SECUREBOOT_ENROLL_SIGNATURE_TO_DB,
@@ -386,7 +429,7 @@
help = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SAVE_AND_EXIT),
flags = INTERACTIVE,
key = KEY_VALUE_SAVE_AND_EXIT_DB;
-
+
goto FORMID_SECURE_BOOT_OPTION_FORM,
prompt = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NO_SAVE_AND_EXIT),
help = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NO_SAVE_AND_EXIT),
@@ -409,7 +452,6 @@
flags = INTERACTIVE,
key = SECUREBOOT_ENROLL_SIGNATURE_TO_DBX;
- subtitle text = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NULL);
label SECUREBOOT_ENROLL_SIGNATURE_TO_DBX;
label LABEL_END;
subtitle text = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NULL);
@@ -423,6 +465,38 @@
maxsize = SECURE_BOOT_GUID_SIZE,
endstring;
+ oneof name = SignatureFormatInDbx,
+ varid = SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION.CertificateFormat,
+ prompt = STRING_TOKEN(STR_DBX_CERTIFICATE_FORMAT_PROMPT),
+ help = STRING_TOKEN(STR_DBX_CERTIFICATE_FORMAT_HELP),
+ option text = STRING_TOKEN(STR_DBX_CERTIFICATE_FORMAT_SHA256), value
= 0x2, flags = DEFAULT;
+ option text = STRING_TOKEN(STR_DBX_CERTIFICATE_FORMAT_SHA384), value
= 0x3, flags = 0;
+ option text = STRING_TOKEN(STR_DBX_CERTIFICATE_FORMAT_SHA512), value
= 0x4, flags = 0;
+ option text = STRING_TOKEN(STR_DBX_CERTIFICATE_FORMAT_RAW), value =
0x5, flags = 0;
+ endoneof;
+
+ suppressif ideqval SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION.CertificateFormat == 5;
+ checkbox varid = SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION.AlwaysRevocation,
+ prompt = STRING_TOKEN(STR_ALWAYS_CERTIFICATE_REVOCATION_PROMPT),
+ help = STRING_TOKEN(STR_ALWAYS_CERTIFICATE_REVOCATION_HELP),
+ flags = INTERACTIVE,
+ endcheckbox;
+
+ suppressif ideqval SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION.AlwaysRevocation == 1;
+ date varid = SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION.RevocationDate,
+ prompt =
STRING_TOKEN(STR_CERTIFICATE_REVOCATION_DATE_PROMPT),
+ help = STRING_TOKEN(STR_CERTIFICATE_REVOCATION_DATE_HELP),
+ flags = STORAGE_NORMAL,
+ enddate;
+
+ time varid = SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION.RevocationTime,
+ prompt =
STRING_TOKEN(STR_CERTIFICATE_REVOCATION_TIME_PROMPT),
+ help = STRING_TOKEN(STR_CERTIFICATE_REVOCATION_TIME_HELP),
+ flags = STORAGE_NORMAL,
+ endtime;
+ endif;
+ endif;
+
subtitle text = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NULL);
subtitle text = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NULL);
@@ -431,7 +505,7 @@
help = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SAVE_AND_EXIT),
flags = INTERACTIVE,
key = KEY_VALUE_SAVE_AND_EXIT_DBX;
-
+
goto FORMID_SECURE_BOOT_OPTION_FORM,
prompt = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NO_SAVE_AND_EXIT),
help = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NO_SAVE_AND_EXIT),
@@ -441,6 +515,51 @@
endform;
//
+ // Form: 'Enroll Signature' for DBT options.
+ //
+ form formid = SECUREBOOT_ENROLL_SIGNATURE_TO_DBT,
+ title = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SECURE_BOOT_ENROLL_SIGNATURE);
+
+ subtitle text = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NULL);
+
+ goto FORM_FILE_EXPLORER_ID_DBT,
+ prompt = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SECURE_BOOT_ADD_SIGNATURE_FILE),
+ help = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SECURE_BOOT_ADD_SIGNATURE_FILE),
+ flags = INTERACTIVE,
+ key = SECUREBOOT_ENROLL_SIGNATURE_TO_DBT;
+
+ subtitle text = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NULL);
+ label SECUREBOOT_ENROLL_SIGNATURE_TO_DBT;
+ label LABEL_END;
+ subtitle text = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NULL);
+
+ string varid = SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION.SignatureGuid,
+ prompt = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SECURE_BOOT_SIGNATURE_GUID),
+ help = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SECURE_BOOT_SIGNATURE_GUID_HELP),
+ flags = INTERACTIVE,
+ key = KEY_SECURE_BOOT_SIGNATURE_GUID_DBT,
+ minsize = SECURE_BOOT_GUID_SIZE,
+ maxsize = SECURE_BOOT_GUID_SIZE,
+ endstring;
+
+ subtitle text = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NULL);
+ subtitle text = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NULL);
+
+ goto FORMID_SECURE_BOOT_OPTION_FORM,
+ prompt = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SAVE_AND_EXIT),
+ help = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SAVE_AND_EXIT),
+ flags = INTERACTIVE,
+ key = KEY_VALUE_SAVE_AND_EXIT_DBT;
+
+ goto FORMID_SECURE_BOOT_OPTION_FORM,
+ prompt = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NO_SAVE_AND_EXIT),
+ help = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NO_SAVE_AND_EXIT),
+ flags = INTERACTIVE,
+ key = KEY_VALUE_NO_SAVE_AND_EXIT_DBT;
+
+ endform;
+
+ //
// File Explorer for PK
//
form formid = FORM_FILE_EXPLORER_ID_PK,
@@ -449,7 +568,7 @@
label FORM_FILE_EXPLORER_ID;
label LABEL_END;
endform;
-
+
//
// File Explorer for KEK
//
@@ -480,7 +599,16 @@
label LABEL_END;
endform;
+ //
+ // File Explorer for DBT
+ //
+ form formid = FORM_FILE_EXPLORER_ID_DBT,
+ title = STRING_TOKEN(STR_FILE_EXPLORER_TITLE);
+ label FORM_FILE_EXPLORER_ID;
+ label LABEL_END;
+ endform;
+
//
// Enroll Pk from File Commit Form
//
@@ -489,21 +617,23 @@
label SECUREBOOT_ADD_PK_FILE_FORM_ID;
label LABEL_END;
-
+
subtitle text = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NULL);
text
help = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SAVE_AND_EXIT),
text = STRING_TOKEN(STR_SAVE_AND_EXIT),
+ text = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NULL),
flags = INTERACTIVE,
key = KEY_VALUE_SAVE_AND_EXIT_PK;
text
help = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NO_SAVE_AND_EXIT),
text = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NO_SAVE_AND_EXIT),
+ text = STRING_TOKEN(STR_NULL),
flags = INTERACTIVE,
key = KEY_VALUE_NO_SAVE_AND_EXIT_PK;
endform;
-endformset;
+endformset;
\ No newline at end of file
Modified:
trunk/edk2/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigDxe.inf
===================================================================
---
trunk/edk2/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigDxe.inf
2014-11-14 00:39:04 UTC (rev 16379)
+++
trunk/edk2/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigDxe.inf
2014-11-14 08:41:12 UTC (rev 16380)
@@ -62,40 +62,40 @@
## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES ## Variable:L"CustomMode"
## SOMETIMES_PRODUCES ## Variable:L"CustomMode"
gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid
-
+
## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES ## Variable:L"SecureBootEnable"
## SOMETIMES_PRODUCES ## Variable:L"SecureBootEnable"
gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid
-
+
## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES ## GUID # Unique ID for the type of
the signature.
## SOMETIMES_PRODUCES ## GUID # Unique ID for the type of
the signature.
gEfiCertRsa2048Guid
-
+
## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES ## GUID # Unique ID for the type of
the signature.
- ## SOMETIMES_PRODUCES ## GUID # Unique ID for the type of
the signature.
+ ## SOMETIMES_PRODUCES ## GUID # Unique ID for the type of
the signature.
gEfiCertX509Guid
-
+
## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES ## GUID # Unique ID for the type of
the signature.
- ## SOMETIMES_PRODUCES ## GUID # Unique ID for the type of
the signature.
+ ## SOMETIMES_PRODUCES ## GUID # Unique ID for the type of
the signature.
gEfiCertSha1Guid
-
+
## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES ## GUID # Unique ID for the type of
the signature.
- ## SOMETIMES_PRODUCES ## GUID # Unique ID for the type of
the signature.
+ ## SOMETIMES_PRODUCES ## GUID # Unique ID for the type of
the signature.
gEfiCertSha256Guid
-
+
## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES ## Variable:L"db"
## SOMETIMES_PRODUCES ## Variable:L"db"
## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES ## Variable:L"dbx"
## SOMETIMES_PRODUCES ## Variable:L"dbx"
gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid
-
+
## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES ## Variable:L"SetupMode"
## SOMETIMES_PRODUCES ## Variable:L"PK"
## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES ## Variable:L"KEK"
## SOMETIMES_PRODUCES ## Variable:L"KEK"
## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES ## Variable:L"SecureBoot"
gEfiGlobalVariableGuid
-
+
gEfiIfrTianoGuid ## PRODUCES ## GUID
# HII opcode
## PRODUCES ## HII
## CONSUMES ## HII
@@ -105,6 +105,10 @@
gEfiFileSystemVolumeLabelInfoIdGuid ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES ## GUID
# Indicate the information type
gEfiFileInfoGuid ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES ## GUID
# Indicate the information type
+ gEfiCertX509Sha256Guid ## SOMETIMES_PRODUCES ## GUID
# Unique ID for the type of the certificate.
+ gEfiCertX509Sha384Guid ## SOMETIMES_PRODUCES ## GUID
# Unique ID for the type of the certificate.
+ gEfiCertX509Sha512Guid ## SOMETIMES_PRODUCES ## GUID
# Unique ID for the type of the certificate.
+
[Protocols]
gEfiHiiConfigAccessProtocolGuid ## PRODUCES
gEfiDevicePathProtocolGuid ## PRODUCES
@@ -119,4 +123,3 @@
[UserExtensions.TianoCore."ExtraFiles"]
SecureBootConfigDxeExtra.uni
-
\ No newline at end of file
Modified:
trunk/edk2/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigFileExplorer.c
===================================================================
---
trunk/edk2/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigFileExplorer.c
2014-11-14 00:39:04 UTC (rev 16379)
+++
trunk/edk2/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigFileExplorer.c
2014-11-14 08:41:12 UTC (rev 16380)
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@
}
/**
- Helper function called as part of the code needed to allocate
+ Helper function called as part of the code needed to allocate
the proper sized buffer for various EFI interfaces.
@param[in, out] Status Current status
@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@
}
/**
- Append file name to existing file name, and allocate a new buffer
+ Append file name to existing file name, and allocate a new buffer
to hold the appended result.
@param[in] Str1 The existing file name
@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@
Str = AllocateZeroPool (Size1 + Size2 + sizeof (CHAR16));
ASSERT (Str != NULL);
- TmpStr = AllocateZeroPool (Size1 + Size2 + sizeof (CHAR16));
+ TmpStr = AllocateZeroPool (Size1 + Size2 + sizeof (CHAR16));
ASSERT (TmpStr != NULL);
StrCat (Str, Str1);
@@ -170,7 +170,7 @@
//
//
- // Use TmpStr as a backup, as StrCpy in BaseLib does not handle copy of
two strings
+ // Use TmpStr as a backup, as StrCpy in BaseLib does not handle copy of
two strings
// that overlap.
//
StrCpy (TmpStr, Ptr + 3);
@@ -182,7 +182,7 @@
//
//
- // Use TmpStr as a backup, as StrCpy in BaseLib does not handle copy of
two strings
+ // Use TmpStr as a backup, as StrCpy in BaseLib does not handle copy of
two strings
// that overlap.
//
StrCpy (TmpStr, Ptr + 2);
@@ -196,7 +196,7 @@
}
FreePool (TmpStr);
-
+
return Str;
}
@@ -354,7 +354,7 @@
Free resources allocated in Allocate Rountine.
@param[in, out] MenuOption Menu to be freed
-
+
**/
VOID
FreeMenu (
@@ -459,7 +459,7 @@
This function opens a file with the open mode according to the file path. The
Attributes is valid only for EFI_FILE_MODE_CREATE.
- @param[in, out] FilePath On input, the device path to the file.
+ @param[in, out] FilePath On input, the device path to the file.
On output, the remaining device path.
@param[out] FileHandle Pointer to the file handle.
@param[in] OpenMode The mode to open the file with.
@@ -495,7 +495,7 @@
EFI_SIMPLE_FILE_SYSTEM_PROTOCOL *EfiSimpleFileSystemProtocol;
EFI_FILE_PROTOCOL *Handle1;
EFI_FILE_PROTOCOL *Handle2;
- EFI_HANDLE DeviceHandle;
+ EFI_HANDLE DeviceHandle;
if ((FilePath == NULL || FileHandle == NULL)) {
return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
@@ -816,7 +816,7 @@
if (NoSimpleFsHandles != 0) {
FreePool (SimpleFsHandle);
}
-
+
//
// Remember how many file system options are here
//
@@ -826,7 +826,7 @@
/**
- Find files under the current directory. All files and sub-directories
+ Find files under the current directory. All files and sub-directories
in current directory will be stored in DirectoryMenu for future use.
@param[in] MenuEntry The Menu Entry.
@@ -892,7 +892,7 @@
if (DirInfo == NULL) {
return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
}
-
+
//
// Get all files in current directory
// Pass 1 to get Directories
@@ -934,7 +934,7 @@
NewFileContext->FileName
);
NewMenuEntry->HelpString = NULL;
-
+
NewFileContext->IsDir = (BOOLEAN) ((DirInfo->Attribute &
EFI_FILE_DIRECTORY) == EFI_FILE_DIRECTORY);
if (NewFileContext->IsDir) {
BufferSize = StrLen (DirInfo->FileName) * 2 + 6;
@@ -977,7 +977,7 @@
{
//
// Free current updated date
- //
+ //
if (mStartOpCodeHandle != NULL) {
HiiFreeOpCodeHandle (mStartOpCodeHandle);
}
@@ -1032,6 +1032,9 @@
} else if (FeCurrentState == FileExplorerStateEnrollSignatureFileToDbx) {
FormId = SECUREBOOT_ENROLL_SIGNATURE_TO_DBX;
FileFormId = FORM_FILE_EXPLORER_ID_DBX;
+ } else if (FeCurrentState == FileExplorerStateEnrollSignatureFileToDbt) {
+ FormId = SECUREBOOT_ENROLL_SIGNATURE_TO_DBT;
+ FileFormId = FORM_FILE_EXPLORER_ID_DBT;
} else {
return;
}
@@ -1118,7 +1121,7 @@
//
FreeMenu (&FsOptionMenu);
FindFileSystem ();
-
+
CreateMenuStringToken (PrivateData->HiiHandle, &FsOptionMenu);
UpdateFileExplorePage (PrivateData->HiiHandle, &FsOptionMenu,
PrivateData->FeCurrentState);
@@ -1156,13 +1159,15 @@
FormId = SECUREBOOT_ENROLL_SIGNATURE_TO_DB;
} else if (PrivateData->FeCurrentState ==
FileExplorerStateEnrollSignatureFileToDbx) {
FormId = SECUREBOOT_ENROLL_SIGNATURE_TO_DBX;
+ } else if (PrivateData->FeCurrentState ==
FileExplorerStateEnrollSignatureFileToDbt) {
+ FormId = SECUREBOOT_ENROLL_SIGNATURE_TO_DBT;
} else {
return FALSE;
}
PrivateData->MenuEntry = NewMenuEntry;
PrivateData->FileContext->FileName = NewFileContext->FileName;
-
+
TmpDevicePath = NewFileContext->DevicePath;
OpenFileByDevicePath (
&TmpDevicePath,
@@ -1200,7 +1205,7 @@
}
/**
- Clean up the dynamic opcode at label and form specified by both LabelId.
+ Clean up the dynamic opcode at label and form specified by both LabelId.
@param[in] LabelId It is both the Form ID and Label ID for opcode
deletion.
@param[in] PrivateData Module private data.
@@ -1226,4 +1231,3 @@
mEndOpCodeHandle // LABEL_END
);
}
-
Modified:
trunk/edk2/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigImpl.c
===================================================================
---
trunk/edk2/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigImpl.c
2014-11-14 00:39:04 UTC (rev 16379)
+++
trunk/edk2/SecurityPkg/VariableAuthenticated/SecureBootConfigDxe/SecureBootConfigImpl.c
2014-11-14 08:41:12 UTC (rev 16380)
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
CHAR16 mSecureBootStorageName[] = L"SECUREBOOT_CONFIGURATION";
SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA mSecureBootConfigPrivateDateTemplate = {
- SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA_SIGNATURE,
+ SECUREBOOT_CONFIG_PRIVATE_DATA_SIGNATURE,
{
SecureBootExtractConfig,
SecureBootRouteConfig,
@@ -63,16 +63,16 @@
};
HASH_TABLE mHash[] = {
- { L"SHA1", 20, &mHashOidValue[8], 5, Sha1GetContextSize, Sha1Init,
Sha1Update, Sha1Final },
- { L"SHA224", 28, &mHashOidValue[13], 9, NULL, NULL,
NULL, NULL },
- { L"SHA256", 32, &mHashOidValue[22], 9, Sha256GetContextSize,Sha256Init,
Sha256Update, Sha256Final},
@@ Diff output truncated at 100000 characters. @@
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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